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ARTICLE
THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NATIONS
Anthony J. Bellia Jr.*
Bradford R. Clark**
Courts and scholars have vigorously debated the proper role of customary international law in American courts: To what extent should it be considered federal common law, state law, or general law? The debate has
reached something of an impasse, in part because various positions rely on,
but also are in tension with, historical practice and constitutional structure.
This Article describes the role that the law of nations actually has played
throughout American history. In keeping with the original constitutional
design, federal courts for much of that history enforced certain rules respecting other nations’ “perfect rights” (or close analogues) under the law of nations as an incident of political branch recognition of foreign nations, and
in order to restrain the judiciary and the states from giving other nations just
cause for war against the United States. Rather than viewing enforcement of
the law of nations as an Article III power to fashion federal common law,
federal courts have instead applied rules derived from the law of nations as a
way to implement the political branches’ Article I and Article II powers to
recognize foreign nations, conduct foreign relations, and decide momentous
questions of war and peace. This allocation of powers approach best explains the most important federal cases involving the law of nations across
American history. This Article does not attempt to settle all questions of how
customary international law interacts with the federal system. It does aspire,
however, to recover largely forgotten historical and structural context crucial
to any proper resolution of such questions.

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE ENGLISH SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . .
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INTRODUCTION
There is an ongoing debate among courts and scholars regarding
the proper role of customary international law in American courts.1 Two
1. Customary international law generally refers to law that “results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (1987).
Today, “customary international law” is generally used in lieu of the customary “law of
nations.” See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (equating “customary international law” with “the law of nations”). In this
Article, we generally use the phrase, “the law of nations” to refer to the customary law of
nations as opposed to treaties.
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diametrically opposed approaches have emerged. The “modern” position asserts that federal and state courts should recognize and enforce
customary international law as supreme federal law whether or not the
political branches have incorporated it through constitutional lawmaking
processes.2 Proponents of this position maintain that courts should recognize customary international law as a form of federal common law and
treat it as both preemptive of state law and sufficient to establish federal
“arising under” jurisdiction.3 The “revisionist” position, by contrast, asserts that customary international law is federal law only to the extent that
the political branches have properly incorporated it; otherwise, it may
operate as state law if a state has incorporated it.4

2. See Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of
International Law, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 295, 295; Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s
Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 Fordham L.
Rev. 463, 472 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111
Harv. L. Rev. 1824, 1825 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About
Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66
Fordham L. Rev. 371, 371–72 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary
International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 393, 393–94 (1997). For a
more cautious endorsement of judicial power “to make federal common law interstitially in
the area of foreign affairs to serve important federal interests,” see Daniel J. Meltzer,
Customary International Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal Common Law, 42 Va. J. Int’l L.
513, 536 (2002).
3. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886–87 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that “[t]he
law of nations forms an integral part of the common law, and . . . became a part of the
common law of the United States upon the adoption of the Constitution” and that “[f]ederal
jurisdiction over cases involving international law is clear”). Proponents of the modern
position argue that customary international law qualifies as “Law[ ] of the United States”
for purposes of the Supremacy and Arising Under Clauses. See Louis Henkin,
International Law as Law in the United States, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1555, 1559–60 (1984).
4. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 870 (1997); see
also Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L.
Rev. 665, 670–73 (1986) (“[C]ustomary international law has not traditionally been
applied by American courts, nor should it be.”). A few scholars reject both the modern
and revisionist positions in favor of a third approach: Courts should treat customary
international law as neither federal nor state law, but rather as a source of nonbinding
transnational law. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Constitution’s Text in Foreign Affairs
342–61 (2007) (recognizing that the law of nations is enforceable in federal courts as a
rule of decision if it “does not displace otherwise-constitutional state or federal law”);
Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 Va. J. Int’l
L. 365, 369–70 (2002) (arguing customary international law is neither state nor federal law,
but “general” law that “would remain available for both state and federal courts to apply in
appropriate cases as determined by traditional principles of the conflict of laws”); see also
Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 1205,
1251 (1988) (contending American courts cannot force the President to comply with
international law); Arthur M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International
Cases, 20 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 48–49 (1995) (analogizing customary international law to “the
law of a foreign country,” only applicable in “American courts in appropriate cases”).
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No consensus has emerged from this impressive body of scholarship,5 and the Supreme Court has not recently addressed the issue.6 Adherents of the modern and revisionist positions dispute what historical
practice evinces and what the constitutional structure requires regarding
the role of customary international law in the federal system. Critics of
the modern position maintain that it “is in tension with basic notions of
American representative democracy” because “[w]hen a federal court applies [customary international law] as federal common law, it is not applying law generated by U.S. lawmaking processes.”7 These critics contend
that the modern position disregards the historical reality that before the
Supreme Court decided Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins in 1938,8 customary
international law was not regarded as federal law, but as a species of nonpreemptive “general law.”9 Erie, they say, banished general law from federal courts and established that state law applies “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress.”10
In response, critics of the revisionist position argue that it fails to
account for the Constitution’s assignment of foreign relations authority
to the federal government rather than the states. In their view, the revisionist position contravenes the Constitution’s basic allocation of foreign
affairs power by allowing states to determine the force and effect of customary international law.11 In addition, they contend that the revisionist
position disregards a long line of statements, stretching back to the
founding, by federal judges and public officials that the customary law of
nations12—today known as “customary international law”13—is “part of
the law of the land.”14 The critics argue that these public actors necessarily understood the law of nations to be preemptive of state law (and perhaps even federal statutes) as well as sufficient to generate Article III aris5. For an insightful evaluation of the modern and revisionist positions, see Young,
supra note 4, at 372–463.
6. Although the Court recently interpreted the Alien Tort Statute to incorporate
some principles of the law of nations, see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), it
has not more broadly addressed the status of customary international law in U.S. courts
absent federal statutory incorporation since its decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). These decisions are discussed infra Part IV.
7. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 857.
8. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
9. See Young, supra note 4, at 393 (explaining that “virtually all participants in the
customary law debate agree” that customary international law had the status of general law
before Erie).
10. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
11. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 2, at 1850–52 (arguing that modern position preserves
national authority over foreign affairs).
12. See infra Part I.A.2 (describing various branches of the law of nations).
13. See supra note 1 (defining customary international law and noting that it has
replaced the older phrase “the law of nations”).
14. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, In Their Own Words: Affirmations of the Founders,
Framers, and Early Judiciary Concerning the Binding Nature of the Customary Law of
Nations, 14 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 205 passim (2008).
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ing under jurisdiction.15 In light of the vast gap between these
competing claims and critiques, the debate over the role of customary
international law in the American federal system has reached something
of a stalemate.
In this Article, we argue that the law of nations has interacted with
the American federal system in a way that neither the modern nor the
revisionist position fairly captures. The Supreme Court has treated certain aspects of the law of nations as a set of background rules to guide its
implementation of the Constitution’s allocation of powers. Specifically,
the Court has respected foreign sovereigns’ “perfect rights” (and close
analogues) as a means of ensuring that any decision to commit the nation
to war would rest exclusively with the political branches, and not with the
judiciary or the states. Indeed, when application of other aspects of the
law of nations would risk embroiling the nation in war, the Court has
declined to apply them in order to preserve political branch authority.
The current debate over the status of customary international law has
paid insufficient attention to the relationship between the law of nations
and the Constitution’s allocation of powers. To be sure, scholars on either side look to the founding and early judicial precedent to evaluate
whether, as a matter of original understanding, courts have authority to
take the lead over the political branches in adopting customary international law as the supreme law of the United States.16 But their historical
accounts are either incomplete or anachronistic, often recasting history
in a post-Erie mold. After the founding, public officials and judges initially debated a question similar to the one that dominates customary international law debates today: whether federal courts have Article III
power to adopt the law of nations as part of a preemptive, jurisdictiontriggering federal common law. They ultimately moved beyond this question, concluding that the constitutional structure precludes the existence
of a federal municipal common law. Instead, they recognized the perfect
rights of sovereigns as essential background for understanding the
Constitution’s allocation of powers.
This Article recovers this lost context and, in the process, identifies a
third way to conceptualize how important aspects of the law of nations
have interacted with the federal system. Our account recaptures the
15. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights
Treaties Are Law of the United States, 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 301, 301 (1998) (“The Founders
clearly expected that customary law of nations was binding, was supreme law . . . and would
be applicable in United States federal courts.”); Stephens, supra note 2, at 416–17 &
nn.113 & 118 (citing eighteenth and nineteenth century Attorney General opinions and
nineteenth century cases).
16. Compare, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, International Law as Law of the United States 7–8
(2003) (arguing that early practice demonstrates understanding that courts may enforce
customary international law as preemptive federal law), and Koh, supra note 2, at 1825
(same), with Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 822–26 (arguing that early practice
demonstrates understanding that courts did not enforce customary international law as
preemptive federal law).
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Founders’ understanding of core aspects of the law of nations and best
describes the Supreme Court’s reliance on such law in key cases throughout American history. This allocation of powers approach helps alleviate
the apparent tension between federal control over foreign affairs
(stressed by proponents of the modern position) and the Constitution’s
federal lawmaking procedures (emphasized by proponents of the revisionist position).
In the late eighteenth century, a foundational principle of the law of
nations was that each nation should reciprocally respect certain perfect
rights of every other nation to exercise territorial sovereignty, conduct
diplomatic relations, exercise neutral rights, and peaceably enjoy liberty.17 The perfect rights of sovereigns were so fundamental that interference with them provided just cause for war.18 Thus, respect for these
rights was essential to maintaining international peace. This idea was
ubiquitous in English and American legal thought at the time of the
founding.
The Founders understood the need to respect perfect rights of sovereigns in order to avoid embroiling the fledgling United States in foreign
conflict. This background provides essential context for understanding
the Constitution’s allocation of powers to the federal political branches to
recognize foreign nations and make war and peace.19 The Founders also
authorized federal court jurisdiction over several categories of cases implicating the law of nations.20 By simultaneously allocating authority to
the federal political branches over foreign relations and jurisdiction to
the federal judiciary over cases likely to implicate the law of nations, the
Founders established complementary, not conflicting, powers.
From ratification through the War of 1812, the Supreme Court employed the law of nations to respect perfect rights and, in the process,
upheld constitutional prerogatives of the federal political branches in foreign relations. Over time, judges increasingly grounded their decisions
in the Constitution’s allocation of foreign relations powers to the political
branches. In the twentieth century, the Court continued to respect what
were historically considered perfect rights, but recognized that the
Constitution’s allocation of foreign relations powers also required the judiciary to apply at least some principles of modern customary international law as well.
It is not our purpose to settle all questions regarding the role of customary international law in the federal system. Rather, we seek to identify
the role that certain aspects of the law of nations actually have played
throughout American history in light of the constitutional structure. In
context, historical practice does not evince a principle that all of the law
of nations necessarily functioned as preemptive federal law. Much of
17.
18.
19.
20.

Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations *145, *302; see infra Part I.A.2.
Vattel, supra note 17, at *lxii–lxiii.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
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what was regarded as part of the law of nations—the law merchant, for
example—was never understood to operate as preemptive federal law, by
incorporation or otherwise. But neither does historical practice evince a
principle that rules derived from the law of nations could never trigger
federal preemption. Instead, history and structure demonstrate that
courts have applied certain principles derived from the law of nations as a
means of upholding the Constitution’s allocation of foreign affairs powers to Congress and the President—in particular, the powers to recognize
foreign nations and decide questions of war and peace.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by discussing the relationship between municipal law (the law of a particular sovereign) and
the law of nations in late eighteenth century England. To understand the
role that the law of nations played in the original constitutional design, it
is crucial to understand its role in the English legal system—a role that
was familiar to the Founders and that established the background against
which the Constitution was established. In some respects, of course, the
Constitution rejected practices of English governance. But in other respects, the Constitution can only be understood by reference to relevant
English traditions that supply crucial historical context.
Part I explains—and in certain respects recovers—three important
points about English practice that illuminate early American constitutional understandings and disagreements about the role of the law of nations. First, English courts generally applied the law of nations as part of
the law of the land because they adopted it as part of the common law.
Some members of the founding generation believed that the law of nations applied in American courts on the assumption that the United
States as a whole had somehow received the common law from England.
The Supreme Court’s rejection of this assumption led it to tie the application of certain principles of the law of nations to the Constitution’s allocation of powers. Second, when English judges and other writers described
the law of nations as part of the law of the land, they did not mean that it
was supreme relative to other parts of the law of the land. Accordingly,
when members of the founding generation referred to the law of nations
as part of “the law of the land,” they did not mean that the law of nations
was necessarily part of the supreme law of the land within the meaning of
the Supremacy Clause. Third, English writers understood that judicial
enforcement of perfect rights of sovereigns under the law of nations was
necessary to uphold the prerogatives of the Crown in foreign relations,
including the authority to send and receive ambassadors and to make war
and peace. The Founders allocated these prerogatives to Congress and
the President and assumed that federal courts would likewise enforce perfect rights as a means of upholding this allocation of powers.
In light of this historical context, Part II explains the role that the
Founders envisioned for the law of nations in the original constitutional
design. Like English courts, state courts incorporated the law of nations
into state law before ratification. But their violations of the law of nations
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were well known, as were the challenges that those violations posed for
U.S. foreign relations. The Constitution was framed in part to better consolidate national political control over foreign relations. In Articles I and
II, the Founders allocated foreign relations powers to Congress and the
President, including powers to recognize foreign nations and make war.
Prominent members of the founding generation understood that federal
political power over war and peace would be effective only if states did
not embroil the United States in war by violating these principles of the
law of nations. Thus, judicial enforcement of the law of nations was necessary to sustain the foreign relations powers allocated to the federal government. To serve that end, Article III authorized federal jurisdiction
over categories of cases—such as those involving admiralty and ambassadors—in which the law of nations would often supply rules of decision.
In addition, the Arising Under Clause provided a judicial mechanism to
ensure the effective enforcement of enacted federal municipal law, including treaties and statutes exercising foreign relations powers. Taken
together, Article III jurisdiction was designed to facilitate judicial adherence to the law of nations, uphold the constitutional prerogatives of the
political branches, and guard against state actions that would give other
nations just cause for war against the United States.
Part III describes how early executive and judicial officials understood the Constitution to require application of certain default rules derived from the perfect rights of sovereigns. It was clear at the founding
that federal court jurisdiction over cases implicating this part of the law of
nations would further federal authority over foreign relations. It would
take a couple of decades, however, for the Court to clearly articulate that
the Constitution’s allocation of powers was the basis of its obligation to
enforce, as the law of the land, an important subset of principles derived
from the law of nations. The Justices realized that not only states but also
federal courts could undermine the Constitution’s allocation of foreign
relations powers if either disregarded core principles of the law of nations. Given the Constitution’s allocation of foreign affairs and war powers, the Court recognized that the political branches, rather than the judiciary, should decide whether to risk provoking conflict with foreign
nations by interfering with traditional sovereign rights. For various reasons, the question whether states remained free to pursue their own path
in such cases did not come before the Court in the nation’s early years.
But to the extent that the Court understood Articles I and II to require
courts to apply certain rules derived from the law of nations, it applied a
constitutional rule of decision that would ultimately override contrary
state law under the Supremacy Clause.
Part IV explains how several well-known federal cases have continued
to apply principles derived from the law of nations to uphold the
Constitution’s allocation of powers. Scholars often cite Banco Nacional de
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Cuba v. Sabbatino,21 for example, for the proposition that federal courts
should apply modern principles of customary international law as federal
law.22 The decision is best read, however, to reflect adherence to the
same allocation of powers principles recognized by the Marshall Court,
under which the Court upheld the perfect rights of sovereigns as a means
of preserving federal political branch authority over foreign relations.
The Sabbatino Court applied the act of state doctrine—a traditional rule
respecting a foreign nation’s perfect right to territorial sovereignty—
rather than a modern rule that would have compromised foreign territorial sovereignty. In so doing, the Court carried on a centuries-old tradition of upholding perfect rights in cases implicating the law of nations. It
is tempting simply to characterize the Court’s practice as applying “federal common law”—judicially crafted “rules of decision whose content
cannot be traced by traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional commands.”23 This characterization, however, is
both anachronistic and too simplistic. Rather than devising its own rules
of decision out of whole cloth in cases like Sabbatino, the Court has applied constitutionally derived rules of decision that preserve federal political branch control over the conduct of foreign affairs. Taken in historical context, the best reading of Supreme Court precedent dating from
the founding to the present is that the law of nations does not apply as
preemptive federal law by virtue of any general Article III power to fashion federal common law, but only when necessary to preserve and implement distinct Article I and Article II powers to recognize foreign nations,
conduct foreign relations, and decide momentous questions of war and
peace.
I. THE LAW

OF

NATIONS

AND THE

ENGLISH SYSTEM

To understand the role of the law of nations in the original constitutional design, it is first necessary to appreciate its role in the late eighteenth century English legal system. Many of those who framed the
Constitution, participated in its ratification, and expounded its meaning
were lawyers trained in English traditions. It is not possible to understand certain provisions of the Constitution without reference to how
those who established it understood law to operate.24 That said, the
Constitution did not simply enshrine the English system of government.
In many respects it broke from English practice, most notably by estab21. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
22. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 2, at 490–97 (interpreting “Sabbatino and
its progeny [as] strong evidence that CIL should be federal common law in many, if not all,
cases involving acts of foreign governments”); Koh, supra note 2, at 1835 (arguing “that
even after Erie and Sabbatino, federal courts retain legitimate authority to incorporate bona
fide rules of customary international law into federal common law”).
23. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 685 (5th ed. 2003).
24. See infra notes 304–306 and accompanying text.

R
R

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\109-1\COL101.txt

10

unknown

Seq: 10

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

22-DEC-08

11:13

[Vol. 109:1

lishing distinctive separation of powers and federalism principles. Accordingly, the relevance of English legal traditions to American constitutional interpretation is context specific.25 To determine its relevance,
one must examine both English practice and the American constitutional
structure.
This Part explains English legal traditions that, in turn, help explain
the role of the law of nations in the American constitutional system. Contemporary debates over customary international law and the federal system have overlooked key aspects of the English tradition. Before we can
understand the proper role of the law of nations in the U.S. constitutional framework, we must recover the English background against which
the Constitution was adopted.
Three points are crucial. First, the law of nations applied as a rule of
decision in English courts because Parliament and courts incorporated it
into the municipal law of England. English courts and treatise writers
described the law of nations, so incorporated, as part of the law of the
land. This context illuminates why, following ratification, certain members of the founding generation assumed that federal courts had the
same power as English courts to adopt the law of nations as part of a
municipal common law of the United States. In response, other members of the founding generation argued that the American constitutional
structure precluded federal courts from recognizing a federal municipal
common law into which courts could incorporate the law of nations. Ultimately, the Supreme Court, for structural reasons, would reject the existence of a municipal common law of the United States.
Second, when English courts described the law of nations as part of
the law of the land, they did not mean that it was necessarily the supreme
law of the land. Proponents of the modern position make much of statements by members of the founding generation, borrowed from English
law, that the law of nations was part of the law of the land. They read
such statements to mean that all of the law of nations was understood to
be the supreme law of the land under the Supremacy Clause. By supreme law, proponents mean a law that displaces conflicting law—typically state law, but potentially even an act of Congress.
This is not, however, a necessary implication of such statements. In
England, much of the law of nations as adopted by the common law did
not operate as supreme relative to other sources of municipal law. The
common law itself was subject to reasonable local deviations and usages.
Accordingly, the law merchant, as adopted, was subject to such devia25. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 777,
850–51 (2004) [hereinafter Bellia, Cause of Action] (explaining that the federal
constitutional structure can be determinative of whether federal courts hold a power that
English courts held); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 26 n.111, 28 n.119 (2001) (describing contexts in which the Supreme
Court has considered English context determinative or not determinative of constitutional
meaning).
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tions. The law maritime operated independently of, not preemptively
over, the common law. And, in all events, the common law was subject to
Parliamentary override. Thus, to describe the law of nations as part of
the law of the land was not to describe its relationship to other parts of
the law of the land. The same would obtain in the United States: To say
that the law of nations was part of the law of the land was not necessarily
to imply that it was supreme over other parts of the law of the land, either
local law (state law) or national law (acts of Congress).
A final important point about English practice is that judicial application of certain aspects of the law of nations operated to sustain national
political authority in foreign relations. As the law of nations was understood in the late eighteenth century, each nation had certain perfect
rights relative to other sovereigns—rights concerning ambassadors, territorial sovereignty, and use of the high seas. Violation of a nation’s perfect right gave that nation just cause to wage war. This feature of the law
of nations was axiomatic. By recognizing rights of ambassadors and upholding rights of nations against private acts of hostility, courts maintained the authority of the Crown to recognize foreign nations and decide questions of war and peace. This English practice provides crucial
background for understanding why U.S. courts enforced certain aspects
of the law of nations—namely the perfect rights of sovereigns—in a seemingly preemptive way.
Section A of this Part defines municipal law and the law of nations as
English writers understood them. Section B describes how these sources
of law operated in English courts. It demonstrates why English statements that the law of nations was part of the law of the land do not control the distinct question of what subsets of American law count as the
supreme law of the land under the Supremacy Clause. It also explains,
however, an aspect of the law of nations—the perfect rights of sovereigns—that operated in England to uphold Crown prerogatives in foreign relations. This context illuminates how the Supreme Court of the
United States would come to draw upon the perfect rights of nations as a
means of upholding the constitutional allocation of foreign relations authority to the federal political branches.
A. Defining Municipal Law and the Law of Nations
1. Municipal Law. — William Blackstone defined “municipal” law in
his well-known Commentaries on the Laws of England as “the rule by which
particular districts, communities, or nations are governed.”26 In “common speech,” the expression “municipal law . . . applied to any one state
or nation, which is governed by the same laws and customs.”27 Significantly, municipal law was synonymous with the “law of the land”;
26. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *44.
27. Id.
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Blackstone used the two phrases interchangeably.28 Either denoted a
rule “prescribed by the supreme power in a state.”29
English writers identified two forms of municipal law: written and
unwritten.30 The unwritten law was common law—the customary law of
the land. “General customs,” Blackstone explained, are “the universal
rule of the whole kingdom, and form the common law, in its . . . usual
signification,” governing such matters as trusts and estates, property, contracts, rules of construction, civil injuries, and crime.31 The common law
also governed the jurisdiction and modes of proceeding of English
courts32—both common law courts, which decided cases according to the
law of the land,33 and courts that applied other sources of law, such as the
courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,34 the ecclesiastical
28. See, e.g., id. at *54, *69, *75, *83 (using “law of the land” to refer to municipal
laws of England).
29. Id. at *44, *45.
30. See id. at *63 (“The municipal law of England, or the rule of civil conduct
prescribed to the inhabitants of this kingdom, may with sufficient propriety be divided into
two kinds: the lex non scripta, the unwritten, or common law; and the lex scripta, the written,
or statute law.”).
31. Id. at *67–68.
32. See, e.g., R v. Almon, (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 94, 103 (K.B.) (Wilmot, J.)
(“[C]onstant immemorial usage, sanctified and recognised by the Courts of Westminster
Hall, and in many instances by the Legislature [make it now] as much a part of the law of
the land, as any other course of practice which custom has introduced and
established . . . .”); Fogue v. Gale, (1747) 95 Eng. Rep. 551, 551 (K.B.) (“[W]e cannot
depart from the practice, which is the law of the Court, and, as such, is the law of the
land . . . .”); Welles v. Trahern, (1740) 125 Eng. Rep. 1147, 1150 (C.P.) (“[W]e are of
opinion that such a jurisdiction being contrary to the law of the land cannot be granted
without an Act of Parliament, even by the King himself . . . .” (citation omitted)); Trantor v.
Duggan, (1697) 88 Eng. Rep. 1219, 1219 (K.B.) (“[B]y the law of the land, no man ought
to be subpoenaed to answer an English bill in those Courts, unless he live and be personally
served there, that is within the jurisdiction thereof.”); 1 Matthew Bacon, A New
Abridgment of the Law *180 (Dublin, Luke White, 6th ed. 1793) (explaining that an
attachment proceeding “is certainly now established as Part of the Law of the Land”); 4 id.
at *173 (explaining that “the true reason” that ecclesiastical courts have jurisdiction of
certain crimes but not others “is, because the Law of the Land hath indulged them with the
Conuzance of some Crimes, and not of others”); 3 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *422 (“We
afterwards proceeded to consider the nature and distribution of wrongs and injuries
affecting every species of personal and real rights, with the respective remedies by suit,
which the law of the land has afforded for every possible injury.”); 4 id. at *288 (“[T]he
method of examining the delinquent himself upon oath, with regard to the contempt
alleged, is at least of as high antiquity, and by long and immemorial usage is now become
the law of the land.”).
33. See 3 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *30–61 (describing common law jurisdiction
of the courts of Westminster and inferior courts).
34. See, e.g., Spanish Ambassadour v. Buntish, (1615) 80 Eng. Rep. 1156, 1157
(Adm.) (“[I]f the matter, or contract, was done beyond sea, this by the law of the land is to
be tried here . . . .”); 2 Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of
England *51 (explaining that “lex terrae” does not extend to certain legal events “done
upon the high sea,” but that “lawes of the realme” authorize other proceedings to deal with
such events).
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courts,35 and the universities.36 The duty to determine the content of the
law of the land rested with the judges of the several courts of
Westminster.37 They professed to determine this law from prior judicial
records38 or, where no judicial decision established the point, from established custom.39 Judges and other legal writers routinely referred to this
common law as “the law of the land.”40
35. See, e.g., Brownsword v. Edwards, (1751) 28 Eng. Rep. 157, 158 (Ch.) (“[B]y the
law of the land the ecclesiastical court cannot proceed to judge of the marriage and to
pronounce sentence of nullity after death of one of the married parties . . . .”); Hill v.
Turner, (1737) 26 Eng. Rep. 326, 326 (Ch.) (“[T]here is no colour to say the ecclesiastical
court want jurisdiction, for the authority they exercise in matrimonial cases is the general
law of the land . . . .”); R v. Bettesworth, (1730) 93 Eng. Rep. 896, 897 (K.B.) (“[T]he
Ecclesiastical Court shall never be suffered to set up their practice against the law of the
land . . . .”).
36. See, e.g., Parkinson’s Case, (1689) 90 Eng. Rep. 977, 978 (K.B.) (distinguishing
between the private laws of the college, administered by the “visitor” and not appealable to
the courts of law, and “the law of the land,” the violation of which “this Court [of law] will
take notice thereof, notwithstanding the visitor” through mandamus).
37. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *69 (“[H]ow are these customs or maxims to
be known, and by whom is their validity to be determined? The answer is, by the judges in
the several courts of justice.”).
38. See, e.g., R v. Despard, (1798) 101 Eng. Rep. 1226, 1230 (K.B.) (opinion of
Kenyon, C.J.) (“[T]he records of the Court furnish me with the law of the land.”). See
generally 1 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *69 (“And indeed these judicial decisions are the
principal and most authoritative evidence, that can be given, of the existence of such a
custom as shall form a part of the common law.”).
39. See, e.g., Despard, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1230 (opinion of Kenyon, C.J.) (“To one
argument used by the defendant’s counsel I cannot assent, namely, that no point is to be
considered as law, unless it has been made and judicially decided: if that were true,
farewell to the common law of the land.”); id. at 1231 (opinion of Ashhurst, J.) (“It is
rather an extraordinary position . . . that nothing is to be considered as law but what has
been solemnly decided; for a point may be so clear that it was never doubted, and yet if this
position were well founded, it would not be law.”); Paget v. Gee, (1753) 27 Eng. Rep. 133,
134 (Ch.) (“Where this court finds out the law of the land in any instances, they will follow
and extend it to other cases that are analogous.”).
40. See, e.g., Massey v. Rice, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1122, 1124 (K.B.) (Mansfield, J.)
(“By the settled law of the land, men by deeds may fetter their estates: but tenant in tail
when of age may unfetter them, observing a certain form.”); Mitchel v. Neale, (1755) 28
Eng. Rep. 433, 433 (Ch.) (“This general custom of copyhold may be called the law of the
land . . . .”); Kruger v. Wilcox, (1755) 27 Eng. Rep. 168, 168 (Ch.) (“Such is the law of the
land as to retainers in other cases.”); Herne and Herne, (1741) 27 Eng. Rep. 707, 708
(Ch.) (explaining that “the general Law of the Land” governed certain matters of
maintenance); Welles v. Trahern, (1740) 125 Eng. Rep. 1147, 1150 (C.P.) (“Besides, it is
certain that the university do not judge according to the common law but according to the
civil law; so that if this conusance be allowed men’s properties are to be tried without a jury
and by a different law from the law of the land.”); Pratt and Pratt, (1731) 94 Eng. Rep. 758,
760 (K.B.) (explaining that “heir at law” as used in statute, “is generally understood, [as]
the heir by the general law of the land”); Jordan v. Foley, (1725) 25 Eng. Rep. 199, 199
(Ch.) (“[T]he husband is only chargeable for what is sued for and recovered in the life of
the wife; this is the clear law of the land, and unalterable but by Act of Parliament . . . .”); R
v. Thorp, (1697) 90 Eng. Rep. 824, 824 (K.B.) (“And now it was objected in arrest of
judgment, that the matter for which the defendants were convicted was not a crime within
the law of the land . . . .”); Kemp v. Andrews, (1690) 90 Eng. Rep. 704, 704 (K.B.) (“The
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Particular local customs existed alongside the general customary law
of the land. Courts did not regard the general customary law of the land
as necessarily preemptive of conflicting local customs. To the contrary,
courts enforced local customs that derogated from the common law of
the land. In 1741, for example, the Court of Chancery explained that “by
the general Law of the Land, a Father is a Judge of the Merit of his Children, and has a Right to dispose of his Property at his Death in such
Manner as he shall think fit. But by the Custom of London . . . [he] has
not this Power . . . .”41 Examples of local customs that governed as rules
of decision in derogation of the general customary law abound.42 Judges
explained that whether a proven local custom contrary to the general law
of the land would govern as the rule of decision depended on whether
the local custom was “reasonable.”43 It is important to appreciate this fact
defendant pleaded . . . that by the law of the land there is no survivorship between joint
merchants . . . .”); Mathews v. Whetton, (1629) 79 Eng. Rep. 804, 804 (K.B.) (argument of
counsel) (“[B]y the law of the land every copyholder may make a lease for a year without
forfeiture . . . .”); Moore v. Foster, (1605) 80 Eng. Rep. 43, 44 (K.B.) (“[B]y the common
law of the land, the misusage and mis-carrying of a commissioner of the business is not
punishable . . . .”). Courts also described the prerogative of the Crown as incorporated
into the law of the land. See, e.g., Sandys v. Spivey, (1744) 94 Eng. Rep. 968, 968 (K.B.)
(“The prerogative of the Crown is incorporated with the law of the land. . . . The King, by
his prerogative, hath a right to sue in what Court he pleases, and to imprison his debtor in
the goal [sic] for the county or liberty where he is arrested.”).
41. Herne, 27 Eng. Rep. at 708.
42. See, e.g., Steel v. Houghton, (1788) 126 Eng. Rep. 32, 33–34 (C.P.) (“[S]uch a
general right . . . must be by the common law of the land; and though . . . in certain places
there may be particular regulations of its exercise by custom, that will not derogate from
the general right . . . which will . . . prevail, unless a custom is shewn to the contrary.”); R v.
Inhabitants of Minchin-Hampton, (1762) 97 Eng. Rep. 847, 848 (K.B.) (“Beech is certainly
not timber by the general law of the land: yet it may be timber by the particular custom of
the place . . . .”); Robinson v. Bland, (1760) 96 Eng. Rep. 129, 131 (K.B.) (argument of
counsel, Blackstone) (“Courts have admitted local customs and particular usages to prevail
in derogation of the common law.”); Mitchel, 28 Eng. Rep. at 433 (“This general custom of
copyhold may be called the law of the land; yet in several instances that general law is
broke in upon. (Note: Every custom which departs from the common law must be
construed strictly and ought not to be enlarged beyond the usage.)” (citation omitted));
Fenn v. Mariott, (1743) 125 Eng. Rep. 1252, 1252 (C.P.) (“But we thought the present case
not at all parallel to that; because that depends on the general law of the land in respect to
customary estates, but this on the particular custom of the manor.”); cf. R v. Inhabitants of
Sheffield, (1787) 100 Eng. Rep. 58, 61 (K.B.) (“[B]y the general law of the land the parish
[is] bound to repair all highways lying within it, unless by prescription they can throw the
onus on particular persons . . . when that is the case, it is [an] exception to the general
rule.”); Birch v. Blagrave, (1755) 27 Eng. Rep. 176, 176 (Ch.) (“[W]hether it be in fraud of
the local law of London, or general law of the land, is the same thing.”); 1 Blackstone, supra
note 26, at *75 (“[These customs] are all contrary to the general law of the land, and are
good only by special custom, though those of London are also confirmed by act of
parliament.”).
43. For instance, Lord Mansfield stated that “[t]he only question” regarding whether
a local custom governed as a rule of decision was “whether this be a reasonable custom or
not.” Butter v. Heathby, (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1154, 1156 (K.B.). In 1743, the Court of
Common Pleas determined that a particular custom of a manor was “good”: “It was
insisted that such custom was unreasonable, and that in the present case it was unjust . . . .
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about the common law in considering the role of the law of nations in the
English system. When courts adopted the law merchant (a branch of the
law of nations) as part of the common law, the law merchant was subject
to local deviations as part of the common law.
In addition to customary municipal law, general and local, there was
written municipal law. The “legis scriptae, the written laws of the kingdom,” as Blackstone described them, were “statutes, acts, or edicts, made
by the king’s majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords
spiritual and temporal, and commons in parliament assembled.”44
English courts referred to the written laws of the kingdom, as they did to
the common law, as the “law of the land.”45 Where an act of Parliament
was not clearly in derogation of the general common law, courts would
interpret the act to comport with the common law.46 On the other hand,
parliamentary supremacy—ultimately recognized by Blackstone and
others—required courts to apply acts of Parliament in preference to the
common law in cases of irreconcilable conflict.47 Moreover, courts of
Westminster required that acts of Parliament receive uniform constructions across localities. As Justice Nash Grose explained in 1787, a statute,
as a “universal law,” may not “receive different constructions in different
towns. It is the general law of the land that this kind of property should
be rated; and we cannot explain the law differently by the usage of this or
that particular place.”48 Relative to the common law and local deviations
from it, acts of Parliament were supreme.
2. The Law of Nations. — Unlike municipal law, the law of nations
was not understood to be the law of a single nation. According to
Blackstone, the law of nations “cannot be dictated by any; but depends
entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon mutual compacts, treaties,
leagues and agreements between these several communities.”49 To appreciate how the Founders understood the law of nations, it is important
to examine the writings of Emmerich de Vattel. Vattel’s treatise, The Law
But to this we answered that we thought it neither unreasonable nor unjust.” Fenn, 125
Eng. Rep. at 1252; see also Mitchel, 28 Eng. Rep. at 434 (“In several manors there are
unreasonable customs, though not so unreasonable as that the law will set them aside.”). If
a local custom was to govern in derogation of the common law, courts, according to some
decisions, should construe the custom “strictly” and not “enlarge” it “beyond the usage.”
See id. at 433 (“Every custom which departs from the common law must be construed
strictly . . . and ought not to be enlarged beyond the usage.”).
44. 1 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *85.
45. For example, in Biggs v. Lawrence, Justice Francis Buller disallowed recovery on a
contract made “directly against the statute laws of this country,” a contract that offended
“against the law of the land.” (1789) 100 Eng. Rep. 673, 675 (K.B.).
46. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *89 (describing this principle).
47. See id. (“Where the common law and a statute differ, the common law gives place
to the statute.”).
48. R v. Hogg, (1787) 99 Eng. Rep. 1341, 1345 (K.B.).
49. 1 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *43. For a discussion of Blackstone’s treatment of
the law of nations, see Mark W. Janis, The American Tradition of International Law: Great
Expectations 1789–1914, at 2–11 (2004).
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of Nations, was well known in England and America at the time of the
founding.50 In 1775, Benjamin Franklin wrote to thank Charles Dumas,
American agent in the Hague, for “the kind present you have made us of
your edition of Vattel. It came to us in good season, when the circumstances of a rising state make it necessary frequently to consult the law of
nations.” A copy, Franklin explained, “has been continually in the hands
of the members of our [Continental] Congress.”51 It has been argued
that a copy that Dumas, through Franklin, gave to the Philadelphia public
library “undoubtedly was used by members of the Second Continental
Congress . . . ; by the leading men who directed the policy of the United
Colonies until the end of the war; and, later, by the man who sat in the
Convention of 1787 and drew up the Constitution of the United States.”52
Vattel described the law of nations in terms of the “necessary” and
the “voluntary.” A necessary principle of the law of nations was “a sacred
law which nations and sovereigns are bound to respect and follow in all
their actions”; a voluntary principle was “a rule which the general welfare
and safety oblige them to admit in their transactions with each other.”53
For Vattel, “the very object of the society of nations” was to promote “the
peaceable enjoyment of that liberty which [each nation] inherits from
nature.”54 To further this goal, “nature has established a perfect equality
of rights between independent nations.”55
This equality and independence obliged nations to respect certain
perfect rights that each held against the others. A perfect right, as de50. See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 26, 35 (1952) (explaining that this treatise and writings of
Grotius, Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui “were an essential and significant part of the minimal
equipment of any lawyer of erudition in the eighteenth century”); see also Janis, supra note
49, at 57 (“Those meeting at Philadelphia to draft the document were not deficient in
formal training in the law of nations.”); David Gray Adler, The President’s Recognition
Power, in The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy 133, 137 (David
Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996) (“During the Founding period and well beyond,
Vattel was, in the United States, the unsurpassed publicist on international law.”); Douglas
J. Sylvester, International Law as Sword or Shield? Early American Foreign Policy and the
Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1, 67 (1999) (explaining that in American
judicial decisions, “in all, in the 1780s and 1790s, there were nine citations to Pufendorf,
sixteen to Grotius, twenty-five to Bynkershoek, and a staggering ninety-two to Vattel”).
51. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Charles Dumas (Dec. 19, 1775), in 2 The
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States 64, 64 (Francis Wharton
ed., 1889).
52. Abraham C. Weinfeld, Comment, What Did the Framers of the Federal
Constitution Mean by “Agreements or Compacts”?, 3 U. Chi. L. Rev. 453, 459 (1936)
(quoting Albert de Lapradelle, Introduction to 3 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations
or the Principles of Natural Law, at xxx n.I (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916). In 1978, the
Supreme Court wrote that Vattel was the “international jurist most widely cited in the first
50 years after the Revolution.” U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452,
462 n.12 (1978).
53. Vattel, supra note 17, at *xv.
54. Id. at *lxi–lxii (emphasis omitted).
55. Id. at *149; see also id. at *lxiii (describing equality of nations).
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fined by general principles of law, was a right that the holder could carry
into execution without legal restraint, including by force. An imperfect
(or inchoate) right, on the other hand, was accompanied by legal restrictions that its holder had to respect.56 According to Vattel, “[t]he perfect
right is that which is accompanied by the right of compelling those who
refuse to fulfil the correspondent obligation; the imperfect right is unaccompanied by that right of compulsion.”57 Therefore, when one sovereign nation violated the perfect rights of another, the aggrieved nation
had just cause for waging war to compel the corresponding duty.58 This
idea of perfect rights was well recognized in England and deeply rooted
in writings on the law of nations by such well-known writers as Pufendorf
and Burlamaqui.59 English admiralty courts, which frequently applied
the law of nations in their prize jurisdiction, invoked the concept on numerous occasions.60
56. See Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace 282 n.2 (J. Barbeyrac trans.,
London, W. Innys et al. 1738) (1625) (explaining that “a Man may be forced to do what he
is obliged to” under a perfect right); 2 Samuel Pufendorf, Elementorum Jurisprudentiae
Universalis Libri Duo 58 (William Abbott Oldfather trans., Clarendon Press 1931) (1672)
(explaining that one who has a “perfect” right may “compel” the corresponding obligation
“either by directing action against him before a judge, or, where there is no place for that,
by force”); 1 T. Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, Being the Substance of a Course of
Lectures on Grotius De Jure Belli et Pacis 28–29 (Cambridge, J. Archdeacon 2d ed. 1779)
(“Where no law restrains a man from carrying his right into execution, the right is of the
perfect sort. But where the law does in any respect restrain him from carrying it into
execution, it is of the imperfect sort.”).
57. Vattel, supra note 17, at *lxii–lxiii.
58. Id. at *lxiv.
59. See, e.g., 1 Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law
173 (Nugent trans., Cambridge, University Press 4th ed. 1792) (1747 & 1751) (“Offensive
wars are those, which are made to constrain others to give us our due, in virtue of a perfect
right we have to exact it of them . . . .”); 1 Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium
Libri Octo 127 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1688)
(“Now an unjust act, which is done from choice, and infringes upon the perfect right of
another is commonly designated by the one word, injury.”); 8 id. at 1294 (describing as
“causes of just wars”: “to assert our claim to whatever others may owe us by a perfect right”
and “to obtain reparation for losses which we have suffered by injuries”); see also G.F. de
Martens, Summary of the Law of Nations, Founded on the Treaties and Customs of the
Modern Nations of Europe 273 (William Cobbett trans., Philadelphia, Thomas Bradford
1795) (“Nothing short of the violation of a perfect right . . . can justify the undertaking of
war . . . . [But] every such violation . . . justifies the injured party in resorting to arms.”); 2
Alberico Gentili, De Iure Belli Libri Tres 106 (John C. Rolfe trans., Clarendon Press 1933)
(1612) (“[B]ecause [the Sanguntines] had aided and received the enemies of Hannibal,
he had a perfect right to make war upon them.”); 2 Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo
Scientifica Pertractatum 43–108 (Joseph H. Drake trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1764)
(explaining that nations have “imperfect rights” to external commerce, and describing
how by agreement nations can obtain “perfect rights” to commerce).
60. See, e.g., The President, (1804) 165 Eng. Rep. 775, 776 (Adm.) (stating that
American Government has “perfect right” to “confer the privileges of American navigation
on vessels occupied by their Consuls in foreign states”); The Der Mohr, (1802) 165 Eng.
Rep. 624, 625 (Adm.) (stating that neutral vessel “had a perfect right to carry” cargo,
“provided it was not attended with any circumstances of ill faith, or unneutral conduct”);
The Rebecca, (1799) 165 Eng. Rep. 253, 253 n.b (Adm.) (noting court in “The ‘Wilhelmina,’
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The London Telegraph invoked the phrase in 1797 to describe the
origins and principles of the war then proceeding between England and
France. It explained that “[a]s a perfect equality prevails in the society
and intercourse of nations, . . . every Government has a perfect right to
be admitted to that open, avowed, authorised, honourable negotiation,
which in the practice of nations is employed for the pacific adjustment of
their contested claims.”61 Because this is a perfect right, “it follows, as a
necessary consequence, that they who refuse such authorised negociation
are RESPONSIBLE for a war which that refusal makes on their part
UNJUST.”62
Vattel did not catalogue an exhaustive list of the perfect rights that
sovereign nations enjoyed based on their equality and independence.
Throughout his work, he simply noted where he believed that a right he
was describing was perfect under the law of nations. This included “the
right to security”—“that is, to preserve herself from all injuries” other nations might attempt to inflict.63 He also identified, as perfect, the right to
govern, excluding from any state “the smallest right to interfere in the
government of another.”64 “Of all the rights that can belong to a nation,”
Vattel stated, “sovereignty is, doubtless, the most precious, and that which
other nations ought the most scrupulously to respect, if they would not
do her an injury.”65 Accordingly, it did not “belong to any foreign power
to take cognizance of the administration of that sovereign, to set himself
up for a judge of his conduct, and to oblige him to alter it.”66 Vattel also
emphasized the connection between sovereignty and territory: “The sovereignty united to the domain establishes the jurisdiction of the nation in
her territories.”67 “We should not only refrain,” he continued, “from
usurping the territory of others; we should also respect, and abstain from
every act contrary to the rights of the sovereign: for, a foreign nation can
claim no right in it.”68 Each nation also had an equal right to use the
open sea, the violation of which warranted the use of force.69
Additionally, Vattel described the rights to establish embassies and to
send and receive public ministers as essential to effectuating all other
Carlson, 23d July 1799,” determined “[t]he Dane has a perfect right, in time of profound
peace, to trade between Holland and France . . . and there is no ground upon which any of
its advantages can be withheld from him in time of war”); The Maria, (1799) 165 Eng. Rep.
199, 206 (Adm.) (explaining that the only circumstance in which lawful use of force can
lawfully be resisted is in a “state of war and conflict between two countries, where one party
has a perfect right to attack by force, . . . the other has an equally perfect right to repel by
force”).
61. Origin and Principles of the War, Telegraph (London), Jan. 17, 1797, at 3.
62. Id.
63. Vattel, supra note 17, at *154.
64. Id. at *155.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *166.
68. Id. at *169.
69. Id. at *126.
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rights. “Nations,” he explained, “should treat and hold intercourse together in order to promote their interests,—to avoid injuring each
other,—and to adjust and terminate their disputes.”70 Public ministers
were “necessary instruments in the management of those affairs which
sovereigns have to transact with each other, and the channels of that correspondence which they have a right to carry on.”71 Vattel described the
right to send public ministers—and thus the rights, privileges, and immunities of public ministers—as inviolable because “[t]he respect which is
due to sovereigns should redound to their representatives, and especially
their ambassadors, as representing their master’s person in the first
degree.”72
Finally, Vattel described the obligations that nations assumed in treaties to give treaty partners corresponding perfect rights: “As the engagements of a treaty impose on the one hand a perfect obligation, they produce on the other a perfect right. The breach of a treaty is therefore a
violation of the perfect right of the party with whom we have
contracted.”73
All of these rights that Vattel described under the rubric “law of nations” related to reciprocity between and among nations. Some English
writers and judges used the phrase “the law of nations” to denote not only
such rules of state-state relations, but also certain transnational rules of
private conduct, including the law merchant and the private law maritime.74 These various branches of the law of nations did not describe
strict mutually exclusive categories; nonetheless, the categories were, and
remain, helpful.75
70. Id. at *452.
71. Id. at *453.
72. Id. at *464.
73. Id. at *196.
74. For descriptions of these branches, see Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law:
A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1280–81 (1996) [hereinafter Clark,
Federal Common Law] (identifying three branches that comprise the law of nations: “the
law merchant, the law maritime, and the law governing the rights and duties of sovereign
states” (citations omitted)); Dickinson, supra note 50, at 26–29 (identifying law merchant,
law maritime, and “law of states”); Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early
American Law, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 819, 821–22 (1989) [hereinafter Jay, Early American Law]
(describing law merchant, law maritime, conflict of laws principles, and “law governing the
relations between states” as comprising the law of nations); see also Randall Bridwell &
Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitution and the Common Law 51 (1977) (describing
admiralty, commercial law, and conflict of laws as comprising the law of nations); William
A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The
Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1513, 1517 (1984) [hereinafter Fletcher,
General Common Law] (describing law merchant and law maritime).
75. As Blackstone described it:
[I]n mercantile questions, such as bills of exchange and the like; in all marine
causes, relating to freight, average, demurrage, insurances, bottomry, and others
of a similar nature; the law-merchant, which is a branch of the law of nations, is
regularly and constantly adhered to. So too in all disputes relating to prizes, to
shipwrecks, to hostages, and ransom bills, there is no other rule of decision but
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B. Municipal Law and the Law of Nations as Rules of Decision
The relationship between the law of nations and municipal law as
rules of decision in late eighteenth century English courts was complex.
Notable English judges and treatise writers introduced the idea that the
law of nations was part of the laws of England in the eighteenth century.
In 1764, Lord Mansfield explained that “Lord Talbot declared a clear
opinion [in 1736]— ‘That the law of nations, in its full extent, was part of
the law of England.’”76 Blackstone too described the law of nations as
part of the law of the land. For him, adoption of the law of nations by the
common law was necessary to render its judicial application politically
legitimate:
[S]ince in England no royal power can introduce a new law, or
suspend the execution of the old, therefore the law of nations
(wherever any question arises which is properly the object of
[its] jurisdiction) is here adopted in [its] full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land.77
According to Blackstone, this adoption enabled England to “be a part of
the civilized world.”78
To deem the law of nations part of the law of the land was not to
define its relationship to other parts of the law of the land. One must
differentiate the various branches of the law of nations, as English writers
described them, to appreciate this multifaceted relationship. The late
eighteenth century English lawyer would not have understood the law
merchant or law maritime to provide rules of decision that could conflict
with English national or local municipal law, let alone preempt it. Moreover, judges construed municipal law to avoid conflict with the law of
state-state relations. Rather than undermine municipal prerogatives,
Blackstone explained, core principles of the law of state-state relations
served to sustain them, particularly in foreign relations.
1. The Law Merchant’s Adaptability. — The law merchant, a branch of
the law of nations, was inherently subject to local deviations and thus not
preemptive of other parts of English municipal law. English courts and
this great universal law, collected from history and usage, and such writers of all
nations and languages as are generally approved and allowed of.
4 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *67.
76. Triquet v. Bath, (1764) 97 Eng. Rep. 936, 938 (K.B.) (quoting Buvot v. Barbut,
(1736) 25 Eng. Rep. 777, 778 (Ch.) (“That the law of nations (which in its fullest extent
was and formed part of the law of England) . . . .”)).
77. 4 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *67. For a discussion of how the law of nations
applied in eighteenth century English courts only to the extent that English law adopted it,
see Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty 62, 349–50 & n.43 (2008).
78. 4 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *67. David Armitage has argued that in light of
when Triquet and Buvot were reported in relevant part, Blackstone’s Commentaries represent
the first appearance in print of the doctrine that the law of nations is part of English law.
David Armitage, Parliament and International Law in the Eighteenth Century, in
Parliaments, Nations and Identities in Britain and Ireland, 1660–1850, at 169, 174 (Julian
Hoppit ed., 2003).
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writers commonly described the law merchant as “part of the law of
England, which decides the causes of merchants by the general rules
which obtain in commercial countries.”79 Such references did not indicate that the law merchant was superior to or preemptive of contrary laws
of the land. Rather, if an act of Parliament conflicted with the common
law, which included the law merchant, the act of Parliament controlled.80
Moreover, just as courts applied local customs that derogated from the
common law in certain circumstances,81 they also applied local usages
that supplanted or supplemented the law merchant.82
In light of English practice, certain judges in America would apply
the law merchant only where it did not conflict with the positive municipal law.83 In the first two decades following ratification, American courts
79. 1 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *273. One effect of courts’ deeming the law
merchant part of the common law or the law of England was that they could take judicial
notice of it, just as they took judicial notice of the common law. See Edie v. E. India Co.,
(1761) 97 Eng. Rep. 797, 802 (K.B.) (opinion of Foster, J.) (“This custom of merchants is
the general law of the kingdom, part of the common law; and therefore ought not to have
been left to the jury, after it has been already settled by judicial determinations.”); id. at
803 (“The custom of merchants is part of the law of England; and Courts of Law must take
notice of it, as such.”); Meggadow v. Holt, (1692) 88 Eng. Rep. 1134, 1134 (K.B.) (“[T]he
law of merchants is jus gentium, and part of the common law; and therefore we ought to
take notice of it, when set forth in pleading.”); Hodges v. Steward, (1691) 91 Eng. Rep.
117, 117 (K.B.) (“[T]he Court is to take notice of the law of merchants as part of the law of
England . . . .”).
80. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *89 (“Where the common law and a statute
differ, the common law gives place to the statute . . . .”); see also id. at *75 n.8 (“Merchants
ought to take their law from the courts, and not the courts from merchants: and when the
law is found inconvenient for the purposes of extended commerce, application ought to be
made to parliament for redress.”).
81. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
82. See generally Timothy Cunningham, The Law of Bills of Exchange, Promissory
Notes, Bank-Notes, and Insurances 77–100 (1760) (listing examples of special or local
customs that operated in conjunction with, or contrary to, principles of the law merchant).
For example, local customs governed usances. See, e.g., Buckley v. Cambell, (1706) 88
Eng. Rep. 917, 917 (Q.B.) (Holt, C.J.) (explaining, regarding time of usances, that “he
would take notice of the custom of merchants here, but not that at Amsterdam or Venice,
&c.,” for “[i]n such case, you must set forth the custom in your declaration”); Meggadow, 88
Eng. Rep. at 1135 (“It is not necessary to shew the custom of merchants, but it is necessary
to shew how the usance shall be intended, because it varies as places do.”). Local custom
also governed, in certain instances, whether infants could bind themselves by accepting
bills of exchange. See, e.g., Williams v. Harrison, (1697) 91 Eng. Rep. 774, 774 (K.B.)
(recognizing local custom in London that infant may bind himself as apprentice by
accepting bill of exchange, notwithstanding that the “custom of merchants [which holds
otherwise] is part of the law of the land”).
83. See, e.g., Odlin v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 18 F. Cas. 583, 584 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No.
10,433) (Washington, J.) (“These regulations [the custom of merchants] are read in the
British and American courts, and have frequently furnished rules of decision, where the
positive law of the country, or former decisions upon the point, had not prescribed a
different one.”); Walden v. LeRoy, 2 Cai. 263, 265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (Kent, C.J.) (“The
Law Merchant is, however, the general law of commercial nations; and, where our own
positive institutions and decisions are silent, it is to be expounded by having recourse to
the usages of other nations.”).
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recognized that local usages could govern as rules of decision notwithstanding a conflict with the general law merchant, and that the general
law merchant itself varied from nation to nation.84 The Supreme Court
based its 1842 decision in Swift v. Tyson upon the same premise.85 In
short, as American jurists appreciated, English judges and writers did not
understand the law merchant—though part of the law of the land—generally to preempt contrary national law or local usage.
2. The Law Maritime’s Sphere of Operation. — Moreover, English law
incorporated certain parts of the law of nations—namely the law maritime—to operate independently of, not preemptively over, municipal
law. The common law defined the jurisdiction of admiralty courts in
England,86 and “the lawes of the realme” allowed them to apply the law
maritime to disputes within their jurisdiction.87 As a result of a longstanding rivalry between common law and admiralty courts in England,
English courts understood the “law of the sea” (the law maritime) to govern a sphere separate from that governed by the “law of the land” (municipal law).88 The law of nations governed maritime actions and other
actions arising upon the sea that municipal law did not govern. In addition, the courts of admiralty had jurisdiction only over cases that the law
84. See, e.g., Fenwick v. Sears’s Adm’rs, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 259, 270 (1803) (“[T]he
custom of merchants in the United States differs in some respects from the custom of
merchants in England.”); Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365, 368 (1797) (Elsworth, C.J.)
(“I say the custom of merchants in this country; for the custom of merchants somewhat
varies in different countries, in order to accommodate itself to particular courses of
business, or other local circumstances.”); Thurston v. Koch, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 348, 351, 23 F.
Cas. 1183, 1184 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,016) (Paterson, J.) (“It is, however, evident, that
the law merchant varies in different nations, and even in the same nation at different
times. The course of trade, local circumstances, commercial interests, and national policy,
induce to some variation of the rule.”); Snyder v. Findley, 1 N.J.L. 78, 79 (1791) (“[A]s to
negligence, the custom of merchants settles it in Great Britain; there is, however, no such
custom here.”); Fleming v. M’Clure, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 428, 432 (S.C. Const. Ct. 1804)
(“The law merchant, as it obtains in England, is, generally speaking, the law of this
country. Some exceptions have been made, and some more may be made, which
convenience and necessity have directed, and may hereafter suggest.”).
85. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). In Swift, the Court expressly acknowledged the
nonpreemptive nature of the general commercial law. The Court justified its famous
rejection of a New York judicial determination of a question of general commercial law on
the ground “that the Courts of New York do not found their decisions upon this point
upon any local statute, or positive, fixed, or ancient local usage: but they deduce the
doctrine from the general principles of commercial law.” Id. at 18. Had a New York
(“local”) statute or usage deviated from the law merchant, that statute or usage would have
controlled, and the Court would have deferred to New York courts’ understanding of it.
Cf. Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1276–92 (arguing that Swift was
defensible at time it was decided).
86. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
87. 2 Coke, supra note 34, at *51.
88. See generally David W. Robertson, Admiralty and Federalism: History and
Analysis of Problems of Federal-State Relations in the Maritime Law of the United States
35–64 (1970) (describing rivalry).
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maritime governed.89 The “tidewater doctrine”—that admiralty jurisdiction extended no further inland than tidal waters—reflected and demarcated the respective jurisdictions of common law and admiralty courts in
England.90 If a court of admiralty attempted to exercise jurisdiction over
a case that municipal law governed, the courts of Westminster (courts
that administered the municipal law of the land) would issue a writ of
prohibition removing the case to the common law courts.91 Just as courts
of admiralty lacked jurisdiction over cases that municipal law governed,
the common law courts lacked jurisdiction over cases that maritime law
governed.92 Accordingly, an appeal from a court of admiralty would run
not to the courts of Westminster but to judge delegates who were ap89. Coke explained that:
By the lawes of this realm the court of the admirall hath no conusance, power, or
jurisdiction of any manner of contract, plea, or querele within any county of the
realm, either upon the land or the water: but every such contract, plea, or
querele, and all other thing rising within any county of the realm, either upon the
land or the water, and also wreck of the sea ought to be tried, determined,
discussed, and remedied by the lawes of the land, and not before, or by the
admirall nor his lieutenant in any manner.
4 Coke, supra note 34, at *134; see also 1 Bacon, supra note 32, at *623 (explaining
general rule “[t]hat the Admiral’s Jurisdiction is confined to Matters arising on the High
Seas only, and that he cannot take Conuzance of Contracts, &c. made or done in any River,
Haven or Creek within any County; and that all Matters arising within these are triable by
the Common Law”); 1 Sir John Comyns, A Digest of the Laws of England 275 (London,
Strahan & Woodfall 1780) (“[T]he Court of Admiralty has no Jurisdiction in any Cause
which arises upon Land, or within any County.”); 2 A General Treatise of Naval Trade and
Commerce 422 (London, E. and R. Nutt & Gosling 1739) (“All Maritime Causes, or Causes
arising wholly upon the Sea, out of the Jurisdiction of any Country, this Court [of
Admiralty] hath Power to determine; but a Judgment of a Thing done upon Land, is
void . . . .”).
90. Cf. The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428, 429 (1825)
(following English practice of limiting admiralty jurisdiction over maritime contracts to
“cases where the service was substantially performed, or to be performed, upon the sea, or
upon waters within the ebb and flow of the tide”), overruled in part by The Genesee Chief,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851); Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1341–42
(describing tidewater doctrine and its initial acceptance and ultimate rejection by Supreme
Court).
91. See, e.g., Spanish Ambassadour v. Buntish, (1615) 80 Eng. Rep. 1156, 1157
(Adm.) (explaining that there was “just cause for a prohibition” because admiral exceeded
his jurisdiction over matters arising on the high seas); see also 1 Bacon, supra note 32, at
*558 (explaining that admiralty and ecclesiastical courts are also “not Courts of Record,
but derive their Authority from the Crown, and are subject to the Controul of the King’s
Temporal Courts, when they exceed their Jurisdiction”); 1 Comyns, supra note 89, at 276
(“So, upon Motion, after a Suggestion, that the Suit in the Admiralty is for a Matter out of
their Jurisdiction, and after Oyer of the Libel, and Day given to the Party, a Prohibition
goes.”).
92. See 3 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *68–69 (“The maritime courts, or such as have
power and jurisdiction to determine all maritime injuries, arising upon the seas, or in parts
out of reach of the common law, are only the court of admiralty, and [its] courts of
appeal.”); Thomas Parker, The Laws of Shipping and Insurance 268 (London, Strahan &
Woodfall 1775) (same).

R

R

R

R

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\109-1\COL101.txt

24

unknown

Seq: 24

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

22-DEC-08

11:13

[Vol. 109:1

pointed by commission out of Chancery.93 Thus, the law maritime operated not in preference to municipal law, but in its own separate sphere.
3. The Law of State-State Relations. — The question whether the law of
state-state relations could preempt English municipal law did not squarely
arise in late eighteenth century English legal writings. In large measure,
courts administered the two bodies of law independently of each other.
The law of prize—a branch of admiralty that directly implicated sovereign relations—provided a rule of decision in courts of admiralty, which
lacked jurisdiction to apply municipal law governing actions arising upon
land.94 Since an admiralty court lacked jurisdiction over questions of municipal law,95 it also lacked any opportunity to resolve conflicts that might
exist between the law of nations and municipal law.96
Moreover, even when courts had authority to administer rules from
both sources of law, they strained to find constructions of municipal law
that did not derogate from the law of nations.97 The law of state-state
relations could furnish a rule of decision in the courts of Westminster,
and thus conflict with municipal law was at least conceivable there. For
example, the law of nations provided public ministers with certain privileges and immunities in English courts. Lord Mansfield suggested in
1764 that an act of Parliament could not change these privileges. In
93. 3 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *69 (“From the sentences of the admiralty judge
an appeal always lay, in ordinary course, to the king in chancery . . . . But . . . upon appeal
made to the chancery, the sentence definitive of the delegates appointed by the
commission shall be final.”); 4 Coke, supra note 34, at *135 (“And if an erroneous
sentence be given in that court, no writ of error, but an appeale before certain delegates
do lye, as it appeareth by the statute of 8 Eliz. reginae, cap. 5. which proveth that it is no
court of record.”); 1 Comyns, supra note 89, at 279 (“If there be an Appeal from a
Sentence in the Court of Admiralty, it may be to the King in Chancery, who thereupon
makes a Commission to Delegates.”).
94. As Blackstone described it:
[I]n case of prize vessels, taken in time of war, in any part of the world, and
condemned in any courts of admiralty or vice-admiralty as lawful prize, the appeal
lies to certain commissioners of appeals consisting chiefly of the privy council,
and not to judges delegates. And this by virtue of divers treaties with foreign
nations; by which particular courts are established in all the maritime countries of
Europe for the decision of this question, whether lawful prize or not: for this
being a question between subjects of different states, it belongs entirely to the law
of nations, and not to the municipal laws of either country, to determine it.
3 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *69; see also Parker, supra note 92, at 269 (“[T]his being a
question between subjects of different states, it belongs entirely to the law of nations, and
not to the municipal laws of either country, to determine it.”).
95. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing this limitation).
96. See, e.g., The Recovery, (1807) 165 Eng. Rep. 955, 958 (Adm.) (asserting that
“this is a Court of the Law of Nations, though sitting here under the authority of the King
of Great Britain,” and it thus administers “the law of nations, simply, and exclusively of the
introduction of principles borrowed from our own municipal jurisprudence” (emphasis
omitted)).
97. Since the law of nations was part of the common law, this practice comported with
English courts’ practice of construing municipal acts to not derogate from the common
law. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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Heathfield v. Chilton, he remarked that the statute in question “did not
intend to alter, nor can alter the law of nations” insofar as the law of nations recognizes privileges in foreign ministers.98 In evaluating this statement, it is important to distinguish the content of the law of nations
(which reflects the practice of many nations) from the obligation of a municipal court to follow the law of nations if an enactment of its sovereign
provides otherwise. In Chilton, Mansfield observed that an act of Parliament cannot alter the law of nations itself. This is, of course, true in the
sense that the law of nations was not made by any single nation, but constituted the practice of many nations. Mansfield did not purport to address, however, what rule of decision a court should apply if faced with an
irreconcilable conflict between the law of nations and an act of Parliament; in this case, he construed the act of Parliament to comport with the
law of nations.99
Other judges also assumed that Parliament sought to act in concert
with the law of nations, and refused to speculate about potential conflicts.
In 1811, in The Fox, Sir William Scott addressed the following question:
“What would be the duty of the Court under Orders in Council that were
repugnant to the law of nations?”100 He began by observing “that this
Court is bound to administer the law of nations to the subjects of other
countries in the different relations in which they may be placed towards
this country and its government.”101 “At the same time,” he continued,
“it is strictly true, that by the constitution of this country, the King in
Council possesses legislative rights over this Court, and has power to issue
orders and instructions which it is bound to obey and enforce; and these
constitute the written law of this Court.”102 A judicial practice operated
to avoid conflict between “[t]hese two propositions, that the Court is
bound to administer the law of nations, and that it is bound to enforce
the King’s Orders in Council”: specifically, that “these orders and instructions are presumed to conform themselves, under the given circumstances, to the principles of its unwritten law.”103
Scott would not indulge the hypothetical question of what rule of
decision a court should apply if the written law of England plainly did not
conform to the law of nations in a given case. “[T]his Court will not let
itself loose into speculations as to what would be its duty under such an
emergency, because it cannot without extreme indecency, presume that
98. (1767) 98 Eng. Rep. 50, 50 (K.B.) (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 51. Outside his judicial role, Mansfield appears to have addressed the
question in some measure. Responding to an opinion by Mayor James Duane of New York
that cited Mansfield for the proposition that the common law adopted the law of nations,
Mansfield reportedly stated that “the law of nations could never be pleaded against a law of
the land.” Hamburger, supra note 77, at 351–52.
100. (1811) 165 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1121 (Adm.).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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any such emergency will happen.”104 Indeed, he answered this question
as he expected a common law court would respond if asked to enforce an
act of Parliament that contradicted “principles of natural reason and justice.”105 This “is a question which I presume they would not entertain a
priori, because they will not entertain a priori the supposition that any
such will arise.”106 Even though English judges and writers described the
law of nations as a part of the law of the land, this description did not
necessarily imply that it displaced other parts of the law of the land.
C. The Law of Nations and Crown Prerogatives in Foreign Relations
Rather than operating to displace other parts of the law of land, core
principles of the law of nations operated to uphold certain municipal
prerogatives. Specifically, Blackstone described judicial enforcement of
principles of the law of state-state relations as facilitating “prerogatives of
the Crown” in foreign relations.107 In his Commentaries, Blackstone explained why judicial enforcement of certain principles of the law of nations was necessary to sustain those prerogatives. He noted the general
criminal prohibition in English law against violating the law of nations to
make his point. Specifically, Blackstone noted that the municipal laws of
England subjected to punishment “any subject committing acts of hostility upon any nation in league with the king” and characterized such conduct as “a very great offence against the law of nations.”108 English law
provided this criminal penalty, Blackstone explained, to sustain the
Crown’s prerogatives in foreign relations against acts that would undermine them.109
Blackstone enumerated several particular prerogatives of the Crown
in foreign affairs; for almost all of them, he explained how judicial enforcement of specific law of nations principles sustained them. First,
“[t]he king . . . has the sole power of sending embassadors to foreign
states, and receiving embassadors at home.”110 In describing this power,
Blackstone explained that “[t]he rights, the powers, the duties, and the
privileges of embassadors are determined by the law of nature and nations, and not by any municipal constitutions.”111 Blackstone recognized
that “writers on the law of nations” disputed the extent of certain ambassadorial rights, such as immunity from prosecution, but noted that
English law afforded them broad protection.112 To sustain the authority
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1121.
Id. at 1122.
1 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *252.
Id. at *252–53.
Id.
Id. at *253.
Id.
Id.
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of the Crown to determine foreign relations, “the security of embassadors
is of more importance than the punishment of a particular crime.”113
Next, Blackstone stated that “[i]t is . . . the king’s prerogative to
make treaties, leagues, and alliances with foreign states and princes. For
it is by the law of nations essential to the goodness of a league, that it be
made by the sovereign power.”114 Furthermore, “[u]pon the same principle the king has also the sole prerogative of making war and peace.”115
Under the law of nations, Blackstone explained, “the right of making war,
which by nature subsisted in every individual, is given up by all private
persons that enter into society, and is vested in the sovereign power
. . . .”116 “It would indeed be extremely improper,” Blackstone reasoned,
“that any number of subjects should have the power of binding the supreme magistrate, and putting him against his will in a state of war.”117 If
England were to give another nation cause for war by waging hostilities
against that nation, it would be the decision of the Crown as sole holder
of the prerogative to make war. For the same reason, the prerogative to
issue letters of marque and reprisal, as well as to grant safe conducts,
rested with the Crown.118
Most important for present purposes, the principles of the law of
nations that Blackstone identified as necessary to maintain “the principal
prerogatives of the king respecting this nation’s intercourse with foreign
nations”119 reflected the ubiquitous perfect rights of sovereigns.120
Blackstone recognized that private hostilities against a nation, or a violation of certain rights of its representatives, could inappropriately lead a
nation into a state of war.121 To sustain the Crown’s control over foreign
relations, English law enforced principles of the law of nations prohibiting private hostilities and respecting the rights of ambassadors, including
through its criminal law.122 Enforcement of the law of nations in this
context did not preempt English law or otherwise limit municipal authority; to the contrary, it operated to preserve it.
***
From this analysis, three points emerge that illuminate early understandings and disputes regarding law of nations in the American system.
First, English courts assumed a common law power to adopt the law of
113. Id. at *254.
114. Id. at *257.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at *258–60.
119. Id. at *261.
120. See supra Part I.A.2 (explaining concept of perfect rights of nations and how
their violation was understood to provide just cause for war).
121. 1 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *258 (recognizing that an individual, by waging
hostilities, could generate a state of war with another nation).
122. Id. at *252–54.
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nations as part of English municipal law. Whether federal courts had the
same power would be a subject of fierce debate in the first decades following ratification. Second, when English courts described the law of nations as part of the law of the land, they did not necessarily imply that it
took priority over other parts of the law of the land, including not only
acts of Parliament but also (in some instances) local custom. Accordingly, American judges and writers who borrowed this phrase were speaking of a concept that bears no relationship to the distinctly American
concept of supreme law of the land—a novel construct adopted by the
Supremacy Clause to resolve the inevitable conflicts that would arise in a
federal republic with dual sovereignty. Third, one aspect of the law of
nations—the perfect rights of sovereigns—served the special function of
implementing and preserving certain prerogatives of the Crown in foreign relations. The Marshall Court would infer from the Constitution’s
allocation of similar foreign relations prerogatives to the political
branches that American courts should likewise respect the perfect rights
of sovereigns as a means of upholding that allocation.
II. THE LAW

OF

NATIONS

AND THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

The Constitution assigned to the federal government certain foreign
relations powers that were familiar prerogatives of the English Crown,
including recognition of foreign nations and control over war and peace.
It also authorized federal court jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
likely to involve the law of nations. Federal court jurisdiction over cases
implicating the perfect rights of sovereigns would prevent state courts
from disregarding them, and thereby undermining U.S. foreign policy.
Thus, the concept of perfect rights provides important context for understanding the Constitution’s allocation of foreign affairs powers. As the
following sections explain, a key reason the Constitution authorized this
jurisdiction was to preserve the power of the federal political branches to
recognize foreign states, comply with the law of nations, and conduct foreign relations.
It would be a couple of decades after ratification before the Supreme
Court would clearly articulate the constitutional basis of its authority to
enforce certain principles derived from the law of nations as the law of
the land. At the time of the founding, however, it was clear that federal
jurisdiction over cases implicating the law of nations would further federal political branch authority over foreign relations vis-à-vis the states.
Section A describes the states’ post-independence incorporation of the
English common law, and how their violations of the law of nations contributed to the need for the Federal Convention. Section B explains the
Constitution’s allocation of foreign affairs authority to the federal political branches and its denial of corresponding powers to the states. Finally,
section C examines the Founders’ assumption that aspects of the law of
nations would operate in American courts, and their use of federal juris-
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diction to uphold the foreign affairs prerogatives of the political
branches.
A. The Law of Nations and Pre-constitutional State Practice
After declaring independence, states adopted the common law of
England and, by incorporation, the law of nations. “[E]leven of the original thirteen colonies immediately adopted ‘receiving statutes’ expressly
incorporating the common law as state law.”123 The twelfth state, New
Jersey, received the common law by including a similar provision in its
Constitution of 1776.124 Connecticut did not adopt a written constitution
until 1818, but its judiciary incorporated the common law into its unwritten constitution “so far as it corresponds with our circumstances and situation.”125 Accordingly, prior to ratification of the Constitution, state
courts applied the various branches of the law of nations as part of their
common law.
For example, in a famous Pennsylvania case predating the
Constitution, the defendant (Longchamps) was indicted at common law
for assaulting and threatening the Consul General of France (Marbois)
“in violation of the law of nations, against the peace and dignity of the
United States and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.”126 Chief Justice
M’Kean described the case as one “of first impression in the United
States” that “must be determined on the principles of the law of nations,
which form a part of the municipal law of Pennsylvania.”127 The jury
convicted the defendant and the Chief Justice reiterated that the law of
nations, “in its full extent, is part of the law of this State, and is to be
collected from the practice of different Nations, and the authority of writers.”128 The sentence—“a little more than two years imprisonment” and
a fine129—was chosen not only to punish the offender, but also “to deter
others from the commission of the like crime, preserve the honor of the
State, and maintain peace with our great and good Ally, and the whole
world.”130
123. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 1027 n.307 (2002).
124. Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United
States, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 791, 799 (1951).
125. 1 Zephaniah Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 1
(Windham, John Byrne Pub. 1795); see also id. (“A common law peculiar to ourselves,
resulting from our local circumstances, has been established by the decision of our courts;
but has never been committed to writing.”).
126. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 111 (Pa. O. & T. 1784)
(emphases omitted).
127. Id. at 114.
128. Id. at 116 (emphases omitted). For a discussion situating Respublica in the early
debate over complete judicial, as opposed to selective legislative, incorporation of offenses
against the law of nations, see Hamburger, supra note 77, at 350 n.43.
129. Respublica, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 118.
130. Id. at 117.
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Though states incorporated the law of nations, their violations of it—
especially respecting the Treaty of Paris of 1783—were notorious. One of
the primary reasons that the Framers drafted a new constitution was the
growing sense that the existing confederation was inadequate to enable
the United States to ensure compliance with its obligations under treaties
and the law of nations.131 The Founders perceived this situation to be
fraught with danger. The first defect Edmund Randolph pointed out
when he opened the Federal Convention was the confederation’s inability to prevent other countries from waging war against the United States
as a consequence of state violations of the law of nations.132 Similarly, in
urging ratification, John Jay stressed that “[i]t is of high importance to
the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations,” and that “this
will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national Government,
than it could be . . . by thirteen separate States.”133
Historically, the most established principles of the law of nations—
the perfect rights of sovereigns—respected nations’ territorial sovereignty, equal rights on the high seas, treaty rights, and representative
agents operating in other nations. Nations considered the violation of
these principles hostile actions justifying war. Prominent members of the
founding generation presumed general knowledge of the idea of perfect
rights under the law of nations. For instance, notable early commentators on American law, such as James Wilson and James Kent, wrote as if
their readers were familiar with the concept of perfect rights. In his
Lectures on Law, James Wilson observed that nations should abide by treaties they make, for “by not preserving them, they subject themselves to all
the consequences of violating the perfect right of those, to whom they
were made.”134 The consequences, of course, were forcible retaliation by
the treaty partner. In his Commentaries on American Law, James Kent discussed the importance that one nation “not violate the perfect rights of
other nations,” and referenced the substance of certain perfect rights—
such as a nation’s “perfect right to judge for itself whether the language
or conduct of a foreign minister be admissible,” and a neutral’s “perfect
right to avail himself of the vessel of his friend, to transport his property.”135 Other writers and officials similarly referenced the concept of
perfect rights, both as a general principle of law and in the context of the

131. See Janis, supra note 49, at 56 (“[I]t was the inability of the United States under
the Articles of Confederation to live up to its obligations as a sovereign state under
international law which proved to be one of the principal causes of the downfall of that
early form of US government.”).
132. 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 24–25 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter Farrand’s Records].
133. The Federalist No. 3, at 14–15 (John Jay) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
134. 1 James Wilson, The Works of the Honourable James Wilson, L.L.D. 176 (Bird
Wilson ed., Philadelphia, Lorenzo Press 1804).
135. 1 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 25, 38, 119 (1826).
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law of nations.136 Early American jurists, including John Marshall, took
for granted the existence of perfect rights.137 Supreme Court Justices
relied upon such rights, explicitly and implicitly, in several prominent
early cases implicating the law of nations, as Part III will explain. Thus,
those who drafted and ratified the Constitution were undoubtedly familiar with the concept of perfect rights under the law of nations and the
serious consequences that flowed from their violation.
B. The Foreign Relations Powers of the Federal Political Branches
The Constitution is structured to enable the federal government to
conduct foreign relations and ensure compliance with the law of nations,
particularly the perfect rights of sovereigns. Article II provides that
“[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America;”138 that “[t]he President shall be the Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States;”139 that
“[h]e shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties;”140 that “he shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;”141 and that “he shall receive Ambassadors
and other public Ministers.”142 The power to send and receive ambassadors enabled the new federal government, on behalf of the United States,
136. See, e.g., William Barton, A Dissertation on the Freedom of Navigation and
Maritime Commerce 53–54 (1802) (explaining that when a right is perfect, “no law
restrains me, or no person has any right to hinder me from recovering it” (quoting 1
Rutherforth, supra note 56, at 29)); id. at 280–81 (explaining how Pufendorf and Grotius
considered violation of a perfect right to be just cause for war); William John Duane, The
Law of Nations, Investigated in a Popular Manner, Addressed to the Farmers of the United
States 28 (Philadelphia, William Duane 1809) (explaining how neutrals, by treaty,
conceded certain of their perfect rights to belligerents); An Essay on the Rights and Duties
of Nations, Relative to Fugitives from Justice 10–13 (Boston, David Carlisle 1807) (“Much
confusion in our reasoning will be avoided by attending to the distinction which divides
perfect from imperfect rights . . . .”); Letter from John Jay to William Wilberforce (Apr. 14,
1806), in 2 The Life of John Jay 307 (William Jay ed., New York, J. & J. Harper 1833) (“It
appears to me, that every independent state has, as such, a perfect right at all times, whether
at war or at peace, to make grants to and treaties with any other independent state.”).
137. See, e.g., The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 426 (1815) (Marshall, C.J.) (“A
belligerent has a perfect right to arm in his own defence; and a neutral has a perfect right
to transport his goods in a belligerent vessel.”); Hannay v. Eve, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 242, 247
(1806) (Marshall, C.J.) (describing Congress as “having a perfect right, in a state of open
war, to tempt the navigators of enemy-vessels to bring them into the American ports”).
138. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
139. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
140. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
141. Id.
142. Id. art. II, § 3.
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to recognize foreign nations as equal and independent sovereigns possessing certain perfect rights.143
In addition, Article I gives Congress power to “regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations;”144 “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization;”145 regulate the value “of foreign Coin;”146 “constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court”147 (and thereby provide foreign states and
citizens with an alternative to adjudication in state court); “define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses
against the Law of Nations;”148 “declare War, grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;”149
“raise and support Armies;”150 “provide and maintain a Navy;”151 “provide for calling forth the Militia to . . . repel Invasions;”152 “provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia;”153 and “make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.”154
At the same time, Article I specifically restricts the states’ ability to
conduct their own foreign relations, ensuring they do not exercise powers assigned to the federal government.155 Section 10 provides in abso143. Although today we often equate recognition of foreign states with the President’s
power to receive ambassadors, the Founders arguably understood the act of sending
ambassadors as an equal, if not more important, step in the process. See Adler, supra note
50, at 137, 146–49. The constitutional design supports this conclusion because it gives the
President unilateral power to receive ambassadors, U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, but requires
Senate approval to send ambassadors, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In addition to sending and
receiving ambassadors, the President and the Senate arguably trigger recognition of a
foreign state or government by making a treaty, and Congress arguably triggers
recognition by appropriating money to pay the expenses and salary of an ambassador to a
country seeking recognition. See Julius Goebel, Jr., The Recognition Policy of the United
States 131–33 (1915) (recounting debate over recognition of South American
governments and whether to send ministers to the new nations). Once the United States
recognized a foreign nation—by whatever means—the United States would risk giving that
nation just cause for war if it failed, as a whole, to respect the perfect rights of that nation.
144. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
145. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
146. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
147. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
148. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. For an insightful analysis of this power, see J. Andrew Kent,
Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of
Nations, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 843, 852 (2007) (arguing clause authorizes regulation of
individuals whose conduct violates international law, and authorizes punishment of foreign
and domestic states for violations of international law).
149. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
150. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
151. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
152. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
153. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
154. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
155. See generally Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1295–99.
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lute terms that “No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation; [or] grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal.”156 It also
states that:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in
such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.157
Taken together, these provisions assign several specific powers concerning foreign relations to the political branches of the federal government; notably, they apportion all of the foreign relations powers that
Blackstone identified as Crown prerogatives158 between the President,
the Senate, and Congress as a whole. The Constitution disables states
from exercising these powers in pursuit of their own foreign relations.159
In addition, the Constitution enables the federal government to override
state law by a variety of means—by exercising its express constitutional
powers, by making a “Treaty,” or by enacting a “Law.” All of these methods rely on “the supreme Law of the Land” and thus override contrary
state law.160 Addressing one of the flaws that Randolph saw in the
Articles of Confederation, the Constitution requires state legislators and
executive officials (as well as state judges) to take an oath “to support this
Constitution” and its hierarchy of authorities.161
C. Foreign Relations and the Judicial Branch
The Constitution also uses state and federal judiciaries to uphold the
political branches’ conduct of foreign relations. It provides two limited
judicial mechanisms to uphold federal political authority when federal
156. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
157. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
158. See supra notes 108–118 and accompanying text.
159. Although Article I, Section 10 disables the states in key respects from conducting
their own foreign policy, it does contain several omissions. For example, it does not
prohibit the states from sending and receiving ambassadors. Nonetheless, the Founders
understood that some federal powers necessarily imply exclusivity. See The Federalist No.
32, supra note 133, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining Constitution conferred
exclusive federal power and alienated state sovereignty “where it granted an authority to
the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally
contradictory and repugnant”); The Federalist No. 82, supra note 133, at 553–54 (Alexander
Hamilton) (stating that “where an authority is granted to the union with which a similar
authority in the states would be utterly incompatible,” such authority is “exclusively
delegated to the federal head”). Because the Founders understood that the “union will
undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members,” The
Federalist No. 80, supra note 133, at 536 (Alexander Hamilton), permitting states to send
and receive ambassadors “would necessarily undermine the foreign relations of the United
States as a whole,” Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1298.
160. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (defining “the supreme Law of the Land” and stating
that “the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”).
161. Id. art. VI, cl. 3.
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and state law, or federal and state actors, come into conflict: (1) The
Supremacy and Arising Under Clauses provide for judicial enforcement
of the supreme law of the land—i.e., the Constitution, laws, and treaties
of the United States, and (2) Article III authorizes federal court jurisdiction over categories of cases likely to implicate various branches of the law
of nations. This section explains these two mechanisms and their limits.
1. The Supremacy of Federal Enactments. — The Founders of the
Constitution adopted the Supremacy and Arising Under Clauses of the
Constitution to prevent states from undermining the proper enforcement
of enacted federal laws. Through these clauses, they designated the
“Constitution,” “Laws,” and “Treaties” as supreme municipal law in the
states, binding on state judges and enforceable in federal courts. Unlike
other provisions of the Constitution,162 these provisions make no reference to the customary law of nations, and participants in the ratification
debates did not understand them to incorporate such law per se. At the
same time, members of the founding generation would have understood
certain perfect rights to be integral to political branch recognition of foreign nations—and thus would have assumed them to supply crucial background context regarding the legal consequences of the political
branches’ exercise of their constitutional powers of recognition.
The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.163
In parallel language, the Arising Under Clause provides: “The judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”164
As explained, scholars adhering to the modern position have asserted that the customary law of nations constitutes part of “the Laws of
the United States” within the meaning of these clauses. Accordingly, in
their view, it qualifies as “the supreme Law of the Land” and provides a
predicate for federal arising under jurisdiction.165 Scholars adhering to
the revisionist position have refuted this assertion, arguing that the text
and structure of the Constitution demonstrate that “Laws of the United
States” in the Supremacy and Arising Under Clauses refer solely to acts of
162. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress power “To define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of
Nations”).
163. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
164. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
165. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
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Congress.166 The framing and ratification of these clauses lend support
to the argument that “Laws” meant acts of Congress, not forms of customary law, including the customary law of nations.167
The delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787 considered several
means by which to ensure the supremacy of national prerogatives against
the states. Among the most debated means was a congressional negative
of state laws contravening national prerogatives,168 which Madison
deemed “essential to the efficacy & security of the Genl. Govt.”169 The
Convention, however, following debate on the negative, ultimately rejected it.170 Immediately thereafter, Luther Martin proposed a
supremacy provision as an alternative:
[T]he Legislative acts of the U. S. made by virtue & in pursuance
of the articles of Union, and all treaties made & ratified under
the authority of the U. S. shall be the supreme law of the respective States, as far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said
States, or their Citizens and inhabitants—& that the Judiciaries
of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions,
any thing in the respective laws of the individual States to the
contrary notwithstanding.171
166. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien
Tort Statute and Article III, 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 587, 597–616 (2002) [hereinafter Bradley,
Alien Tort Statute] (arguing that “Laws of the United States” in Supremacy and Arising
Under Clauses was not originally understood to encompass the law of nations).
167. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79
Tex. L. Rev. 1321, 1334–37 (2001) [hereinafter Clark, Separation of Powers] (equating
“Law” as used in Article I, Section 7, with “Laws” as used in the Supremacy Clause); cf.
Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International
Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 875 (2007) [hereinafter
Bradley et al., Sosa] (arguing pre-Erie courts “did not view general common law as having
the status of [preemptive] federal law”).
For extended treatment of the histories of the Supremacy and Arising Under Clauses,
see Anthony J. Bellia Jr., The Origins of Article III “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 57 Duke
L.J. 263, 292–317 (2007) [hereinafter Bellia, Origins] (discussing Arising Under Clause);
Clark, Separation of Powers, supra, at 1346–55 (discussing Supremacy Clause); James S.
Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of
Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 696, 702–73 (1998)
(discussing Supremacy and Arising Under Clauses).
168. The “Virginia Plan,” as put forth by Edmund Randolph on May 29, 1787,
provided at least three such mechanisms. First, it would have empowered the national
legislature “to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of
the National Legislature the articles of Union.” 1 Farrand’s Records, supra note 132, at 21.
Second, it would have empowered the national legislature “to call forth the force of the
Union” against states that violated the articles of the plan. Id. Third, it would have
provided for a national judiciary comprising “inferior tribunals” and “one or more
supreme tribunals” with jurisdiction over several classes of cases, including those involving
“the national peace and harmony.” Id. at 21–22.
169. 2 id. at 27.
170. Id. at 27–28.
171. Id. at 28–29 (quoting Luther Martin resolution). The language of this
supremacy provision tracked the language of a supremacy provision that William
Paterson’s initial “New Jersey Plan” had included:
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The Convention unanimously adopted this proposal to bind state judiciaries to national “acts” and “treaties” as “the supreme law of the respective States.”172
The Convention next considered what role a national judiciary
should play in maintaining the supremacy of enacted federal laws. It ultimately adopted a resolution proposed by Madison to extend jurisdiction
to “cases arising under laws passed by the general Legislature, and to such
other questions as involve the National peace and harmony.”173 Madison
apparently included the arising under category to ensure—following the
defeat of the negative—that Congress could enable federal courts to apply federal laws as rules of decision in order to uphold their supremacy
over contrary state law.174
In further proceedings, the Convention conformed the language of
the Supremacy Clause to that of the Arising Under Clause, strengthening
both provisions as interlocking means of ensuring the supremacy of federal law.175 It unanimously extended the Supremacy Clause to encompass not only national laws and treaties, but the Constitution itself.176
Soon thereafter it extended federal court jurisdiction beyond cases arising under “laws” passed by the national legislature to encompass cases
arising under “this Constitution”177 and under “treaties made or which
shall be made” under the authority of the United States.178 Through this
process, as James Liebman and William Ryan have explained, the Framers
[A]ll Acts of the U. States in Congs. made by virtue & in pursuance of the powers
hereby & by the articles of confederation vested in them, and all Treaties made &
ratified under the authority of the U. States shall be the supreme law of the
respective States so far forth as those Acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States
or their Citizens, and that the Judiciary of the several States shall be bound
thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the Individual States
to the contrary notwithstanding . . . .
1 id. at 245.
172. 3 id. at 286–87.
173. 2 id. at 38–39.
174. Luther Martin expressed this understanding of events in his Information to the
General Assembly of the State of Maryland. He stated that his view at the Convention was that,
in light of the Supremacy Clause that he introduced, state court jurisdiction in the first
instance over “all cases that should arise under the laws of the general government” would
suffice to maintain the supremacy of federal laws. Luther Martin, Information to the
General Assembly of the State of Maryland (Nov. 29, 1787), reprinted in 2 The Complete
Anti-Federalist 27, 57 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). The “majority” of delegates, however,
he explained, believed that inferior national courts were necessary “for the enforcing of
[national] laws.” Id.
175. Peter Strauss has recently suggested that the Convention’s revision of the
Supremacy Clause to refer to “Laws” instead of “Acts” argues in favor of reading the clause
to encompass unwritten law. See Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1567, 1568–71 (2008). For arguments that this shift “is best understood as merely a
stylistic change,” see Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1681, 1688 (2008) [hereinafter Clark, Procedural Safeguards].
176. 2 Farrand’s Records, supra note 132, at 381–82, 389, 394–95, 409.
177. Id. at 430.
178. Id. at 431.
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devised a “judicial review device” to replace “federal legislative review of
state laws for consistency with national law.”179
In short, evidence from the framing of the Supremacy and Arising
Under Clauses suggests that the Framers understood these clauses to be
concerned solely with the enforcement of laws of the United States made
under the authority of the United States—the “Constitution,” “Laws,” and
“Treaties”—by domestic political actors according to distinct sets of procedures found in the Constitution.180
Of course, to the extent that the Constitution, a federal statute, or a
treaty incorporated aspects of the customary law of nations, those aspects
would be part of preemptive, jurisdiction-supporting federal law. The
Founders plainly would have understood that the federal political
branches could trigger the clauses by incorporating aspects of the law of
nations into federal laws and treaties.181 As the next section will explain,
federal officials initially embraced, but later repudiated, the idea that the
United States as a whole had somehow received the common law, and
thus the law of nations. As occasions arose for providing fuller explanations of constitutional powers, members of the founding generation
would come to describe the Constitution itself as requiring courts to respect certain perfect rights of the foreign nations in order to uphold the
prerogatives of the political branches. These perfect rights of sovereigns
were defined by the law of nations. Absent such constitutional mandate
or political branch incorporation, the terms of the Supremacy and Arising Under Clauses were not understood to encompass the law of nations.
2. Enforcement of the Law of Nations. — Because the Arising Under
Clause did not cover all cases involving the law of nations, the
Constitution provided an alternative mechanism to ensure the proper application of the broader law of nations—giving federal courts jurisdiction
over categories of cases in which various branches of the law of nations
were likely to apply. Certain Framers favored going further and giving
179. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 167, at 733. The ratification debates reflect this
understanding of the Supremacy and Arising Under Clauses. Participants described
arising under jurisdiction as encompassing cases in which a law made under the authority
of the United States provided a determinative rule of decision. See Bellia, Origins, supra
note 167, at 306–12. Likewise, participants justified arising under jurisdiction as a means
of ensuring impartial enforcement of federal enactments and promoting their uniform
interpretation. See id. at 312–16.
180. See U.S. Const. art. VII (specifying procedures for initial “Establishment of this
Constitution”); id. art. V (establishing procedures for amending “this Constitution”); id.
art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (prescribing procedures for transforming bill into law); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2
(setting forth procedures for making treaties); see also Clark, Separation of Powers, supra
note 167, at 1331 (“Both the specificity of, and the purposeful variations among, the
procedures prescribed by the Constitution for adopting the ‘Constitution,’ ‘Laws,’ and
‘Treaties’ suggest exclusivity.”).
181. For example, Congress enacted a statute to punish those who commit “the crime
of piracy, as defined by the law of nations,” on the high seas. Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77,
§ 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14. The Supreme Court upheld Congress’s incorporation of the law
of nations by reference in United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158–60 (1820).
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federal courts jurisdiction over all cases arising under the law of nations.182 The Convention, however, chose instead to extend the judicial
power to several types of cases in which the law of nations was likely to
apply. Prominent Framers strenuously argued for federal jurisdiction
over these categories (particularly those implicating the law of state-state
relations) in order to prevent state courts from generating foreign conflict by disregarding such law.
Proponents of the Constitution emphasized that the United States
must observe the law of nations in order to obtain a place of respect
among other nations.183 Indeed, the states’ inability to treat British creditors fairly (as required by the Treaty of Peace)184 or to protect foreign
ambassadors (as required by the law of nations)185 stood among the
events that precipitated the Federal Convention. As mentioned, when
Edmund Randolph opened the Convention, one of the first points he
made was that the confederation was powerless to counteract a state that
“acts against a foreign power contrary to the laws of nations or violates a
treaty.”186 Both Randolph and Madison expressed concern that states, by
disregarding the law of nations, would lead the confederation into armed
conflict. Madison opposed Paterson’s “New Jersey Plan” in part because
the federal court jurisdiction it provided was insufficient to “prevent
those violations of the law of nations & of Treaties which if not prevented
must involve us in the calamities of foreign wars.”187
182. An outline of the Pinckney Plan found among the Wilson papers proposed
establishing “a federal judicial Court” with appellate jurisdiction over “all Causes wherein
Questions shall arise . . . on the Law of Nations.” 2 Farrand’s Records, supra note 132, at
136. Similarly, another document in Wilson’s hand proposed giving the federal judiciary
authority to hear appeals in all cases that may arise “on the Law of Nations, or general
commercial or marine Laws.” Id. at 157 (emphasis omitted).
183. See infra note 295 and accompanying text.
184. Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and
Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 Yale
J. Int’l L. 1, 6–20 (1996) (explaining that Founders adopted alienage jurisdiction in
response to states’ attempts to prevent British creditors from collecting their debts).
185. See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A
Badge of Honor, 83 Am. J. Int’l L. 461, 478 (1989) (recounting congressional decision to
“vest at least one set of federal courts with explicit jurisdiction over” cases involving
violations of the law of nations, “in the knowledge that the federal judiciary could be
counted on to enforce the law of nations as a national obligation,” and to avoid risk that
“state courts . . . might not recognize and apply the law of nations”).
186. 1 Farrand’s Records, supra note 132, at 24. According to Randolph:
If a State acts against a foreign power contrary to the laws of nations or violates a
treaty, [the confederation] cannot punish that State, or compel its obedience to
the treaty. It can only leave the offending State to the operations of the offended
power. It therefore cannot prevent a war. If the rights of an ambassador be
invaded by any citizen it is only in a few States that any laws exist to punish the
offender.
Id. at 24–25.
187. Id. at 316; see also A Letter of His Excellency Edmund Randolph, Esquire, on
the Federal Constitution (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist, supra note
174, at 86, 88 (asserting that “the law of nations is unprovided with sanctions in many cases,
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Article III plainly contemplates federal court jurisdiction over several
categories of cases likely to involve branches of the law of nations well
known to the Framers. In addition to the Arising Under Clause (encompassing the Constitution, laws, and treaties188), Article III specifically delineated additional categories of cases likely to involve the national peace
and harmony. It is significant that the Framers included these categories
as distinct heads of jurisdiction separate and apart from the arising under
grant. The Arising Under Clause and the Supremacy Clause were inextricably linked to the proposition that enacted federal law was supreme law
that all courts, federal and state, must strive to enforce properly and construe uniformly. Accordingly, the Framers delineated other cases involving “national peace and harmony” as distinct from cases arising under the
three enacted forms of the supreme law of the land. As finalized and
ratified, Article III extends the federal judicial power
to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—
to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to
Controversies between two or more States;—between a State
and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different
States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.189
Although several American officials, like earlier English writers,
would come to describe the law of nations as part of the law of the land,
the structure of Article III confirms that they did not mean to convey that
all such law was “the supreme Law of the Land” any more than their
English counterparts did. Nor did they believe such law in itself to be law
“made in pursuance” of the Constitution.190
In 1828, Chief Justice Marshall made this point explicitly in American
Insurance Co. v. Canter.191 In the course of ascertaining whether an inferior territorial court, created by the Florida territorial legislature, had jurisdiction to adjudicate “cases in admiralty,” the Supreme Court held that
such cases are not in themselves “cases arising under the laws and
which deeply affect public dignity and public justice” and predicting that the
confederation might be “doomed to be plunged into war, from its wretched impotency to
check offences against this law”). In the Virginia ratifying convention, Madison also
argued that the failure of states to honor the law of nations was negatively affecting
commercial intercourse. See 10 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution 1469 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993) [hereinafter
Documentary History of the Ratification] (“We well know, Sir, that foreigners cannot get
justice done them in these [state] Courts, and this has prevented many wealthy Gentlemen
from trading or residing among us.”).
188. See supra notes 175–179 and accompanying text.
189. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
190. For additional historical and structural reasons why the Founders would not have
understood the common law and the law of nations to be “made in pursuance” of the
Constitution, see Clark, Procedural Safeguards, supra note 175, at 1685–87.
191. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
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Constitution of the United States.”192 Congress had created two Superior
Courts in the territory of Florida and given them exclusive jurisdiction in
“all cases arising under the laws and Constitution of the United States.”193
One party claimed that the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction by the inferior territorial court was inconsistent with the Superior Court’s exclusive
jurisdiction.194
The Supreme Court squarely rejected this argument. Marshall began by reciting that Article III extends the judicial power to three distinct
classes of cases195: “‘to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors,
or other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.’”196 According to Marshall, these categories are not
interchangeable:
The Constitution certainly contemplates these as three distinct
classes of cases; and if they are distinct, the grant of jurisdiction
over one of them, does not confer jurisdiction over either of the
other two. The discrimination made between them, in the
Constitution, is, we think, conclusive against their identity. If it
were not so, if this were a point open to inquiry, it would be
difficult to maintain the proposition that they are the same. A
case in admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the Constitution
or laws of the United States. These cases are as old as navigation
itself; and the law, admiralty and maritime, as it has existed for
ages, is applied by our Courts to the cases as they arise.197
In short, the Supreme Court expressly stated in Canter that cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction—involving an important branch of the
law of nations—were not categorically cases arising under “the Laws of
the United States” within the meaning of Article III.198
192. Id. at 545.
193. Id. at 543.
194. Id. at 515.
195. These three categories of “Cases,” along with six other categories of
“Controversies,” comprise the nine heads of Article III jurisdiction. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
196. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 545 (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2).
197. Id. at 545–46.
198. Four years earlier, Chief Justice Marshall similarly implied that general principles
of law were not “Laws of the United States” under which a case could arise for purposes of
Article III jurisdiction. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819
(1824). The Court addressed whether a case brought by the Bank of the United States
arose under the act of Congress establishing the Bank and defining its capacities, even
though general principles of law provided the determinative rule of decision. Marshall
framed the jurisdictional question as whether the fact that “general principles of the law”
were involved in the case, in addition to an act of Congress, meant the case did not arise
under federal law. Id. at 819–21. Osborne held that so long as a federal law “forms an
ingredient” of the original cause, “it is in the power of Congress to give [inferior federal
courts] jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be
involved in it.” Id. at 823. This holding necessarily implied that, absent a federal law
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This conclusion in no way diminished the importance of other jurisdictional categories likely to entail application of the law of nations. Most
important, the law of state-state relations could provide rules of decision
not only in admiralty cases, but also in ambassadorial and alienage
cases.199 In The Federalist, Hamilton explained why federal jurisdiction in
cases involving state-state relations was necessary to “the peace of the confederacy.”200 This jurisdiction
rests on a plain proposition, that the peace of the whole ought
not to be left at the disposal of a part. The union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its
members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be
accompanied with the faculty of preventing it. As the denial or
perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any
other manner, is with reason classed among the just causes of
war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are
concerned. This is not less essential to the preservation of the
public faith, than to the security of the public tranquility.201
With respect to maritime disputes in particular, Hamilton observed that
even “[t]he most bigotted idolizers of state authority have not thus far
shewn a disposition to deny the national judiciary cognizance of maritime
causes.”202 These cases “so generally depend on the laws of nations, and
so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are relative to the public peace.”203
Even under the Articles of Confederation, Hamilton noted, “[t]he
most important part of” admiralty and maritime cases—prize cases—fell
within the jurisdiction of the national judiciary,204 which heard “the trial
of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas; and . . . appeals in all
cases of captures.”205 Prize cases arguably had the greatest potential to
affect war and peace. Two warring powers had the right, under the law of
nations, to make prizes of their adversaries’ ships, goods, and effects captured at sea.206 In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, nations
forming an “ingredient” of the original cause, the operation of general law in the case
would be insufficient to establish constitutional arising under jurisdiction.
199. Michael G. Collins, The Diversity Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 42 Va. J. Int’l
L. 649, 655–58 (2002) (suggesting inclusion of these three types of jurisdiction meant
violations of the law of nations would not give rise to federal question jurisdiction); see also
Bradley, Alien Tort Statute, supra note 166, at 598–600 (explaining that these categories
“gave the federal courts substantial authority to hear disputes involving the law of
nations”).
200. The Federalist No. 80, supra note 133, at 534 (Alexander Hamilton).
201. Id. at 535–36.
202. Id. at 538.
203. Id.
204. Id.; see also Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1337 (discussing
Hamilton’s remarks and “significance of the proper disposition of prize cases to the peace
of the Union”).
205. Articles of Confederation art. IX, § 1.
206. Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1334.
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encouraged privateers to capture enemy ships by permitting them to obtain title through condemnation proceedings in admiralty courts.207 Admiralty jurisdiction not only facilitated this function, but also remedied
abuses. “[B]ecause ‘a nation was responsible for the actions of its [privateers]’ . . . it was essential to the public peace and the amicable relations of nations that prize courts adhere closely to the law of nations.”208
As Justice Story explained, “[i]f justice be there denied, the nation itself
becomes responsible to the parties aggrieved,” and the nation to which
the aggrieved parties belong “may vindicate their rights, either by a
peaceful appeal to negotiation, or by a resort to arms.”209
Federal jurisdiction was appropriate in cases of this kind because
state courts might offend foreign nations by disregarding or misapplying
the law of nations. This risk was not strictly limited to cases implicating
perfect rights and the law of state-state relations. The law merchant, or
general commercial law, would often furnish the rule of decision in diversity suits involving both American and foreign citizens, as Swift v. Tyson
famously recognized.210 Likewise, the law maritime typically governed in
private maritime cases.211 The Founders recognized that federal jurisdiction over such cases was necessary to encourage interstate and international trade and commerce.212
Hamilton went further and argued that jurisdiction was warranted
even over cases “which may stand merely on the footing of the municipal
law” rather than “arising upon treaties and the law of nations.”213 Such
jurisdiction was necessary because “an unjust sentence against a foreigner, where the subject of controversy was wholly relative to the lex loci”
could, “if unredressed, be an aggression upon his sovereign, as well as
one which violated the stipulations in a treaty or the general laws of nations.”214 Hamilton justified federal court jurisdiction in these cases on
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1335 (quoting William R. Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty
Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 Am. J. Legal Hist. 117, 124
(1993)).
209. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 865
(Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
210. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); see also supra note 85 and accompanying text
(explaining Swift).
211. See Fletcher, General Common Law, supra note 74, at 1538–54 (providing
example of how the law maritime applied in marine insurance cases).
212. See John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 3, 18, 27 (1948) (explaining importance of international admiralty
litigation and Founders’ perception that federal courts would be more sympathetic to
business interests than would state courts). For example, at the Virginia Ratifying
Convention, Madison argued in favor of diversity jurisdiction on the ground that it was
necessary to counteract the prejudices of state courts that have “prevented many wealthy
gentlemen from trading or residing among us.” 10 Documentary History of the
Ratification, supra note 187, at 1469.
213. The Federalist No. 80, supra note 133, at 536 (Alexander Hamilton).
214. Id.
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the ground that federal courts were less likely than state courts to sanction aggression upon the sovereignty of foreign nations, and thus more
likely to keep the United States out of foreign conflict.
Jay likewise declared it to be “of high importance to the peace of
America, that she observe the laws of nations towards all these Powers . . . .”215 He emphasized the importance of federal court jurisdiction
over cases implicating the law of nations to promote national uniformity
in its application:
[U]nder the national Government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in
one sense, and executed in the same manner—whereas adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or
in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be
consistent . . . .216
The primary way that the Constitution furthered respect for the law of
nations was to authorize federal court jurisdiction over cases likely to implicate it, and to enable Congress to make such jurisdiction exclusive if
necessary. “The wisdom of . . . committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by, and responsible only to one
national Government,” Jay observed, “cannot be too much
commended.”217
As Chief Justice of the United States, Jay provided a similar account
of federal court jurisdiction in Chisholm v. Georgia.218 He explained that
before the Constitution was ratified
the United States had, by taking a place among the nations of
the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations; and it was
their interest as well as their duty to provide, that those laws
should be respected and obeyed; in their national character and
capacity, the United States were responsible to foreign nations
for the conduct of each State, relative to the laws of nations, and
the performance of treaties; and there the inexpediency of referring all such questions to State Courts, and particularly to the
Courts of delinquent States became apparent. . . .
These were among the evils against which it was proper for
the nation, that is, the people of all the United States, to provide
by a national judiciary, to be instituted by the whole nation, and
to be responsible to the whole nation.219
In sum, the Founders thought that federal jurisdiction over cases
likely to implicate the law of nations, or otherwise involve foreign relations, would avoid foreign conflict and foster economic growth. The
Supremacy Clause, Arising Under Clause, and the other Article III juris215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

The Federalist No. 3, supra note 133, at 14 (John Jay).
Id. at 15.
Id.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
Id. at 474 (emphasis omitted).
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dictional grants worked together to uphold federal prerogatives in matters of international concern.
3. Early Limitations on Judicial Enforcement. — It is worth noting, however, a crucial limitation of these judicial mechanisms: Insofar as they
existed to uphold political branch authority, Congress retained authority
to define the extent to which their exercise by courts was necessary. The
Constitution specified the creation of “one Supreme Court,” but left it to
Congress to decide whether to create “inferior Courts” and to specify
their jurisdiction.220 Congress, of course, created lower federal courts in
1789, but did not vest them with original jurisdiction over cases arising
under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.221 In addition, although Congress authorized jurisdiction in diversity suits between foreign citizens and state citizens, it imposed a $500 amount in
controversy requirement.222 This forced most existing British creditors
to sue in state court where they were unlikely to recover.223 They could
raise their rights under the Treaty of Peace in those proceedings, but
federal judicial recourse could only be had through appeal by writ of error in the Supreme Court.224
In at least two areas, however, Congress carefully structured federal
jurisdiction to enable federal courts to prevent state violations of the law
of nations in the first instance. First, section 13 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 gave the Supreme Court exclusive original “jurisdiction of suits or
proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their
domestics, or domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise
consistently with the law of nations.”225 In addition, a year later Congress
used its power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations to
establish that, upon conviction, those who prosecute, solicit, or execute
any writ or process against “any ambassador or other public minister of
220. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
221. In 1801 the outgoing Federalist Congress for the first time gave federal courts
original “cognizance . . . of all cases in law or equity, arising under the constitution and
laws of the United States,” Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92, but the
Jeffersonian Republican Congress repealed that grant in 1802 (along with other measures
outgoing Federalists had enacted to strengthen the Federalist judiciary), see Act of Mar. 8,
1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132. Congress did not again confer jurisdiction on federal
courts to hear cases arising under federal law until 1875. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1,
18 Stat. 470, 470.
222. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
223. See William R. Casto, The First Congress’s Understanding of Its Authority over
the Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 26 B.C. L. Rev. 1101, 1111–12 (1985) (noting many
British creditors were unable to vindicate rights in federal court); Wythe Holt, “To
Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal
Courts, 1989 Duke L.J. 1421, 1487–88 (same); Charles Warren, New Light on the History
of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 78 (1923) (linking amount in
controversy requirement to maximum sum allegedly owed by assignees of confiscated
property from revolutionary era).
224. § 25, 1 Stat. at 85–86.
225. § 13, 1 Stat. at 80.
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any foreign prince or state . . . shall be deemed violators of the laws of
nations, and disturbers of the public repose, and imprisoned not exceeding three years.”226 These statutes had their intended effect: Until
Congress codified diplomatic immunity in 1978, no suits appear to have
been successfully prosecuted against ambassadors or other public
ministers.227
Second, section 9 of the Judiciary Act gave lower federal courts “exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction . . . ; saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law
remedy, where the common law is competent to give it.”228 Significantly,
this provision was understood to give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
over prize cases229—a category of cases governed by the law of nations
and liable to provoke a war if handled improperly.230 Congress’s treatment of prize cases and cases against ambassadors shows that it had multiple tools at its disposal to ensure compliance with the law of nations. In
the Judiciary Act, Congress carefully used federal court jurisdiction to
prevent state courts from offending the law of nations in ways that posed
particular threats to the peace of the United States.
***
The Constitution provided limited judicial mechanisms for maintaining federal political authority in foreign relations. The Supremacy Clause
obligated state courts to follow enacted federal law, while the Arising
Under Clause authorized federal court jurisdiction as an additional enforcement mechanism. Jurisdiction over other cases implicating foreign
relations would in turn help avoid foreign conflict initiated by actors
other than the national political branches. It was clear to the Founders
that federal jurisdiction over cases implicating the law of nations would
serve to maintain federal authority in foreign affairs. It was not immediately clear, however, how the law of nations related to federal or state
226. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, §§ 25–26, 1 Stat. 112, 118.
227. Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1315 (citing 17 Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4050, at 238–39 (2d ed. 1988)); see also
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (codified as amended at
22 U.S.C. §§ 254a–254e (2000)) (incorporating Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations as U.S. law, requiring diplomats to obtain liability insurance, authorizing suits
against insurers, and codifying other aspects of diplomatic immunity); 17 Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4050, at 199–200 (3d ed. 2007) (finding no
successful cases during period of exclusive original jurisdiction in Supreme Court, which
ended in 1978).
228. § 9, 1 Stat. at 77.
229. See Jennings v. Carson, 13 F. Cas. 540, 542–43 (D. Pa. 1792) (No. 7281)
(explaining that prize cases were regarded as “civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction” and thus fell within the federal courts’ “exclusive original cognizance” under
Judiciary Act); see also Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1350–53 (examining
federal courts’ admiralty jurisdiction under Judiciary Act).
230. See Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1334–37; supra notes
204–209 and accompanying text.
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municipal law, or the extent to which the Constitution required courts to
apply the law of nations in such cases. The next Part describes the initial
confusion that surrounded these questions and how the Court came to
resolve them.
III. EARLY ENFORCEMENT

OF THE

LAW

OF

NATIONS

The Constitution does not specify the status of the law of nations in
U.S. courts. In England, the common law simply incorporated the law of
nations as municipal law. In America, the states received the common
law of England, presumptively incorporating the law of nations as part of
each state’s law. Whether the national government also received the
common law—and therefore the law of nations—was not definitively resolved until a few decades after the founding. Beginning in 1812, the
Supreme Court recognized that there can be no common law of the
United States,231 and thus no wholesale incorporation of the law of nations as federal municipal law. Thereafter, federal courts continued to
apply certain aspects of the law of nations—not because they were part of
a true federal common law, but either (as in Swift) because that was the
applicable rule of decision or (as relevant here) because such law was
understood to supply the operational detail of the Constitution’s allocation of foreign relations powers.
The law of nations was not monolithic in this regard. As Erie would
later recognize, with respect to matters within the reserved or concurrent
powers of the states (such as the general commercial law), states were free
to depart from the law of nations absent enacted federal law to the contrary. Short of prescribing the substantive law, Congress could also steer
at least some of these cases into federal court by conferring concurrent or
exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts. By contrast, with respect to matters outside the reserved powers of the states (such as the rights of foreign sovereigns, diplomats, and heads of state), the Supreme Court
respected the perfect rights of sovereigns for reasons that would seem to
bind state and federal courts alike.
Specifically, the Court read the political branches’ Article I and II
powers over foreign relations—especially the recognition and war powers—to require judicial enforcement of perfect sovereign rights. It is not
uncommon for the Court to read constitutional provisions in light of
background principles of the common law or law of nations against which
they were drafted, and the foreign relations powers are no exception.
The law of nations supplied a well-known set of default rules relating to
perfect rights that would have informed the Founders’ understanding of
the federal political branches’ recognition and war powers. The Court
231. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834) (“There is no principle
which pervades the union and has the authority of law, that is not embodied in the
constitution or laws of the union.”); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32, 32–33 (1812) (rejecting federal common law crimes).
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followed such rules as a means of implementing the federal political
branches’ exclusive constitutional prerogatives to recognize foreign nations, manage questions of war and peace, and decide on behalf of the
nation whether, when, and how to risk war by departing from such rules.
At the same time, however, the Court declined to apply competing principles of the law of nations when such application would have undermined,
rather than furthered, the constitutional prerogatives of the political
branches.
A. The Early Debate over Federal Reception of the Common Law
Prior to ratification, states adopted the common law of England,
which incorporated the law of nations. After ratification, state courts continued to apply the law of nations as part of their municipal common
law,232 including the common law of crimes. The question quickly arose
whether the United States could prosecute individuals in federal court
for committing common law crimes. The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of crimes and offenses “cognizable
under the authority of the United States.”233 For the next two decades,
public officials in the United States debated whether federal courts had
jurisdiction to define and punish common law offenses against the
United States in the absence of further congressional action.234 In other
words, they debated whether the United States had a municipal common
law of crimes235 that incorporated, among other things, certain offenses
against the law of nations. This debate was not limited to federal common law crimes, however, because its resolution turned on whether the
United States (as opposed to the individual states) had received the common law of England.
To understand contemporaneous opinions of early executive branch
officials and judges, one must appreciate their initial assumption that the
United States—like the states—had received the common law and thus
could prosecute and punish common law crimes, including offenses
232. See, e.g., Brown v. Union Ins. Co. at New-London, 4 Day 179, 186–87 (Conn.
1810) (opinion of Swift, J.) (stating that “our acknowledgement of the authority of the law
of nations, and our adoption of the Marine Law, have established principles decisive of this
question,” and “[t]he same consequences must result from our having adopted the law of
merchants”); Pearsall v. Dwight, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 84, 89 (1806) (“This rule is founded on
the tacit consent of civilized nations, arising from its general utility, and seems to be a part
of the law of nations adopted by the common law.”); Desebats v. Berquier, 1 Binn. 336, 345
(Pa. 1808) (opinion of Tilghman, C.J.) (“[W]e have always been sensible of the
importance of paying a high regard to the law of nations. It is considered as incorporated
with, and forming a part of, our common law.”); see also supra Part II.A.
233. § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77 (providing district court jurisdiction); § 11, 1 Stat. at 78–79
(providing circuit court jurisdiction).
234. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 167, at 1404–12 (describing debate
and its eventual resolution).
235. At the time of the founding, penal laws—including common law criminal
offenses—were conceived to be local rather than general laws. Anthony J. Bellia Jr.,
Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 Geo. L.J. 949, 959–65 (2006).
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against the law of nations. Under English law, criminal penalties and private remedies were matters of municipal governance.236 It was on the
assumption that the United States had received a municipal common law
of crime that public officials discussed how violations of the law of nations
constituted judicially cognizable offenses against the United States.
For example, in 1792, Attorney General Edmund Randolph considered whether the arrest of a public minister’s domestic servant was punishable as a common law offense,237 either under the Crimes Act of
1790238 or as a violation of the law of nations. He began his opinion by
explaining that “[t]he law of nations, although not specially adopted by
the constitution or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the
land.”239 Immediately thereafter, Randolph emphasized the importance
of respecting foreign sovereignty: “[W]ith regard to foreigners, every
change [that a nation makes to the law of nations] is at the peril of the
nation which makes it.”240 Randolph recognized, however, that Congress
could by statute supersede what otherwise would be the common law’s
incorporation of the law of nations. And regarding the case at hand—
“that of arresting a domestic”—Randolph stated that “Congress appear to
have excluded every resort to the law of nations.”241 Accordingly, the
minister could challenge the arrest by appealing “to the federal act
alone.”242
Randolph’s assumption that a violation of the law of nations was punishable under federal common law was soon tested. A crucial issue facing
the new nation was its stance in the war between England and France.
Following the French Revolution, President Washington submitted a series of questions to his cabinet, including the following: (1) “Shall a minister from the Republic of France be received?” and (2) “If received, shall
it be absolutely or with qualifications; and, if with qualifications, of what
kind?”243 Jefferson urged full recognition, while Hamilton urged recep236. See id. at 955–56; supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text.
237. 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 26 (1792).
238. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 25, 1 Stat. 112, 117–118.
239. 1 Op. Att’y Gen. at 27.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 28.
242. Id. In his opinion, Randolph considered not only the legality of the arrest, but
the legality of the entry into the house to serve the execution. Randolph explained that if
the act of Congress criminalized the arrest, the act of entering would be “absorbed in the
arrest.” Id. In that case, the federal courts could entertain a prosecution, as they “are
open to all cases cognizable under the authority of the United States.” Id. If, on the other
hand, the act of Congress did not criminalize the arrest, the arrest would be punishable, “if
at all, under the law of nations, as being left untouched by the municipal act.” Id. Were
this the case, “the mere going into the house and executing a precept will probably sustain
a prosecution; but, at best, it would be esteemed summum jus” (a matter of extreme right
that, if enforced, would produce injustice). Id.
243. George Washington, Questions Submitted by the President to the Cabinet
Respecting a Proclamation of Neutrality, and the Reception of a French Minister (Apr. 18,
1793), reprinted in 10 The Writings of George Washington 533, 533 (Jared Sparks ed.,
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tion with reservations.244 Although Washington received the French envoy Edmond Charles Genet (known as Citizen Genet) without reservation, he soon issued his famous Neutrality Proclamation in an attempt to
keep the United States at peace.245 The effect of the Proclamation was to
renounce any suggestions of alliance between the United States and
France under preexisting treaties.246 In other words, the United States
sought to maintain friendly relations with two nations it now recognized
as equal and independent states under the law of nations.247
The Neutrality Proclamation declared that the United States would
punish citizens who committed, aided, or abetted hostilities against any of
the warring powers. Although Congress had enacted no applicable statute, the President issued “instructions to those officers, to whom it belongs, to cause prosecutions to be instituted against all persons, who
shall within the cognizance of the courts of the United States violate the
law of nations with respect to the powers at war . . . .”248 The proclamation relied on three assumptions: The United States had received the
common law, the common law incorporated the law of nations, and federal prosecutors and judges were free to enforce such law through criminal prosecutions without congressional authorization.
Prominent members of Washington’s cabinet agreed. Hamilton,
writing as Pacificus, described the effect of the Proclamation of
Neutrality:
The true nature & design of such an act is—to make known to
the powers at War and to the Citizens of the Country, whose
Government does the Act that such country is in the condition
of a Nation at Peace with the belligerent parties, and under no
obligation of Treaty, to become an associate in the war with either of them; . . . and as a consequence of this state of things, to
Boston, Russell, Shattuck, and Williams, and Hilliard, Gray and Co. 1836) [hereinafter
Writings of Washington]. Washington also asked: “Are the United States obliged by good
faith to consider the treaties heretofore made with France as applying to the present
situation of the parties? May they either renounce them or hold them suspended till the
government of France shall be established?” Id.
244. See Goebel, supra note 143, at 105–12 (comparing Jefferson’s “de facto principle
of recognition” and Hamilton’s nonintervention policy).
245. George Washington, Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in
Writings of Washington, supra note 243, at 535 [hereinafter Proclamation of Neutrality].
246. See Goebel, supra note 143, at 112.
247. At the time, nations were understood to have a perfect right to remain neutral.
See Vattel, supra note 17, at *333 (“When a war breaks out between two nations, all other
states that are not bound by treaties, are free to remain neut[ral] . . . .”). Nations had to be
vigilant, however, about maintaining neutrality, which required “a strict impartiality towards
the belligerent powers.” Id. at *332. Should a nation “favour one of the parties [at war] to the
prejudice of the other, she cannot complain of being treated by him as an adherent and
confederate of his enemy.” Id.
248. Proclamation of Neutrality, supra note 245, at 535. For further discussion of the
Neutrality Proclamation, see David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Third
Congress, 1793–95, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 4–14 (1996) (discussing immediate response to
proclamation and its constitutionality).

R

R
R
R

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\109-1\COL101.txt

50

unknown

Seq: 50

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

22-DEC-08

11:13

[Vol. 109:1

give warning to all within its jurisdiction to abstain from acts that
shall contravene those duties, under the penalties which the
laws of the land (of which the law of Nations is a part) annexes
to acts of contravention.249
The proclamation, he concluded, “informs the citizens of what the laws
previously established require of them in that state, & warns them that
these laws will be put in execution against the Infractors of them.”250
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson similarly explained to the
French Minister that the United States, to preserve its neutrality, had a
right under the law of nations to prohibit France from arming vessels in
the United States to use against England.251 He indicated that a domestic
vessel armed against nations with which the United States was at peace
would offend the law of nations. Accordingly, Jefferson described such
vessels as “marked in their very equipment with offence to the laws of the
land, of which the law of nations makes an integral part.”252 Here,
Jefferson referred to the law of nations as the law of the land in the same
manner as Randolph had.
In the summer of 1793, Chief Justice Jay more thoroughly explained
the theory behind prosecutions based on the law of nations. In charging
the grand jury in Richmond, Virginia, he explained that the circuit court
had “cognizance only of offences against the laws of the United States,”
and that “[t]he Constitution, the statutes of Congress, the laws of nations,
and treaties constitutionally made compose the laws of the United
States.”253 In directing the grand jurors to return indictments for com249. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 The Papers
of Alexander Hamilton 33, 34 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969).
250. Id. at 43. The Jay Treaty soon gave Hamilton another occasion to examine the
law of nations. Defence No. XX of his “Camillus” essays defended Article 10, which
prohibited the United States or Britain from confiscating or sequestrating the debts,
money, or security of the subjects or citizens of the other. Alexander Hamilton, To
Defence No. XX (Oct. 23–24, 1795), reprinted in 19 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton,
supra note 249, at 329, 329, 346–47. Hamilton examined whether the United States had a
right under its treaties or the law of nations to confiscate or sequester enemy property
found within the United States, declaring: “‘Tis indubitable that the customary law of
European Nations is as a part of the common law and by adoption that of the U States.” Id.
at 342. He found that modern law barred a nation from confiscating or sequestering the
property of another nation on account of war. Therefore, the modern law of nations
coincided with Article 10 of the treaty. Id. at 347. This opinion concerned the extent to
which U.S. obligations under the Jay Treaty conformed to the contemporaneous law of
nations; it did not consider the operation of the law of nations as a rule of decision in
federal courts.
251. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the French Minister (Edmund Charles Genet)
(June 5, 1793), in 6 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 282, 283 (Paul Leiscester Ford ed.,
New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1895).
252. Id.
253. John Jay, Charge to Grand Jury, Richmond, Virginia (May 22, 1793) [hereinafter
Jay, Grand Jury], reprinted in 3 The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 478,
478–79 (Henry P. Johnston ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1891) [hereinafter Jay,
Public Papers]. Jay had similarly charged a grand jury in New Hampshire in 1790: “The
objects of your inquiry are, all offences committed against the laws of the United States in
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mon law crimes against the United States premised upon offenses under
the law of nations, Jay stated that their obligation to do so derived in part
from the deference courts and individuals owe Congress in foreign affairs. He explained that “the laws of reason and morality” directed independent governments “to abstain from violence, to abstain from interfering in their respective domestic government and arrangements, [and] to
abstain from causing quarrels and dissensions.”254 Because of the “respect” that “nations owe to each other,” Jay charged, “[i]f in this district
you should find any persons engaged in fitting out privateers or enlisting
men to serve against either of the belligerent powers, and in other respects violating the laws of neutrality, you will present them.”255 In Jay’s
view, the Constitution’s allocation of powers required individuals, courts,
and grand jurors to respect the rights of foreign sovereigns and leave
retaliatory action to the political branches:
Of national violations of our neutrality our government only can
take cognizance. Questions of peace and war and reprisals and
the like do not belong to courts of justice, nor to individual citizens, nor to associations of any kind, and for this plain reason:
because the people of the United States have been pleased to
commit them to Congress.256
Likewise, if a foreign nation committed an infraction of the law of
nations against the United States or its citizens, it was not within the province of federal courts to respond:
Such measures involve a variety of political considerations, such,
for instances, as these: Is it advisable immediately to declare
war? Would it be more prudent first to remonstrate, or demand
reparation, or direct reprisals? Are we ready for war? Would it
be wise to risk it at this juncture, or postpone running that risk
until we can be better prepared for it? These and a variety of
similar considerations ought to precede and govern the decision
of those who annul violated treaties, order reprisals, or declare
war.257
this District, or on the high seas by persons now in the District. . . . [T]he laws of nations
make part of the laws of this, and of every other civilized nation.” John Jay, The Charge of
Chief-Justice Jay, to the Grand Juries on the Eastern Circuit, N.H. Gazette, June 3, 1790, at
2.
254. Jay, Grand Jury, supra note 253, reprinted in Jay, Public Papers, supra note 253,
at 481.
255. Id., reprinted in Jay, Public Papers, supra note 253, at 482–83.
256. Id., reprinted in Jay, Public Papers, supra note 253, at 483–84; see also Henfield’s
Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1101–04 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (reciting charge of Chief
Justice Jay, to grand jury in Richmond, Virginia, which described the “laws of nations” as
part of “law of the United States,” and explained that “they who commit, aid, or abet
hostilities against . . . powers [relative to whom the United States are in a state of
neutrality] . . . offend against the laws of the United States, and ought to be punished”).
257. Jay, Grand Jury, supra note 253, reprinted in Jay, Public Papers, supra note 253,
at 484–85.
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“Until war is constitutionally declared,” Jay concluded, “the nation and all
its members must observe and preserve peace, and do the duties incident
to a state of peace.”258 Thus, “[a]s judges and grand jurors, the merits of
those political questions are without our province.”259
Justice James Wilson delivered a similar charge to the federal grand
jury in Pennsylvania that indicted Gideon Henfield for agreeing to serve
as the captain of a French privateer tasked with attacking British ships.260
Wilson instructed that “the common law” had been “received in
America,” that “the law of nations” to “its full extent is adopted by her,”
and that “infractions of that law form a part of her code of criminal jurisprudence.”261 He further stated that “a citizen, who in our state of neutrality, and without the authority of the nation, takes an hostile part with
either of the belligerent powers, violates thereby his duty, and the laws of
his country.”262 At trial, Henfield’s counsel protested the lack of congressional authorization for the prosecution. In charging the petit jury,
Justice Wilson (on behalf of himself, Justice Iredell, and Judge Peters)
rejected this suggestion:
It is the joint and unanimous opinion of the court, that the
United States, being in a state of neutrality relative to the present war, the acts of hostility committed by Gideon Henfield are
an offence against this country, and punishable by its laws. It
has been asked by his counsel, in their address to you, against
what law has he offended? The answer is, against many and
binding laws. As a citizen of the United States, he was bound to
act no part which could injure the nation; he was bound to keep
the peace in regard to all nations with whom we are at peace.
This is the law of nations; not an ex post facto law, but a law that
was in existence long before Gideon Henfield existed.263
Perhaps concerned by the lack of a federal statute, the jury voted to acquit Henfield.264 President Washington responded by requesting legislation,265 and Congress promptly enacted the Neutrality Act.266 The Act
expressly prohibited breaches of United States neutrality, including the
acts that gave rise to Henfield’s indictment.267
258. Id., reprinted in Jay, Public Papers, supra note 253, at 485.
259. Id.
260. Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1115–17.
261. Id. at 1106–07 (citing 4 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *67).
262. Id. at 1108.
263. Id. at 1120. For an insightful account of Justice Wilson’s views regarding the
relationship between the law of nations and the common law in the United States, see
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Elusive Foundation: John Marshall, James Wilson, and the
Problem of Reconciling Popular Sovereignty and Natural Law Jurisprudence in the New
Federal Republic, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 113, 163–64, 184–89 (2003).
264. Currie, supra note 248, at 15 & n.63.
265. 4 Annals of Cong. 11 (1793).
266. See ch. 50, § 1, 1 Stat. 381, 381–82 (1794).
267. Id. (prohibiting U.S. citizens within United States from accepting commission
under foreign army or navy).

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\109-1\COL101.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 53

THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NATIONS

22-DEC-08

11:13

53

Nonetheless, throughout the 1790s, federal courts continued to enforce federal common law crimes on the assumption that the United
States had received the common law.268 In 1798, Justice Chase, sitting on
the circuit court, became the first judge to question this assumption. In
United States v. Worrall, the defendant was indicted for attempting to bribe
a federal Commissioner of Revenue.269 Worall’s counsel disputed “that
the common law is the law of the United States, in cases that arise under
their authority.”270 He argued that “[t]he nature of our Federal compact, will not . . . tolerate this doctrine.”271 Justice Chase agreed. An
“indictment solely at common law,” he declared, “cannot be maintained
in this Court.”272 In his view, it was “essential, that Congress should define the offences to be tried, and apportion the punishments to be inflicted, as that they should erect Courts to try the criminal, or to pronounce a sentence on conviction.”273
The issue soon resurfaced as part of a heated debate between incumbent Federalists and ascendant Jeffersonian Republicans over the constitutionality of the Sedition Act. The Act made it a crime to “write, print,
utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious” statements about
Congress, the government, or the President.274 Republicans charged that
the Act was unconstitutional because it was an exercise of “a power not
delegated by the Constitution, but, on the contrary, expressly and positively forbidden by one of the amendments thereto.”275 Federalists responded that “the Act presented no ‘constitutional difficulty’ because the
federal courts were already authorized to punish seditious libel as a common-law crime.”276 Republicans denied the central premise of the
268. See, e.g., United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297, 298–99, 27 F. Cas. 714, 715
(C.C.D. Pa. 1794) (No. 16,122a) (upholding indictment of defendant for sending
threatening letters, behavior that was treasonous in England and indictable at common
law); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1147, 1147–48 (C.C.D. Mass. 1792) (No. 16,323)
(upholding federal court jurisdiction over, and conviction of, defendant for common law
contempt for counterfeiting bank bills). For an illuminating history of Ravara and an
argument that the prosecution was based on a broad understanding of “the common law
of the United States,” see John D. Gordan III, United States v. Joseph Ravara: “Presumptuous
Evidence,” “Too Many Lawyers,” and a Federal Common Law Crime, in Origins of the
Federal Judiciary: Essays on the Judiciary Act of 1789, at 106, 140 (Maeva Marcus ed.,
1992).
269. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 384, 28 F. Cas. 774, 774 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No. 16,766).
270. Id. at 391, 28 F. Cas. at 777 (emphasis omitted).
271. Id. (“[T]he very powers that are granted [to the central government] cannot
take effect until they are exercised through the medium of a law”).
272. Id. at 393, 28 F. Cas at 778.
273. Id. at 394, 28 F. Cas at 779.
274. Ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596 (1798) (expired 1801).
275. James Madison, [Virginia] Resolutions of 1798, in 6 The Writings of James
Madison 326, 328 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
276. William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief
Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth 149 (1995) (quoting Letter from Oliver
Ellsworth to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 12, 1798)); see also H.R. Rep. No. 5-110 (1799),
reprinted in 1 American State Papers: Miscellaneous 181, 184 (1834) (resolving to not
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Federalists’ defense: “‘that the common or unwritten law’ . . . makes a
part of the law of these States, in their united and national capacity.”277
James Madison led the Republican attack and raised two powerful
objections to the idea that the Constitution incorporated the common
law. First, he specifically denied that the common law was adopted by the
Constitution278 because the consequence would be that “the authority of
Congress [would be] co-extensive with the objects of common law.”279
That conclusion would mean that Congress’s power would be “no longer
under the limitations marked out in the Constitution. They would be
authorized to legislate in all cases whatsoever.”280 Second, Madison argued that federal incorporation of the common law “would confer on the
judicial department a discretion little short of a legislative power.”281 He
explained that such incorporation would “present an immense field for
judicial discretion” because it would require federal courts “to decide
what parts of the common law would, and what would not, be properly
applicable to the circumstances of the United States.”282 In his view, giving federal judges this degree of discretion “over the law would, in fact,
erect them into legislators.”283
The debate subsided in 1801 with Thomas Jefferson’s election as
President and the expiration of the Sedition Act.284 In 1806, however,
federal prosecutors charged two Federalist editors with common law seditious libel. The case reached the Supreme Court in 1812, and the Court
rejected federal common law crimes.285 Because both the Attorney
General and the defendant’s counsel declined to argue the case, Justice
repeal Alien and Sedition Acts); 9 Annals of Cong. 2989 (1799) (“[T]he act in question
cannot be unconstitutional, because it makes nothing penal that was not penal before, and
gives no new powers to the court, but is merely declaratory of the common law.”).
277. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 18, 1800), in 6 The
Writings of James Madison, supra note 275, at 347, 372 [hereinafter Madison, Letter].
278. Id. at 382.
279. Id. at 380.
280. Id.; see also 9 Annals of Cong. 3012 (1799) (statement of Rep. Nicholas) (“The
nature of the [common] law of England makes it impossible that it should have been
adopted in the lump into such a Government as this is; because it was a complete system
for the management of all the affairs of a country.”).
281. Madison, Letter, supra note 277, at 380.
282. Id. at 381.
283. Id. Thomas Jefferson was even more emphatic:
Of all the doctrines which have ever been broached by the federal government,
the novel one, of the common law being in force & cognizable as an existing law
in their courts, is to me the most formidable. All their other assumptions of ungiven powers have been . . . solitary, unconsequential, timid things, in comparison
with the audacious, barefaced and sweeping pretension to a system of law for the
[United States], without the adoption of their legislature, and so infinitely
beyond their power to adopt.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 18, 1799), in 7 The Writings of
Thomas Jefferson, supra note 251, at 383–84.
284. See Daniel Sisson, The American Revolution of 1800, at 439–51 (1974).
285. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
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Johnson issued a brief opinion on behalf of the Court.286 He framed the
question as “whether the Circuit Courts of the United States can exercise
a common law jurisdiction in criminal cases.”287 Undoubtedly referring
to the debate surrounding the Sedition Act, Johnson stated that the question had long been “settled in public opinion.”288 Before a federal court
may exercise jurisdiction in such a case, “[t]he legislative authority of the
Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.”289
Through its rejection of a federal common law of crimes, the Court
rejected the assumption that federal courts could enforce the law of nations in the same way as English courts—as part of a national municipal
common law requiring no legislative enactment. This holding did not
banish the law of nations from playing any role in federal court. As the
next section explains, the Supreme Court would come to enforce the perfect rights of sovereigns under the law of nations as a consequence of—
and in deference to—the constitutional authority of the political
branches to control the United States’s engagement with foreign nations.
B. Upholding the Constitution’s Allocation of Powers
In the nation’s first decades, federal courts not only attempted to
apply the law of nations as part of a municipal common law of crime; they
also applied it uncontroversially in dozens of other cases. Often, they
applied the law merchant or the law maritime to resolve private commercial disputes.290 In so doing, courts did not treat these branches of the
286. Id. at 32.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 34. For further discussion of the judiciary’s initial embrace—and ultimate
rejection—of federal common law crimes, see Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 167,
at 1404–12. Sitting as a Circuit Justice, Justice Story tried to distinguish Hudson & Goodwin
in a case involving prosecution of an individual for forcibly rescuing a prize—an offense
against the law of nations. See United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619 (C.C.D. Mass.
1813) (No. 14,857). Before Coolidge reached the Supreme Court, Justice Johnson also had
occasion to revisit the question of federal common law crimes in a case involving an
offense against the law of nations—piracy. See Trial of William Butler for Piracy 35
(C.C.D.S.C. 1813) (original pamphlet in Harvard Law School library; copy on file with the
Columbia Law Review). Unlike Justice Story, Justice Johnson concluded that the
Constitution did not permit federal courts to punish such offenses in the absence of
congressional authorization. (Justice Johnson is strongly presumed to be the author of the
William Butler opinion, though it is unsigned. See Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of Silence:
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, the Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of
Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 Yale L.J. 919, 926 n.34 (1992).) When Coolidge finally
reached the Supreme Court, a majority simply declined “to review their former decision in
[Hudson & Goodwin], or draw it into doubt.” United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
415, 416 (1816).
290. See Fletcher, General Common Law, supra note 74, at 1538–54 (describing
cases).
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law of nations as either state law or preemptive federal law; they simply
applied the law without attributing it to any particular sovereign.291
From the first years of the Republic, however, public officials attached special significance to judicial enforcement of the law of state-state
relations, particularly the perfect rights of sovereigns. At first glance, this
branch of the law of nations appears to have operated in the same way as
the others, such as the law merchant or private law maritime. Cases upholding perfect rights were decided well before Congress gave inferior
federal courts arising under jurisdiction in 1875.292 Moreover, none of
these early cases attempted to invoke the Supreme Court’s appellate arising under jurisdiction over state law cases denying enforcement of a federal right;293 rather, all originated in federal courts under other heads of
jurisdiction. Most of the cases in which federal courts invoked the law of
nations as a rule of decision fell within the federal courts’ jurisdiction
over admiralty and maritime cases, which the Marshall Court expressly
held did not automatically trigger arising under jurisdiction.294
Nonetheless, judges and other public officials considered adherence
to the law of state-state relations uniquely important to the peace and
dignity of the United States.295 In 1793, Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson sent a letter to Chief Justice John Jay and the other Justices of
the Supreme Court seeking advice on twenty-nine questions about the
291. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law,
153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 825, 889–91 (2005) [hereinafter Bellia, Federal Common Law]
(describing operation of general law); Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at
1283–85 (same); Fletcher, General Common Law, supra note 74, at 1517–21 (same).
292. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
293. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86 (granting Supreme Court
jurisdiction over final state court judgments that ruled against federal right “drawn in
question”). By the end of the nineteenth century, some litigants unsuccessfully attempted
to invoke the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to review state court determinations
of general law under the law of nations. See, e.g., Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886)
(holding that Supreme Court has “no right to review” whether defendant’s forcible seizure
in foreign country prevents trial in state court because question is one “of common law, or
of the law of nations”); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286–87 (1875) (holding
that Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction to review “general laws of war, as
recognized by the law of nations applicable to this case” because they do not involve “the
constitution, laws, treaties, or executive proclamations, of the United States”). For an
argument that the Supreme Court could review a state court’s denial of a foreign
ambassador’s assertion of diplomatic immunity under the law of nations, see Clark, Federal
Common Law, supra note 74, at 1320 n.349.
294. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545 (1828) (“A case in admiralty
does not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or the laws of the United States.”); see supra
notes 191–198 and accompanying text (explaining how Canter Court did not understand
law maritime to be part of “the Laws of the United States” within meaning of Article III).
295. See Jay, Early American Law, supra note 74, at 839–45 (explaining that such U.S.
officials advocated adherence to law of nations to avoid war and establish the United States
as a power among nations); cf. Janis, supra note 49, at 37 (explaining that James Kent, in
his Commentaries on American Law, was “interested . . . that the United States be perceived by
other countries as a qualified sovereign partner in the European Christian community of
nations”).
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obligations of the United States under treaties and the state-state relations branch of the law of nations.296 Jefferson recognized that violations
of treaties and the law of nations could both embroil the United States in
foreign conflict and diminish its standing with other nations; he claimed
that opinions from the Court on these questions would “secure us against
errors dangerous to the peace of the U.S. and their authority ensure the
respect of all parties.”297 The Washington Administration recognized
that courts had only limited opportunities to adjudicate such questions,
which “are often presented under circumstances which do not give a cognizance of them to the tribunals of the country,”298 either because such
tribunals lacked jurisdiction or the laws afforded no judicially cognizable
remedy.299 Chief Justice Jay famously declined to answer the questions
Jefferson posed, citing “strong arguments against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions.”300 Jay acknowledged, however, that
adherence to the law of nations was crucial “to the preservation of the
rights, peace, and dignity of the United States.”301 In subsequent years,
as justiciable controversies arose, the Court would confront several of the
questions that Jefferson had posed.
Significantly, it was primarily in cases involving the law of state-state
relations that federal courts declared the law of nations to be part of the
law of the land.302 Justices were aware that disregard of certain principles
of the law of nations—especially the perfect rights of sovereigns—could
trigger bilateral foreign conflict. They did not merely enforce the law of
nations when it applied; if faced with a choice between competing principles of the law of nations, Justices applied the principle that avoided conflict over those that might generate conflict.
In the wartime prize cases of the 1810s, the Court began expressly
tying the application of the law of nations to the Constitution’s allocation
of powers. It justified this course on the ground that the political
branches had exclusive authority to take actions—such as disregarding
perfect rights under the law of nations—that could embroil the United
States in foreign conflict. Linking the law of nations to the Constitution’s
allocation of powers coincided with two developments. First, the Court
rejected the theory that the United States had received the common law
296. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme
Court of the United States (July 18, 1793), in 6 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, supra
note 251, at 351.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See Bellia, Cause of Action, supra note 25, at 784–92 (explaining limitations on
availability of remedies at law and in equity at time of founding).
300. Letter from Chief-Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington
(Aug. 8, 1793), in 3 Jay, Public Papers, supra note 253, at 488.
301. Id. at 489.
302. See Janis, supra note 49, at 62 (observing that Marshall Court opinions referring
to international law as “part of the law of the United States[,] . . . most famously involved
ticklish questions about respecting foreign sovereigns”).
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(and by incorporation the law of nations) as part of federal municipal
law. Second, the United States had gained experience with foreign conflict—conflict that could necessitate political branch decisions contrary to
the law of nations. The Court enforced perfect rights to avoid generating
foreign conflict and to preserve the constitutional prerogatives of
Congress and the President, recognizing, however, that the political
branches were free to make law in derogation of the law of nations, and
that such law would bind courts as the supreme law of the land.
Whether principles of the law of nations preempted contrary state
law was not debated during these early decades: Congress gave federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases most likely to involve the law of
state-state relations, and these cases did not involve conflicting state law.
In certain cases, however, the Court applied law of nations principles for
the stated reason that the Constitution’s allocation of powers required it.
These cases all involved law of nations principles that Blackstone deemed
essential to upholding national prerogatives in foreign affairs,303 such as
the power to send and receive ambassadors, to make treaties, and to control war and peace. As discussed, the Founders apportioned these prerogatives between Congress and the President. By reasoning that the
constitutional allocation of powers required adherence to certain principles of the law of nations, the Court laid the groundwork for its future
holding that such principles apply in both state and federal court, and
even in the face of contrary state law.
Interpreting the Constitution in light of background principles
known to the Founders is nothing new. Such principles provide crucial
context. Accordingly, the Court has interpreted many provisions of the
Constitution to incorporate aspects of the common law or law of nations.
The Court has read the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, for instance, to incorporate common law rights
it meant to protect.304 The extension of federal judicial power in Article
III to “Cases, in Law and Equity,” is incomprehensible without reference
to understandings of law and equity that subsisted in English law.305 The
power of Congress to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal” exclusive of

303. See supra Part I.C.
304. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995) (“[T]he common-law
knock and announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
inquiry.”).
305. See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (explaining Article III “[j]udicial power could come into play only in matters
that were the traditional concern of the courts at Westminster and only if they arose in
ways that to the expert feel of lawyers constituted ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies’”). The
Seventh Amendment provides another example along these lines. See Parsons v. Bedford,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446–47 (1830) (explaining that “[t]he phrase ‘common law’” in the
Seventh Amendment “is used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime
jurisprudence”).
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states is likewise meaningless without reference to what such letters were
understood to be under the law of nations.306
The same analysis applies, for present purposes, to Articles I and II.
One cannot understand the powers to send and receive ambassadors—
and thereby recognize foreign nations—without reference to the perfect
rights that nations afforded one another under the law of nations at the
time this power was conferred. Likewise, one cannot understand the
powers to declare and conduct war and to conclude peace without reference to the customary respect for the perfect rights of nations in peacetime because disregard of such rights gave nations just cause for war. The
Constitution’s assignment of these precise powers to Congress and the
President suggests exclusivity.307 Were courts or states free to disregard
perfect rights, they could trigger a war and usurp the political branches’
exclusive powers over war and peace. As Blackstone explained regarding
English practice,308 judicial respect for the perfect rights of sovereigns
served to sustain the sovereign prerogatives of political authorities to determine such questions of foreign relations. Moreover, when other aspects of the law of nations threatened to disturb political branch prerogatives by potentially embroiling the nation in war, the Court felt free to
disregard them.
This section explains how federal courts—in particular, the Supreme
Court—employed the law of nations from ratification through the War of
1812 to respect perfect rights and, correspondingly, to preserve the constitutional prerogatives of the federal political branches to recognize foreign nations and determine when the United States should risk conflict
with such nations. Notwithstanding debate over the existence of a federal
municipal common law, Justices recognized that respecting perfect rights
of sovereigns under the law of nations operated to sustain federal political authority over questions of war and peace. After the Supreme Court
rejected a federal municipal common law in 1812, the Court made the
allocation of power justification for enforcing perfect rights more
explicit.
1. Avoiding Bilateral Foreign Conflict. — In the years immediately following ratification, the Supreme Court (or individual Justices) described
306. See, e.g., Barron v. City of Balt., 32 U.S. 243, 249 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.)
(explaining that for a state “[t]o grant letters of marque and reprisal, would lead directly to
war; the power of declaring which is expressly given to congress”).
307. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in
Constitutional Interpretation, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 699, 724–25 (2008) [hereinafter Clark, Role
of Structure] (arguing the precise procedures prescribed in the Constitution for amending
the Constitution, and adopting laws and treaties of the United States, should be regarded
as exclusive); see also John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of
Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 Yale L.J. 1663, 1737–38 (2004) (explaining that “despite
its general powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress . . . cannot prescribe a
method of appointing ‘Officers of the United States’ different from the specific methods
laid out in the carefully drawn terms of the Appointments Clause”).
308. See supra Parts I.B.3, I.C.
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how judicial failure to apply certain principles of the law of nations in a
given case would disrespect the perfect rights of another nation. In 1795,
Talbot v. Jansen considered whether Ballard, a United States citizen, and
Talbot, an alleged French citizen, had lawfully captured The Magdalena, a
Dutch vessel owned by citizens of the Netherlands.309 The evidence
showed Ballard actually made the capture, but that Talbot had outfitted
Ballard’s vessel with the necessary guns.310 The Court refused to sanction
the capture of a neutral vessel that would violate rights of neutrality and
the use of the seas; if sanctioned, such a capture would provide just cause
for war against the United States.311 Writing in seriatim, Justice Paterson
found the capture, if made by Ballard alone, to be “altogether unjustifiable” because it was of a vessel of a country “at peace” with the United
States.312 The question, therefore, was whether Talbot could detain the
vessel pursuant to a French commission. Justice Paterson explained that
under the law of nations Talbot, though French, could not use United
States vessels to capture ships of nations “friendly” with the United States:
“The principle deducible from the law of nations, is plain;—you shall not
make use of our neutral arm, to capture vessels of your enemies, but of
our friends. If you do, and bring the captured vessels within our jurisdiction, restitution will be awarded.”313
Justice Iredell similarly explained that unauthorized acts of hostility
against a foreign nation violate the law of nations: “[N]o hostilities of any
kind, except in necessary self-defence, can lawfully be practised by one
individual of a nation, against an individual of any other nation at enmity
with it, but in virtue of some public authority.”314 Indeed, he continued,
“[e]ven in the case of one enemy against another enemy . . . there is no
colour of justification for any offensive hostile act, unless it be authorised
by some act of the government giving the public constitutional sanction
to it.”315 Like Paterson, Iredell noted that to sanction this capture because it was made under pretense of a French commission would be “insulting to the French Republic, which, from a regard to its own honour
and a principle of justice, would undoubtedly disdain all piratical assistance.”316 In an oft-cited passage, Iredell concluded that the unauthorized capture of a neutral vessel by a United States citizen was “so palpa309. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 133–34 (1795).
310. Id. at 155, 157 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
311. Id. at 154–57; see also Vattel, supra note 17, at *126, *336–37 (describing rights
of neutrality and use of the seas as perfect rights).
312. Talbot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 154 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
313. Id. at 156–57. Justice Cushing agreed in principle. Since Ballard was an
American citizen and France had not commissioned this capture, “shall not the property,
which he has thus taken from a nation at peace with the United States, and brought within
our jurisdiction, be restored to its owners?” Id. at 168–69 (opinion of Cushing, J.)
(emphasis omitted).
314. Id. at 160 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
315. Id. at 160–61.
316. Id. at 159 (emphasis omitted).
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ble a violation of our own law (I mean the common law, of which the law
of nations is a part . . .) as well as of the law of nations generally; that I
cannot entertain the slightest doubt, but that . . . prima facie, the District
Court had jurisdiction.”317 This statement is consistent with the circuit
court opinion that Iredell joined two years earlier in Henfield’s Case, defending the common law prosecution of an American citizen for breaching United States neutrality in violation of the law of nations.318 At the
time, Iredell and others simply assumed that the common law (including
the law of nations) applied in the United States and supplied federal
courts with jurisdiction over, and rules of decision to govern, common
law crimes. He simultaneously recognized, however, that the Court had
to respect neutral rights because only the government could authorize an
act of hostility against another nation.
In another 1795 case, United States v. Peters, the Supreme Court applied a rule of the law of nations respecting a foreign nation’s perfect
right of territorial sovereignty instead of a competing rule of the law of
nations that, in operation, would have undermined its territorial sovereignty.319 The question was whether a United States district court could
hear a libel for damages against a French vessel, the Cassius, at port in
Philadelphia. James Yard, a Philadelphia merchant, charged in his libel
that the Cassius, commissioned by France to cruise against enemy ships,
had violated the law of nations by capturing his vessel on the high seas
and taking it to France for adjudication.320 Just two years earlier, as explained, President Washington had recognized the new French government and sought to maintain friendly relations with France.321 The
Court issued a writ of prohibition divesting the U.S. district court of jurisdiction, the exercise of which would violate the law of nations:
[B]y the laws of nations, the vessels of war of belligerent powers,
duly by them authorized, to cruize against their enemies, and to
make prize of their ships and goods, may, in time of war, arrest
and seize the vessels belonging to the subjects or citizens of neutral nations, and bring them into the ports of the sovereign
under whose commission and authority they act, there to answer
for any breaches of the laws of nations, concerning the navigation of neutral ships, in time of war; and the said vessels of war,
their commanders, officers and crews, are not amenable before
the tribunals of neutral powers for their conduct therein . . . .322
317. Id. at 161. Chief Justice Rutledge agreed with his colleagues that the capture
violated the law of nations, explaining, in addition, that the Court had jurisdiction of the
cause on the basis of admiralty. Id. at 169 (opinion of Rutledge, C.J.).
318. See supra notes 260–267 and accompanying text.
319. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795).
320. Id. at 130.
321. See supra notes 243–252 and accompanying text.
322. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 130–31; see also Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54,
91 (1795) (stating that prize cases are “determined by the law of nations” and that “[a]
prize court is, in effect, a court of all the nations in the world, because all persons, in every
part of the world, are concluded by its sentences”); 6 The Documentary History of the
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The Court described Yard’s libel as “contriving and intending to disturb the peace and harmony subsisting between the United States and
the French Republic.”323 Indeed, it characterized the district court proceedings as “in contempt of the government of the United States, against
the laws of nations, and the treaties subsisting between the United States
and the French Republic, and against the laws and customs of the United
States.”324 Thus, rather than proceed to determine whether France had
violated neutral rights by capturing the Cassius, the Court determined
that the law of nations required it to respect territorial sovereignty by
leaving this question exclusively to the courts of the capturing country.325
This case presents an early, clear example of the Supreme Court enforcing the perfect rights of a recognized foreign sovereign and preventing the federal courts from embroiling the United States in foreign conflict. If denied justice by the French tribunal, the aggrieved party was free
to seek redress from the political branches of the federal government,
which could decide—in the exercise of their foreign relations powers—
what action, if any, the United States should take on his behalf. Under
the Constitution, however, the judiciary was powerless to take the lead by
disregarding the territorial rights of a recognized foreign sovereign
under the law of nations and thereby risking foreign conflict.
2. Interpreting Acts of Congress. — In Talbot and Peters, the Court enforced the law of nations in ways that avoided offending the sovereign
rights of other nations. The Court was cautious about offending such
rights even when interpreting acts of Congress. When a statute did not
Supreme Court of the United States, 1789–1800, at 719–27 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds.,
1998). Indeed, courts generally respected the territorial sovereignty of foreign courts by
giving faith and credit to their ordinary judgments. See Vattel, supra note 17, at *166
(describing respect that courts of one sovereign owe to judgments rendered by courts of
another). That said, courts did not respect the judgments of foreign courts acting beyond
their territorial sovereignty. This “conflict of laws” rule—derived from deeply held notions
of territorial sovereignty and equality—was well established. See id. at *165–66
(recognizing absolute connection between sovereign’s authority and its territory, and
arguing foreign sovereign must respect another jurisdiction’s judgment against its subjects
found in that jurisdiction); see also infra notes 342–355 and accompanying text (discussing
Rose v. Himely). Along these lines, the Court also refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of
tribunals that foreign nations established within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. In Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, the Court addressed two questions: first, whether United
States district courts possessed the full powers of admiralty courts and, second, “whether
any foreign nation had a right, without the positive stipulations of a treaty, to establish in
this country, an admiralty jurisdiction for taking cognizance of prizes captured on the high
seas, by its subjects or citizens, from its enemies.” 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 15 (1794). After
holding that district courts do possess the full powers of admiralty, the Court held that “no
foreign power can of right institute, or erect, any court of judicature of any kind, within the
jurisdiction of the United States, but such only as may be warranted by, and be in
pursuance of treaties.” Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted).
323. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 130 (emphasis omitted).
324. Id. at 131 (emphasis omitted).
325. Id. at 130; see also Vattel, supra note 17, at *155–69 (describing obligation to
respect perfect rights of others to govern within their own domains).
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clearly invade the sovereign rights of another nation, the Court read it to
respect those rights, and thereby protected the United States from conflicts that Congress had not plainly authorized. When Congress clearly
intended to take action that risked foreign conflict, however, the Court
enforced congressional directives as written.
a. Reading Unclear Acts of Congress to Respect Perfect Rights. — The famous 1804 case, Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy,326 exemplifies the
Court’s practice of interpreting unclear congressional directives to respect perfect rights recognized under the law of nations.327 During the
undeclared hostilities with France, Congress enacted the Non-Intercourse
Act of 1800, prohibiting commercial intercourse between residents of the
United States and residents of any French territory.328 In The Charming
Betsy, the Court held that this Act did not authorize seizure of an
American-built vessel that an American captain sold at a Dutch Island to
an American-born Danish burgher, who proceeded to carry the vessel for
trade to a French island.329 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court,
began by observing that a federal statute “ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and
consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect
neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country.”330 He determined that the Act did not plainly
express such an intent: “If it was intended that any American vessel sold
to a neutral should, in the possession of that neutral, be liable to the
commercial disabilities imposed on her while she belonged to citizens of
the United States, such extraordinary intent ought to have been plainly
expressed.”331 By applying this canon of construction, Marshall ensured
that Congress, rather than the Court, would determine whether the
United States should risk foreign conflict by interfering with perfect
rights under the law of nations to engage in neutral commerce.332 Unless and until Congress clearly manifested its intent to interfere with such
rights, the Court would not risk imputing to Congress such a major foreign policy decision.
b. Upholding Clear Congressional Derogations from the Law of Nations. —
When, however, Congress enacted clear laws generating or risking con326. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
327. For an earlier example, see Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 29–32 (1801).
328. Federal Non-intercourse Act, ch. 10, § 1, 2 Stat. 7, 8 (1800) (expired 1801).
329. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 64–65, 120–21.
330. Id. at 118.
331. Id. at 119 (emphasis omitted).
332. See Vattel, supra note 17, at *336–37 (recognizing perfect right of neutral nation
to engage in neutral trade). Curtis Bradley has argued that, as a matter of separation of
powers, courts should adhere to The Charming Betsy canon, inter alia, to generally avoid
putting “the United States in violation of international law contrary to the wishes of the
political branches.” Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of
Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 Geo. L.J. 479, 525–26
(1998).
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flict, the Court recognized a duty on its part to enforce such directives
notwithstanding their deviation from background rules of the law of nations. For example, in Bas v. Tingy,333 decided in 1800, the Court applied
a federal statute suspending the law of nations in some respects and regulating salvage rights in ships or goods “retaken from the enemy.”334 One
question presented was whether France, with whom the United States was
engaged in the “Quasi-War,” was an “enemy” under the statute.335 Justice
Chase observed that “[t]here are four acts, authorised by our government, that are demonstrative of a state of war.”336 After enumerating
these acts, he explained that “[t]his suspension of the law of nations, this
right of capture and re-capture, can only be authorised by an act of the
government, which is, in itself, an act of hostility.”337 Chase went on to
enforce the congressional directive, as did each of the other Justices.338
Similarly, in The Schooner Adeline, the Court applied an act of
Congress specifying the value of a ship’s cargo that recaptors were entitled to recover as salvage.339 The recaptors argued that the Court should
assess value according to the law of nations, which provided a greater
amount than the statute. The statute, they argued, was “an unreasonable
departure from an universal usage founded on justice and common utility.”340 The Court rejected this argument, following the express language
of the statute: “The statute is expressed in clear and unambiguous
terms . . . . We cannot interpose a limitation or qualification upon the
terms which the legislature has not itself imposed.”341
3. The Ascendancy of the Allocation of Powers Approach. — In the tumultuous early decades of the nineteenth century, the Court came to link
more expressly the ideas discussed in the preceding sections—that courts
should enforce perfect rights under the law of nations unless and until
Congress clearly derogated from them—with the constitutional structure.
Specifically, the Court recognized that the Constitution allocates to the
political branches, not courts, the powers to recognize foreign nations
and to risk bilateral conflict with such nations by interfering with their
perfect rights.
333. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
334. Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 24, § 7, 1 Stat. 709, 716 (repealed 1800).
335. Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 37.
336. Id. at 43–44 (recounting congressional authorization to resist attempted search
by French vessel, capture any vessel attempting to compel search, recapture seized
American vessel, and capture any armed French vessel).
337. Id. at 44.
338. Id.
339. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244 (1815).
340. Id. at 279–80 (argument of counsel).
341. Id. at 287 (Story, J.). Conversely, of course, Congress could grant greater
protection to foreign sovereign interests than the law of nations provided. See, e.g., The
Thomas Gibbons, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 421, 428 (1814) (“The right of capture is entirely
derived from the law . . . . It is a limited right, which is subject to all the restraints which the
legislature has imposed, and is to be exercised in the manner which its wisdom has
prescribed.”).
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Rose v. Himely 342 decided in 1808, illustrates the Court’s emerging
practice of linking respect for the rights of foreign sovereigns to the
Constitution’s allocation of powers. A French privateer captured cargo in
international waters that the original owner had shipped from the French
colony of Santo Domingo.343 The privateer took the cargo to Cuba and
sold it to a purchaser who, in turn, brought it to South Carolina. The
original owner filed a libel there to recover his goods. While this action
was pending, a tribunal sitting in Santo Domingo pronounced a sentence
of condemnation in absentia, and the purchaser defended his title on
this basis.344 The question before the Court was whether U.S. courts
must give effect to the foreign judgment.
Before answering this question, the Court deemed it necessary to
consider “the relative situation of St. Domingo and France.”345 It was
important to the Court, as a preliminary matter, to identify the sovereign
whose rights were at issue: The question whether the United States had
recognized a breakaway territory as a sovereign nation was analytically antecedent to the question whether the Court must uphold its rights under
the law of nations. Santo Domingo had been a colony of France and had
declared its independence. At the time of suit, however, “France still asserted her claim of sovereignty, and had employed a military force in
support of that claim.”346 Invoking Vattel, the purchaser argued that
Santo Domingo, “having declared itself a sovereign state, and having thus
far maintained its sovereignty by arms, must be considered and treated by
other nations as sovereign in fact.”347 The Court rejected this argument
on the ground that it is for the government rather than its courts to decide whether and when to recognize a colony as a sovereign nation:
But the language of [Vattel] is obviously addressed to sovereigns, not to courts. It is for governments to decide whether
they will consider St. Domingo as an independent nation, and
until such decision shall be made, or France shall relinquish her
claim, courts of justice must consider the ancient state of things
as remaining unaltered, and the sovereign power of France over
that colony as still subsisting.348
The reason for this ruling was that judicial recognition of Santo
Domingo as an independent nation—while France still claimed sovereignty—would be regarded by France as a violation of “that exclusive dominion which every nation possesses within its own territory.”349 Accordingly, decisions regarding when and how to recognize Santo Domingo,
342. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808), overruled in part by Hudson v. Guestier, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 281 (1810).
343. Id. at 241–42.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 272 (emphasis omitted).
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 274.
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like the original decision to recognize France, must be made by the political branches rather than the courts.350 In a subsequent case, Marshall
elaborated the allocation of powers rationale underlying this conclusion:
[These questions] belong more properly to those who can declare what the law shall be; who can place the nation in such a
position with respect to foreign powers as to their own judgment
shall appear wise; to whom are entrusted all its foreign relations;
than to that tribunal whose power as well as duty is confined to
the application of the rule which the legislature may prescribe
for it.351
While thus upholding the territorial sovereignty of France as the
properly recognized nation, Rose v. Himely also illustrates the limits of
such sovereignty. Had the French privateer taken the captured cargo to a
French tribunal and obtained a sentence of condemnation, U.S. courts
would have applied the law of nations to foreclose reexamination of its
judgment.352 In this case, however, the Court stressed that the ship “was
captured more than ten leagues from the coast of St. Domingo, [and] was
never carried within the jurisdiction of the tribunal of that colony.”353
Under these circumstances, the sentence rendered by that court while
the goods were in South Carolina constituted an exercise of extraterritorial “jurisdiction which, according to the law of nations, its sovereign
could not confer.”354 Because the court of Santo Domingo “had no jurisdiction,” the Court reasoned, “the proceedings are coram non judice, and
must be disregarded.”355
The Court’s reliance on the Constitution’s allocation of powers was
also evident in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,356 decided in 1812—
the same year the Court repudiated federal common law crimes.357 A
federal court had permitted the original owners of a French warship
found in the port of Philadelphia to libel the vessel on the grounds that
French nationals had “violently and forcibly taken” the ship from them
on the high seas “in violation of the rights of the libellants, and of the law
of nations,” and that “no sentence or decree of condemnation had been
pronounced against her, by any [French] court of competent jurisdiction.”358 The question was “whether an American citizen can assert, in an
350. “No doctrine [was] better established,” according to Justice Story, than that
sovereigns have exclusive authority to recognize new states that emerge from revolutions.
Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 324 (1818). “[U]ntil such recognition, either by
our own government, or the government to which the new state belonged, courts of justice
are bound to consider the ancient state of things as remaining unaltered.” Id.
351. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634 (1818).
352. Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 276 (“If the court of St. Domingo had jurisdiction of
the case, its sentence is conclusive.”).
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
357. See supra notes 285–289 and accompanying text.
358. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 117.
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American court, a title to an armed national vessel [of another country],
found within the waters of the United States.”359 The Court answered
“no,” finding it to be a “principle of public law, that national ships of war,
entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception, are to be
considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its
jurisdiction.”360
Significantly, the opinion made clear that this immunity was a consequence of the Constitution’s allocation of foreign relations powers. The
exemption for foreign warships in the United States, like diplomatic immunity, could not derive its “validity from an external source” because
the “jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.”361 Thus, it “must be traced up to the consent of the
nation itself”362 in conformity with “those principles of national and municipal law by which it ought to be regulated.”363 In this case, the Court
suggested that the United States’s consent could be implied from the
practice of nations and could be destroyed only by “the sovereign power
of the nation.”364
This “sovereign power” rested with the political branches, not the
courts. This meant that warships were immune from judicial process, unless and until the political branches decided otherwise. Chief Justice
Marshall acknowledged that, “[w]ithout doubt, the sovereign of the place
is capable of destroying” the immunity suggested by the law of nations.365
“He may claim and exercise jurisdiction either by employing force, or by
subjecting such vessels to the ordinary tribunals.”366 The first method
involves the use of military force, and the second involves the exercise of
legislative power. In no case, however, could the nation’s courts disregard the implied immunity of foreign warships on their own.
Marshall went even further. To ensure that the political branches,
not the courts, make the decision to risk foreign conflict by invading the
rights of foreign sovereigns, the opinion imposed a clear statement rule
similar to the one employed in The Charming Betsy: “But until such power
[to destroy implied immunity] be exerted in a manner not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be considered as having imparted to the
ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction, which it would be a breach of faith to
exercise.”367 That the decision rested on the allocation of powers draws
additional support from Marshall’s suggestion “that the sovereign power
of the nation is alone competent to avenge wrongs committed by a sover359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 135.
at 145–46.
at 136.
at 135–36.
at 146.
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eign, that the questions to which such wrongs give birth are rather questions of policy than of law, [and] that they are for diplomatic, rather than
legal discussion.”368
The Court’s holding that the United States could deviate from the
practice of nations, but only on the basis of clear instructions by the political branches, is in accord with its refusal in Peters to adjudicate an alleged
violation of neutral rights on the ground that the law of nations precluded another country’s courts from interfering with the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the capturing country’s prize courts.369 In both
cases, the Court refused to determine whether captures of American vessels by French vessels violated the neutral rights of the United States
under the law of nations, instead applying principles that upheld the prerogatives of the political branches by avoiding conflict with France.
There is, however, one potentially significant difference between
these decisions. Peters applied a rule (the exclusive territorial jurisdiction
of prize courts) derived from a perfect right (the exclusive territorial sovereignty of states). By contrast, The Schooner Exchange applied a practice
of nations (the immunity of foreign warships) that went beyond clearly
defined perfect rights.370 In both cases, however, the Constitution’s allocation of powers favored judicial application of the rule in question because departure could have led to war. Peters upheld the Constitution’s
allocation of war powers by respecting perfect rights because any violation of such rights would have given France just cause for war. Although
The Schooner Exchange did not involve an established perfect right, it ap-

368. Id. The Court similarly acknowledged the political branches’ power to depart
from the law of nations in Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191 (1815).
During the War of 1812, the Court considered whether it should condemn, as enemy
property, produce that a Dane had shipped on a British vessel from Santa Cruz, a Danish
island that Britain had subdued. Id. at 195. In an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, the
Court held that condemnation was proper even though Denmark was not an enemy
country. Under the law of nations as enforced in British courts, the soil produce of the
island became British, and thus enemy property, when Britain took control of the island.
Id. at 197. The Court proceeded to adopt this rule for the United States. Marshall
explained that “[t]he law of nations is the great source from which we derive those rules,
respecting belligerent and neutral rights, which are recognized by all civilized and
commercial states throughout Europe and America.” Id. at 198. It was appropriate for the
United States to adopt this rule because, “[t]he United States having, at one time, formed a
component part of the British empire, their prize law was our prize law.” Id. Though
“principles [of the law of nations] will be differently understood by different nations under
different circumstances,” British prize law “continued to be our prize law, so far as it was
adapted to our circumstances and was not varied by the power which was capable of
changing it.” Id. That power belonged not to the courts, but to the political branches.
369. See supra notes 319–325 and accompanying text (describing Peters).
370. The Schooner Exchange did, however, describe the immunity that it accorded
foreign warships as analogous to the immunity of foreign ministers, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at
145–46, a perfect right in Vattel’s lexicon, Vattel, supra note 17, at *452–64. Nonetheless,
Vattel did not explicitly describe the former immunity as a perfect right.
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plied a customary immunity just as important to the peace of nations.371
Indeed, counsel for the United States warned that “[i]f the courts of the
United States should exercise such a jurisdiction it will amount to a judicial declaration of war.”372 Thus, an essential part of the Court’s rationale for following the practice of nations in The Schooner Exchange was that
the Constitution assigns responsibility to the political branches, not the
courts, to determine whether the United States should take action likely
to provoke war with another nation.373
The War of 1812 generated a flurry of significant prize cases in the
Supreme Court. The Act of Congress declaring war against Great Britain
authorized the President to issue commissions to privateers to cruise
against British vessels and goods.374 In a subsequent act, Congress required any American vessel leaving the United States for a foreign port to
give a bond with security that it would not trade with enemies of the
United States.375 In the next few years, the Supreme Court resolved the
legality of several captures made by privateers pursuant to the declaration
of war and presidential commissions. It enforced the congressional directive of conflict, but respected the prerogatives of Congress to limit the
degree of conflict by carrying the directive no further than Congress had
clearly provided in light of the background principles of the law of nations against which Congress had legislated.376
371. The Court explained that interference with a sovereign’s public armed ship, like
interference with a public minister, “cannot take place, without affecting his power and his
dignity.” The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 144.
372. Id. at 126.
373. Because the Court’s decision rested on the Constitution’s allocation of powers,
The Schooner Exchange suggests that states—like federal courts—are precluded from
denying immunity to French warships. In addition to implicating federal war powers,
failure to uphold immunity arguably would have undermined U.S. recognition of France.
As the Court explained in another case, the judiciary must respect the sovereign rights of a
foreign state because “[t]o him all the departments of the government make but one
sovereignty.” The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 299 (1822). Under this
theory, a violation of such rights by either the federal judiciary or the states would usurp
powers assigned to the political branches. See Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 74,
at 1300–06, 1308–09, 1319 (explaining application of the law of nations is sometimes
necessary to preserve constitutional authority of federal political branches to conduct
foreign relations).
374. Act of June 18, 1812, ch. 102, 2 Stat. 755.
375. Act of July 6, 1812, ch. 129, § 1, 2 Stat. 778, 778–79 (repealed 1815).
376. For example, The Rapid considered whether Congress had authorized capture of
an American vessel engaged in trade with the enemy. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155, 160 (1814).
Because the vessel qualified as belligerent under background principles of the law of
nations, the Court found the capture to be lawful. Id. at 163. Based on these principles,
the Court proceeded to decide in several other 1814 cases whether vessels captured by
commissioned American privateers were belligerent (and thus liable to lawful capture)
under the law of nations. See The Grotius, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 456, 460 (1814) (finding
case to differ “in no material respect from that of the Joseph”); The Joseph, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 451, 454–56 (1814) (upholding capture under The Rapid and The Alexander and
explaining that captures may be made on high seas or within territorial limits of the United
States); The Hiram, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 444, 451 (1814) (“Upon the whole, the Court is of
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One of the most important decisions from this period is Brown v.
United States.377 It provides an interesting contrast to The Schooner
Exchange insofar as Brown held unlawful a confiscation of enemy property—that the law of nations permitted—on the ground that Congress had
not authorized it. The Court considered whether the U.S. Attorney for
the District of Massachusetts could lawfully confiscate British property
(550 tons of pine timber scheduled to be shipped from the United States
to Great Britain) found within the United States at the commencement
of hostilities between the United States and Britain.378 Apparently without the President’s knowledge or consent, the U.S. Attorney filed a libel
to condemn the timber as enemy property.379
Chief Justice Marshall had “no doubt” that the United States had
“power” to confiscate this property under the law of nations: “That war
gives to the sovereign full right to take the persons and confiscate the
property of the enemy wherever found, is conceded.”380 That the United
States had power to confiscate the property, however, was insufficient to
sustain the confiscation.381 Congress had to exercise that power to make
it lawful. Since Congress had not done so, Marshall feared that judicial
condemnation of the property would usurp political authority vested by
the Constitution in Congress.382
Marshall expressly rejected the argument that the principle of the
law of nations that subjects enemy property to confiscation “constitutes a
rule which acts directly upon the thing itself by its own force, and not
through the sovereign power.”383 War “is not an absolute confiscation of
this property, but simply confers the right of confiscation” upon the sovereign.384 In other words, the custom under the law of nations that a
nation may confiscate enemy property during war
opinion that there is no substantial difference between this case and that of the
Julia . . . .”); The St. Lawrence, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 434, 444 (1814) (“The St. Lawrence was
certainly guilty of trading with the enemy; and, being taken on her way from one of his
ports to the United States, she is liable, on that ground, to be confiscated as prize of
war . . . .”); The Sally, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 382, 383 (1814) (“This case cannot be
distinguished from that of the Rapid.”); The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 297–99,
315–16 (1814) (holding that capture of property by American privateers was unlawful if
American citizens, who had settled in Great Britain, had shipped property before learning
of war’s outbreak and showed intent to return to United States); The Aurora, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 203, 219–20 (1814) (finding The Julia to control); The Julia, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
181, 190 (1814) (holding that use of enemy’s license or protection on voyage to neutral
country subjects vessel and goods to lawful capture); The Alexander, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
169, 179 (1814) (“The principles settled in the case of the Rapid decides this cause so far as
respects the character of the Alexander and her cargo.”).
377. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
378. Id. at 121–23.
379. Id. at 121–22.
380. Id. at 122.
381. Id. at 123.
382. Id. at 129.
383. Id. at 128.
384. Id. at 123.
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is a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his will.
The rule, like other precepts of morality, of humanity, and even
of wisdom, is addressed to the judgment of the sovereign; and
although it cannot be disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it
may be disregarded.
The rule is, in its nature, flexible. It is subject to infinite
modification. It is not an immutable rule of law, but depends
on political considerations which may continually vary.385
Under the Constitution, Marshall continued, it rests with Congress,
not courts, to make the sovereign determination whether the United
States should confiscate enemy property during war: “[F]rom the structure of our government, proceedings to condemn the property of an enemy found within our territory at the declaration of war, can be sustained
only upon the principle that they are instituted in execution of some existing law . . . .”386 “Like all other questions of policy,” the question
whether to confiscate enemy property found within the United States, “is
proper for the consideration of a department which can modify it at will;
not for the consideration of a department which can pursue only the law
as it is written. It is proper for the consideration of the legislature, not of
the executive or judiciary.”387 Thus, “until that will shall be expressed, no
power of condemnation can exist in the Court.”388
Finally, Marshall determined that Congress’s declaration of war did
not, in itself, “authorize proceedings against the persons or property of
the enemy found, at the time, within the territory.”389 Contrasting the
confiscation of enemy property found within the United States with that
captured on the high seas, he noted how the declaration of war specifically authorized the President to commission privateers and make general reprisals against British vessels and goods.390 This seizure, however,
was not made by a commissioned privateer, nor had the U.S. Attorney
acted “under the authority of letters of marque and reprisal.”391 Indeed,
Marshall specifically found that the U.S. Attorney did not make the
seizure “under any instructions from the president of the United
States.”392 Accordingly, since “the power of confiscating enemy property
is in the legislature, and . . . the legislature has not yet declared its will to
confiscate property which was within our territory at the declaration of
385. Id. at 128.
386. Id. at 123.
387. Id. at 129.
388. Id. at 123.
389. Id. at 126.
390. Id. at 127.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 121–22. Marshall suggests here that the declaration of war may have
empowered the President to formally authorize seizures through letters of marque and
reprisal or some other form of instruction, but had not so empowered U.S. Attorneys
acting without a formal instruction from the President.
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war,” the courts were without authority to issue a sentence of
condemnation.393
Fairly read, Brown rests exclusively on a principle of constitutional
allocation of powers—namely, that the political branches must determine
the extent to which the United States will engage in, or escalate, hostilities with foreign nations. In Brown, unlike prior cases, the law of nations
was not integral to the constitutional analysis. The Schooner Exchange, for
example, reserved to Congress the power to create or escalate bilateral
foreign conflict by authorizing an act that the law of nations prohibited
(disregarding foreign warship immunity).394 Brown, however, reserved to
Congress the power to create or escalate foreign conflict by engaging in
an act that the law of nations permitted (confiscating enemy property).
The Schooner Exchange Court preserved congressional authority through
judicial enforcement of a principle of the law of nations; the Brown Court
preserved congressional authority by declining to exercise a sovereign
prerogative under the law of nations. In both cases, the Court sought to
uphold the Constitution’s allocation of powers by preserving a foreign
relations power that it believed rested exclusively with Congress.
Lastly, in 1815, the Court resolved one of the most famous War of
1812 capture cases, The Nereide,395 by reference to the perfect rights of
sovereigns and the Constitution’s allocation of powers. The question
presented was whether it was lawful for a commissioned United States
privateer to capture goods belonging to a neutral (a Spaniard) that the
privateer found on an enemy (English) vessel.396 According to the
Court, “a neutral has a perfect right to transport his goods in a belliger393. Id. at 129. In effect, since the declaration of war did not plainly authorize a U.S.
Attorney to confiscate enemy property found in the United States in these circumstances,
the Court applied a clear statement rule akin to that of The Charming Betsy, supra notes
326–332 and accompanying text, to avoid foreign conflict that Congress had not expressly
authorized. In dissent, Justice Story disagreed with Chief Justice Marshall’s conclusion that
the declaration of war had not authorized the confiscation. Justice Story first explained
that he found the confiscation of enemy property located within the United States to be
lawful under the law of nations. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 139–45 (Story, J.,
dissenting). He next asked “whether congress (for with them rests the sovereignty of the
nation as to the right of making war, and declaring its limits and effects) have authorized
the seizure of enemies’ property afloat in our ports.” Id. at 145. He found that the Act did
authorize it, and that even if it did not do so expressly, the President has “a right to employ
all the usual and customary means acknowledged in war, to carry it into effect.” Id. Thus,
“there being no limitation in the act, it seems to follow that the executive may authorize
the capture of all enemies’ property, wherever, by the law of nations, it may be lawfully
seized.” Id. Justice Story, like Chief Justice Marshall, did not question the authority of the
political branches in foreign affairs or assert that federal courts should take the lead in
incorporating any of the law of nations as federal law. He simply believed, unlike Chief
Justice Marshall, that Congress had authorized the seizure in question and that the
President had authority to effectuate it absent congressional limitation.
394. See supra notes 356–373 and accompanying text.
395. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815).
396. Id. at 388–90.
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ent vessel.”397 Although “[b]elligerents have a full and perfect right to
capture enemy goods and articles going to their enemy,” the law of nations rendered neutral goods exempt from capture.398 The captors
nonetheless argued, among other things, that since “Spain . . . would subject American property, under similar circumstances, to confiscation, . . .
the property, claimed by Spanish subjects in this case, ought to be condemed [sic] as prize of war.”399 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court, emphatically rejected this argument on the ground that it was not
the judiciary’s place to decide whether or how to retaliate against a foreign government for its breach of the law of nations:
[T]he court is decidedly of opinion that reciprocating to the
subjects of a nation, or retaliating on them, its unjust proceedings towards our citizens, is a political not a legal measure. It is
for the consideration of the government not of its courts. The
degree and the kind of retaliation depend entirely on considerations foreign to this tribunal. It may be the policy of the nation
to avenge its wrongs in a manner having no affinity to the injury
sustained, or it may be its policy to recede from its full rights
and not to avenge them at all. It is not for its courts to interfere
with the proceedings of the nation and to thwart its views. It is
not for us to depart from the beaten track prescribed for us, and
to tread the devious and intricate path of politics.400
Marshall continued: “If it be the will of the government to apply to Spain
any rule respecting captures which Spain is supposed to apply to us, the
government will manifest that will by passing an act for the purpose.”401
He concluded that until “such an act be passed, the Court is bound by the
law of nations which is a part of the law of the land.”402
Scholars have cited this passage as evidence that federal courts
should take the lead over the political branches in generally adopting
principles of the law of nations as jurisdiction-creating, preemptive federal law.403 The language cannot bear the full weight of this argument.
In context, Marshall was observing that federal courts must adhere to per397. Id. at 426.
398. Id. at 427. Like the Court, Vattel described neutral nations to “enjoy perfect
liberty to trade” in “goods which have no relation to war . . . . An attempt to interrupt or
put a stop to this trade would be a violation of the rights of neutral nations, a flagrant
injury to them.” Vattel, supra note 17, at *336–37 (emphasis omitted).
399. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 422.
400. Id. at 422–23. In Ware v. Hylton, Virginia debtors similarly argued that Great
Britain’s failure to carry out certain provisions of the Treaty of Paris absolved them of their
contractual obligations. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 202 (1796). The Court rejected this
argument and ultimately enforced the debt, holding that the Treaty of Paris preempted
Virginia’s debt confiscation statute. Id. at 237, 245.
401. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 423.
402. Id.
403. See Koh, supra note 2, at 1825 n.8, 1827–28 (“It seems unlikely that the Chief
Justice would have understood the Supreme Court to be ‘bound by the law of nations’ had
that law merely represented the law of the several states.”); Stephens, supra note 2, at
394–95 & n.8 (“[I]f international law is part of federal law, it is the law of the land, binding
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fect rights under the law of nations in order to preserve the constitutional
prerogatives of the political branches and avoid creating conflict with
other nations. Indeed, Marshall proceeded in just this fashion in The
Nereide. He described as a “universally recognized . . . rule of the law of
nations” that “a neutral may lawfully put his goods on board a belligerent
ship, for conveyance on the ocean.”404 By upholding this principle and
restoring captured goods to their Spanish owner absent congressional direction to the contrary, the Court respected Spain’s neutral rights and
refrained from generating bilateral foreign conflict that the political
branches had not sanctioned.
***
In the infancy of the United States, both potential and actual foreign
conflicts generated numerous occasions for federal courts to consider the
status of the law of nations within the American federal system. At the
time, the law of nations governing state-state relations respected the perfect rights of independent sovereigns, and thus tended to avoid war
among nations. In the first two decades following ratification, the Court
explained how upholding perfect rights—sometimes in preference to
other principles of the law of nations that would constrain foreign sovereignty—kept the judiciary from generating such conflict. With the repudiation of federal common law crimes and the onset of the prize cases
that arose during the War of 1812, the Court came to use the language of
allocation of powers to describe judicial adherence to rules drawn from
the law of nations. The Court inferred from the Constitution’s allocation
of foreign relations powers to the political branches that it should apply
principles of the law of nations when necessary to avoid war with other
nations. Because prize cases, in particular, often dealt with the perfect
rights of territorial sovereignty and neutrality, the Court came to view
adherence to the law of nations in prize cases as “a necessary appendage
to the power of war, and negotiation with foreign nations.”405
In such cases, the Court enforced perfect rights as an implicit requirement of the Constitution’s allocation of recognition and war powers
to the political branches. By respecting such rights, the Court avoided
giving nations reason to wage hostilities against the United States, sustaining the powers of the political branches to determine whether and to
on the states pursuant to the supremacy clause; and state courts are bound to follow
federal court decisions as to its meaning.”).
404. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 425. This rule is “founded on the plain and
simple principle that the property of a friend remains his property wherever it may be
found.” Id.
405. Story, supra note 209, § 866; see also La Amistad de Rues, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
385, 390–91 (1820) (stating that failure of “neutral prize tribunals” to exercise their
jurisdiction according to the law of nations would create “irritations and animosities, and
very soon embark neutral nations in all the controversies and hostilities of the conflicting
parties”).
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what extent the United States should be at war or peace. This structural
inference was grounded in background assumptions about the relationship between the prerogatives of the political branches in foreign affairs
and the rights of sovereignty recognized by the law of nations. In almost
all cases in which the Court applied the law of nations to uphold the
Constitution’s allocation of powers, it invoked a law of nations principle
recognized as a perfect right—the violation of which gave a sovereign just
cause for war.406 In the English system, Blackstone described judicial enforcement of such rights as essential to sustaining the prerogatives of the
Crown in foreign relations.407 It is evident that the Marshall Court likewise considered judicial enforcement of the perfect rights of sovereigns as
essential to sustaining the constitutional prerogatives of the political
branches in foreign affairs.
None of these cases expressly involved preemption of state law; in
each, the federal court exercised exclusive jurisdiction, and state law did
not purport to provide a conflicting rule of decision. Moreover, none
involved a question of arising under jurisdiction. But insofar as allocation
of powers supplied a rule of decision in these cases, there are implications for preemption and arising under jurisdiction. The Constitution
preempts conflicting state law, and presumably would have governed as
the rule of decision had these cases originally been brought in state court
or had they involved conflicting state law. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to catalogue those principles of the law of nations that the Founders would have deemed essential to upholding the constitutional allocation of powers. Suffice it to say that each case in which the Court applied
the law of nations involved what was understood to be a right whose violation could lead to war or escalate an existing war. In theory, the constitutional rule of decision that applied to certain of these cases could have
been a predicate for arising under jurisdiction (had Congress authorized
it), but alternative bases authorized by Congress were generally adequate
at the time to confer jurisdiction in such cases.408
406. Even in the earlier cases of the 1790s, when the Court applied principles of the
law of nations to keep the United States out of conflict without expressly referencing
separation of powers, the Court did so by respecting the perfect rights of sovereigns.
407. See supra Part I.C.
408. It is important to bear in mind that many, if not most, cases falling under other
heads of Article III jurisdiction—including those likely to implicate the law of nations—
would not have involved this constitutional rule of decision. Countless cases that fell
within non-arising under Article III jurisdiction and in which the law of nations could
provide a rule of decision in federal court would not have involved separation of powers.
Cases involving the law merchant and private law maritime would not generally involve
separation of powers, see supra notes 290–291 and accompanying text, nor necessarily
would cases involving envoys, see Vattel, supra note 17, at *461 (“They are not public
ministers, and consequently not under the protection of the law of nations.”), or
foreigners, see, e.g., id. at *172 (“[F]oreigners who commit faults are to be punished
according to the laws of the country.”); id. at *173 (“[D]isputes that may arise . . . between
a foreigner and a citizen, are to be determined . . . according to the laws of the place.”).
Thus, the Arising Under Clause would not subsume the other categories of Article III
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Some contemporary scholars have characterized customary international law as federal common law because federal courts appear to
“make” its rules and state courts are bound to follow such rules even in
the face of contrary state law. In reality, the Supreme Court has not considered itself free to adopt or abandon these rules at will. Rather, as this
Part explains, the Court has continued to apply the traditional perfect
rights of sovereigns (or their modern counterparts) as a way of implementing the Constitution’s allocation of powers over foreign relations. In
other words, the Court’s application of these rules does not rest on an
interpretation of any lawmaking powers it purportedly enjoys under Article III, but on its interpretation of Congress’s and the President’s exclusive powers under Articles I and II. From this perspective, it follows that
states must adhere to these rules not because they are supreme in and of
themselves, but because they uphold the Constitution’s assignment of foreign affairs powers to the federal political branches and its corresponding
denial of such powers to the states. As in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, adherence to such rules has functioned as an incident of recognition and preserved amicable bilateral relations between the United
States and other nations, leaving to the political branches the often complex policy questions of whether, how, and when to depart from such
rules.
This Part describes how, from the early decades of the Republic and
across changing eras of American legal thought, the Court has continued
to enforce what were traditionally considered perfect rights of sovereign
nations (or close analogues) as a means of upholding key allocation of
powers principles. Viewing judicial adherence to such rights as necessary
to uphold the Constitution’s allocation of powers provides a persuasive
constitutional basis for the Court’s most important decisions from the
founding to the present.
A. Pre-Erie Enforcement of the Law of Nations
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Court continued to employ
principles of the law of nations as it had in the first two decades. It applied much of the law of nations without considering its source, and adjurisdiction, but there would be some overlap—a common and unremarkable
phenomenon. That some cases would qualify for federal jurisdiction under both the
Arising Under Clause and another head of Article III jurisdiction was an unavoidable (and
unremarkable) feature of delineating categories of cases in which federal court jurisdiction
would serve the purposes of union. For example, it is unremarkable that cases between
citizens of different states might fall under both diversity and arising under jurisdiction if
governed by, for instance, a federal statute; or that cases to which the United States is a
party might fall under both party-based and arising under jurisdiction if governed by
federal law. It would have been impossible for the Framers to devise mutually exclusive
categories of federal jurisdiction and there is no apparent reason why they would have
attempted to do so.
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hered to traditional rules of state-state relations as a means of upholding
federal allocation of powers. Continuing well beyond the nation’s first
decades, federal courts applied the law of nations in countless cases over
which they had jurisdiction without pausing to consider its source. Two
situations in which such law was frequently applied were diversity cases
and cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction involving private rights.
In neither type of case did courts generally regard the law of nations as
constituting part of “the Laws of the United States” within the meaning of
either Article III’s Arising Under or Article VI’s Supremacy Clauses. In
this respect, these judges were in accord with the Framers.409
For example, in the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court did not
consider the law merchant—a branch of the law of nations—to be part of
“the Laws of the United States” within the meaning of the Supremacy
Clause. Swift v. Tyson applied the law merchant to resolve a commercial
dispute between citizens from different states.410 Neither federal nor
state courts considered the other’s decisions on questions of general law
to be binding in subsequent cases.411 In Swift itself, of course, the Court
declared that even assuming “the doctrine to be fully settled in New
York,” it was necessary for the Court “to express [its] own opinion of the
true result of the commercial law.”412 Shortly thereafter, New York’s
highest court was urged to follow “the opinion of Mr. Justice Story in the
recent case of Swift v. Tyson,” but the court declined the invitation and
described the Supreme Court as a “tribunal, whose decisions are not of
paramount authority” on questions of general law.413 If the law merchant
had been considered part of “the Laws of the United States,” then New
York courts would not have been free to disregard Swift and their decisions would have provided a basis for Supreme Court review. In fact, as
the Erie Court later explained, the federal courts’ inability to bind state
courts is what “made rights enjoyed under the unwritten ‘general law’
vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the
federal court.”414 Moreover, Swift expressly acknowledged, as English
courts long had, that general commercial law did not supplant local variations and usages.415 In the pre-Erie era, federal courts with jurisdiction
409. See supra Part II.C.
410. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Of course, jurisdiction in cases applying the Swift
doctrine was based on diversity of citizenship rather than federal question jurisdiction.
411. See Fletcher, General Common Law, supra note 74, at 1538–54 (describing cases
in which that principle operated). See generally Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General
Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 506 (2006) (explaining that “state and federal judges
exercised independent judgment” on questions of general law around time of Swift).
When the Supreme Court began “federalizing” aspects of general law in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some state courts came to describe Supreme
Court determinations of general federal law as binding. See Bellia, Federal Common Law,
supra note 291, at 897–900.
412. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18, 19.
413. Stalker v. M’Donald, 6 Hill 93, 95, 112 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
414. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1938).
415. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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(whether based on admiralty, diversity, or some other category) simply
followed the law of nations in cases where it applied and typically saw no
need to explain the precise source of such law.
By contrast, in prize cases—and other cases involving the perfect
rights of foreign nations—federal courts frequently applied rules derived
from the law of nations as a way of upholding the constitutional prerogatives of Congress and the President to recognize foreign states and maintain amicable relations with such states.416 This practice continued beyond the early years of the Republic. The Paquete Habana 417 provides an
important example. During the Spanish-American War, U.S. naval forces
established a blockade near Cuba and captured two Spanish fishing vessels attempting to reach Havana. The vessels were brought to Key West
where the district court, exercising admiralty jurisdiction, held that the
vessels and cargoes were prizes of war.418 The question before the
Supreme Court was whether “the fishing smacks were subject to capture
by the armed vessels of the United States during the recent war.”419 The
Court chose to adhere to the “ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international
law” that coastal fishing vessels are exempt from capture.420
After reviewing the practice of nations (including the United
States),421 the Court explained in a famous passage that it would follow
such law in the absence of any “controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision” to the contrary.422 According to the Court:
International law is a part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination. For this purpose, where
there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act
or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works
of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and
416. See supra Part III. The Civil War gave rise to an interesting variation. In The
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862), the Supreme Court famously upheld President
Lincoln’s decision to blockade Southern ports following the commencement of the Civil
War, even though Congress had not declared war and no foreign power was involved. The
Court invoked the law of nations and relied on Vattel for the proposition that during a civil
war, the opposing parties must be considered as “‘stand[ing] in precisely the same
predicament as two nations who engage in a contest and have recourse to arms.’” Id. at
667 (quoting Vattel, supra note 17, at *425).
417. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
418. Id. at 714.
419. Id. at 686.
420. Id.
421. Among other things, the Court pointed to early American adherence to that rule
in its treaties of 1785, 1799, and 1828 with Prussia. Although noting that England had
failed to follow the rule “during the wars of the French Revolution,” id. at 691, the Court
stressed that “[i]n the war with Mexico, in 1846, the United States [subsequently]
recognized the exemption of coast fishing boats from capture,” id. at 696.
422. Id. at 700.
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experience have made themselves particularly well acquainted
with the subjects of which they treat.423
After reviewing the works of jurists and commentators in some detail, the
Court was convinced that “it is an established rule of international law,
founded on considerations of humanity . . . [and] mutual convenience . . . that coast fishing vessels . . . are exempt from capture as prize
of war.”424
Although the Court spent many pages demonstrating the existence
and contours of this rule, it offered only a single sentence directly addressing why the rule applied to this case: “This rule of international law
is one which prize courts administering the law of nations are bound to
take judicial notice of, and to give effect to, in the absence of any treaty or
other public act of their own government in relation to the matter.”425
The Court’s failure to provide further elaboration has rendered its rationale notoriously opaque. Considered in the context of the precedent
upon which it relied and its discussion of executive power, however, the
opinion seems to fit comfortably within the allocation of powers framework established by the Court’s earlier decisions.
Indeed, the Court analogized the case to Brown v. United States 426 :
Brown “appears to us to repel any inference that coast fishing vessels,
which are exempt by the general consent of civilized nations from capture, and which no act of Congress or order of the President has expressly authorized to be taken and confiscated, must be condemned by a
prize court.”427 This statement suggests that—as in Brown—courts
should defer to the political branches regarding conduct that foreign nations would regard as an escalation of hostilities. Although the modern
immunity of fishing boats was not a traditionally identified perfect right,
it served the same function by establishing a rule of conduct whose violation could escalate a war. Under our Constitution, Congress, and perhaps the President, might decide to subject fishing boats to confiscation.
But this would be a major foreign policy decision of the type that could
have expanded or prolonged hostilities with Spain. As the Court recognized in Brown, Congress rather than the courts should control the decision to escalate hostilities, even in the context of a declared war: “Like all
other questions of policy, it is proper for the consideration of a department which can modify it at will; not for the consideration of a department which can pursue only the law as it is written.”428
The Paquete Habana’s reliance on Brown comports with its subsequent
discussion of executive power. Proponents of treating international law
as federal common law have long puzzled over the Court’s repeated sug423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.

Id.
Id. at 708.
Id.
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 711.
Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 128–29.
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gestions that the President could override customary international law.429
If international law truly is a part of federal law, then how could the
President alone instruct the judiciary to disregard such law? The Court’s
position is less puzzling once one realizes that, under Brown and other
nineteenth century prize cases like The Schooner Exchange, rules derived
from the law of nations did not apply of their own force, but instead as
default rules necessary to preserve the Constitution’s assignment of foreign relations powers. From this perspective, in the absence of political
branch authorization, the judiciary could depart from rules whose violation would trigger or escalate a war only by usurping powers assigned to
Congress and the President. On the other hand, a “controlling executive . . . act” taken by the President pursuant to his foreign relations powers or congressional mandate430 could authorize—or indeed require—
courts to depart from the law of nations. The President might decide to
withdraw our ambassador, expel Spain’s ambassador, or otherwise limit
recognition during the war. Alternatively, Congress might authorize the
President, in prosecuting the war, to capture fishing vessels otherwise exempt from capture under the law of nations.
It is not our purpose here to delineate the respective powers of the
political branches in foreign relations. Suffice it to say that the most reasonable reading of The Paquete Habana, considered as a whole and in historical context, is that the Court applied a rule of the law of nations analogous to a perfect right in order to preserve for the political branches the
decision to escalate hostilities beyond what they had previously authorized. Historically, perfect rights served as a place holder for the underlying constitutional principle that the political branches, rather than the
courts, are responsible for deciding whether to take action that might
draw the nation into war, or escalate an existing war. Over time, that
principle unsurprisingly accommodated new applications as circumstances changed and the world grew more complex. But the underlying
principle—rooted in the Constitution’s allocation of powers—remained
constant.
B. Erie and the Rise of Legal Positivism
Although allocation of powers provided a rationale for upholding
perfect rights and their modern counterparts in cases like The Schooner
Exchange and The Paquete Habana, it had less obvious relevance to other
branches of the law of nations, such as the law merchant. As explained,
nineteenth century federal and state courts applied the law merchant as a
form of general law without deciding whether such law was state or fed429. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of
Customary International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 321,
324 (1986) (summarizing commentators’ “extensive disagreement as to whether the
President may violate international law”).
430. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
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eral. Swift v. Tyson 431 is the most famous example. The allocation of
powers rationale we identify did not require courts to apply private customary international law such as the law merchant or the law maritime.
Such law did not define the attributes of state sovereignty, and failure to
adhere to it did not give nations just cause for war. To the contrary, U.S.
states and foreign nations voluntarily chose to apply private customary
international law as a mutually beneficial means of promoting interstate
and international commerce. Adherence served the same ends as compliance with modern counterparts such as the Uniform Commercial
Code and analogous international agreements.
From the beginning, the Supreme Court’s approach to private international law was different than its approach to the perfect rights of sovereigns under the law of nations. In diversity cases, the Court famously
applied general commercial law unless, as required by section 34 of the
Judiciary Act, there were contrary “local statutes” or “long-established local customs having the force of laws.”432 The Court applied the law
merchant in these cases not because such law applied of its own force, but
(at least when it decided Swift) because state common law incorporated
such law. The Swift Court made this point explicitly when it observed
“that the Courts of New York do not found their decisions . . . upon any
local statute, or positive, fixed or ancient local usage: but they deduce
the doctrine from the general principles of commercial law.”433 So long
as state courts continued to apply general (as opposed to local) law in
commercial cases, federal courts sitting in diversity were free to do the
same.434 At the same time, of course, states were free to depart from the
law merchant, as they eventually did. Unlike a decision to override perfect rights, such a departure did not implicate the Constitution’s allocation of foreign affairs powers.
Federal courts’ adherence to general law in areas now clearly governed by state law, however, did raise distinct constitutional problems. In
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the Court overturned the Swift doctrine as
“‘an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the Courts of the United
States.’”435 States had long since abandoned adherence to the general
law merchant in commercial cases,436 and federal courts had expanded
the concept of “general law” to include historically local areas of law such
431. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
432. Id. at 18.
433. Id.
434. See Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1286–87.
435. 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown
& Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
436. See Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 1289, 1293–94
(2007) [hereinafter Clark, Constitutional Source] (describing how “state courts gradually
abandoned reliance on the general law merchant in favor of localized commercial
doctrines” and “state legislatures enacted specific statutes to govern commercial
transactions within their jurisdiction”).
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as torts and even some property rights.437 According to the Court, the
federal courts’ continued application of general law in diversity cases was
untenable because, in the absence of enacted federal law, state law provides the rule of decision in federal courts. General law was neither enacted federal law nor state law. Quoting Justice Holmes, the Court endorsed a fundamental tenet of legal positivism that “‘law in the sense in
which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it.’”438 Accordingly, “[e]xcept in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the state.”439
Erie immediately raised questions about whether federal courts could
continue to apply rules derived from the law of nations in preference to
state law. A year after the decision, Philip Jessup argued in a three-page
article that “Mr. Justice Brandeis was surely not thinking of international
law when he wrote his dictum.”440 According to Jessup, “[a]ny question
of applying international law in our courts involves the foreign relations
of the United States and can thus be brought within a federal power.”441
In his view, “[i]t would be as unsound as it would be unwise to make our
state courts our ultimate authority for pronouncing the rules of international law.”442 Although Jessup’s assessment makes an important point
about federalism and the allocation of foreign affairs power to the federal
government, he failed to provide a full account of why adherence to at
least some rules derived from international law is consistent with—and
even required by—the Constitution’s allocation of powers. As discussed
below in Part IV.C, such an explanation is available at least with respect to
the traditional perfect rights of sovereigns under the law of nations.
The post-Erie status of customary international law was soon tested in
Bergman v. De Sieyes, a diversity case removed to federal court.443
437. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 75–76 (detailing expansion of Swift doctrine); Tony Freyer,
Harmony & Dissonance: The Swift & Erie Cases in American Federalism 71 (1981) (“[T]he
federal judiciary continued to enlarge the body of general law so that by 1890 it included
some 26 doctrines.”).
438. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
439. Id. at 78. One of us has recently argued that, properly understood, Erie rests on
the negative implication of the Supremacy Clause—that is, state law applies unless
preempted by “the supreme Law of the Land.” See Clark, Constitutional Source, supra
note 436, at 1306–11 (arguing Erie Court “presuppose[d] that federal courts have no
independent lawmaking authority to displace state law”); see also Henry P. Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
11–12 (1975) (“[Erie] recognizes that federal judicial power to displace state law is not
coextensive with the scope of dormant congressional power. Rather, the Court must point
to some source, such as a statute, treaty, or constitutional provision, as authority for the
creation of substantive federal law.” (citations omitted)).
440. Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to
International Law, 33 Am. J. Int’l L. 740, 743 (1939).
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948).
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Bergman, a New Yorker, sued De Sieyes, a citizen and accredited minister
of France, by serving him as he passed through New York en route to his
post in Bolivia.444 De Sieyes asserted diplomatic immunity under traditional principles of international law; at the time, there was no federal
statute or treaty conferring such immunity in U.S. courts.445 Thus, the
question was whether a federal court, sitting in diversity, should apply
state, federal, or international law to this defense. The Second Circuit,
through Judge Learned Hand, held that because service occurred while
the case was in state court, “the law of New York determines its validity,
and, although the courts of that state look to international law as a source
of New York law, their interpretation of international law is controlling
upon us.”446 After surveying New York decisions and secondary sources,
the court concluded that “we are disposed to believe that the courts of
New York would today hold that a diplomat in transitu would be entitled
to the same immunity as a diplomat in situ.”447
To those who saw international law as a form of federal law, “[i]t
made no sense that questions of international law should be treated as
questions of state rather than federal law; that they could be determined
independently, finally and differently by the courts of fifty states,” and
that such “determinations . . . by state courts were not reviewable by the
Supreme Court” as federal questions.448 Hand did leave open the possibility that a state’s departure from international law could give rise to a
federal question: “Whether an avowed refusal to accept a well-established
doctrine of international law, or a plain misapprehension of it, would
present a federal question we need not consider, for neither is present
here.”449 The court did not need to reach this question because it found
444. Id. at 360–61. This case was not one “affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls” within the meaning of Article III because such jurisdiction only
applies to ambassadors, ministers, and consuls assigned to the United States by a foreign
sovereign. See Ex Parte Gruber, 269 U.S. 302, 303 (1925) (noting Article III, Section 2,
Clause 2 “refers to diplomatic and consular representatives accredited to the United States
by foreign powers”).
445. Congress eventually enacted the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, which
incorporates the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and confers immunity on
diplomats assigned to the United States as well as diplomats in transit. 22 U.S.C.
§§ 254a–254e (2000).
446. Bergman, 170 F.2d at 361.
447. Id. at 363.
448. Henkin, supra note 3, at 1559; see also id. at 1558 (“So great a judge as Learned
Hand apparently assumed that international law was part of state common law for this
purpose and that a federal court in diversity cases had to apply international law as
determined by the courts of the state in which it sat.”); Note, International Law—
Diplomatic Immunity—Applicability of the Rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins to International
Law, 33 Minn. L. Rev. 540, 540 (1948) (noting “disturbing language used by Judge
Learned Hand” in Bergman and arguing that international law should be part of federal
common law).
449. Bergman, 170 F.2d at 361.
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that state law incorporated the customary international law of diplomatic
immunity.450
Bergman raises the constitutional question whether, in the absence of
an applicable federal statute or treaty, state law may override the perfect
rights of recognized foreign states traditionally provided by the law of
nations.451 On the one hand, states might retain this power (at least regarding matters within their territory), with the political branches free to
supersede unsatisfactory state law by statute or treaty. On the other hand,
states might be required to adhere to perfect rights for the same reason
that federal courts must: to preserve the Constitution’s allocation of foreign relations powers and to avoid provoking war. The decision by the
President and the Senate to recognize France by exchanging ambassadors fairly implies that the United States—all of them—recognize France
as an independent state entitled to exercise all of its perfect rights under
the law of nations. One of these rights was the ability to deploy ambassadors with diplomatic immunity, and this right was broad enough to include diplomats in transit. Under these circumstances, exercising state
court jurisdiction over France’s ambassador in transit would interfere
with France’s perfect rights, fail to effectuate U.S. recognition of France,
and risk serious conflict. Thus, one could readily conclude under historical practice and judicial precedent that the Constitution’s allocation of
powers requires state courts—no less than federal courts—to uphold the
prerogatives of the political branches by respecting the immunity of ambassadors in transit.
C. Sabbatino and the Allocation of Powers Approach
The Supreme Court could have followed Judge Hand’s approach
when it confronted the status of the act of state doctrine several years
later in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.452 Instead, it squarely held
that the doctrine’s scope and applicability must be treated as questions of
federal law binding in both state and federal courts. Although the Court
justified this conclusion in part by pointing to the existence of several
“enclaves of federal judge-made law which bind the States,”453 the decision is best understood overall as a consequence of the Constitution’s
allocation of foreign affairs powers to the political branches of the federal
government.454 Sabbatino arose out of Cuba’s decision to nationalize
450. Id.
451. See generally Ramsey, supra note 4, at 350–51 (rejecting federal courts’ ability
“to enforce the law of nations in conflict with state law”).
452. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The act of state doctrine establishes that the courts of one
country will not reexamine the acts of a recognized foreign sovereign taken within its own
territory. Id. at 401.
453. Id. at 426.
454. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 439, at 3 (identifying examples of “constitutional
common law” inspired and authorized by various constitutional provisions, but “subject to
amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress”).
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sugar companies located in Cuba and owned in part by American citizens. The suit asked the judiciary to decide whether the original owner
or the Cuban government was entitled to the proceeds of sugar sold by
Cuba.455 The answer turned on the validity of Cuba’s expropriation.
The Supreme Court held that Cuba was entitled to the proceeds because,
as a matter of federal law, courts may:
not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own
territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a
treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling
legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law.456
The Court acknowledged that it might have avoided the question
whether the case was governed by state or federal law because “New York
has enunciated the act of state doctrine in terms that echo those of federal decisions.”457 Nonetheless, it concluded that “the scope of the act of
state doctrine must be determined according to federal law.”458
In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution required
federal and state courts both to adhere to a rule based on traditional
notions of territorial sovereignty (the act of state doctrine),459 and to disregard a more recent rule of customary international law curtailing territorial sovereignty (the proffered prohibition against discriminatory, un455. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398.
456. Id. at 428.
457. Id. at 424.
458. Id. at 427. The Court’s requirement that a foreign sovereign government be
“extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit,” id. at 428, appears to tie the act
of state doctrine to the political branches’ power to send and receive ambassadors. As one
of us recently explained: “Recognition acknowledges on behalf of the United States that a
foreign state is entitled to all the rights traditionally associated with sovereign states,
including sovereignty within its own territory. The act of state doctrine implements
recognition by upholding this sovereignty.” Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole
Executive Agreements, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1573, 1651 (2007).
459. Rules like the act of state doctrine have deep roots in the traditional perfect right
of territorial sovereignty under the law of nations. See supra notes 67–68 and
accompanying text. For example, in The Santissima Trinidad the Court considered whether
U.S. courts must recognize as a public ship a vessel commissioned by the government of
Buenos Aires, even though no bill of sale was produced to support transfer of ownership
from the original owner. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 334–36 (1822). The Court held that a
duly authenticated commission “imports absolute verity.” Id. at 336. The Court also spoke
in broad terms suggestive of the act of state doctrine:
Nor will the Courts of a foreign country inquire into the means by which the title
to the property has been acquired. It would be to exert the right of examining
into the validity of the acts of the foreign sovereign, and to sit in judgment upon
them in cases where he has not conceded the jurisdiction, and where it would be
inconsistent with his own supremacy.
Id. The Court explained that this “has been the settled practice between nations,” and that
it “cannot be broken in upon, without endangering the peace and repose, as well of
neutral as of belligerent sovereigns.” Id.
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compensated takings).460 Both aspects of the holding were necessary to
the decision and to uphold the constitutional prerogatives of the political
branches to recognize foreign states and maintain amicable bilateral relations. Although commentators often cite Sabbatino for the proposition
that customary international law itself qualifies as a kind of binding federal law,461 the actual decision refutes this proposition. First, the act of
state doctrine did not reflect the current status of customary international
law. As the Court observed, “international law does not require application of the [act of state] doctrine.”462 Rather, “[m]ost of the countries
rendering decisions on the subject fail to follow the rule rigidly.”463
Since Sabbatino did require courts—as a matter of federal law—to apply
the doctrine strictly, it gave foreign sovereigns greater protection than they
enjoyed under customary international law at the time.
Second, the Court concluded “that the act of state doctrine is applicable even if international law has been violated.”464 As they had in the
lower courts, the original owners urged the Court to recognize an exception to the doctrine on the ground that uncompensated takings by foreign sovereigns violate modern norms of customary international law.465
The Court rejected this invitation without pausing to determine whether
international law in fact prohibited such conduct. In its view, recognition
of any such exception—and the judiciary’s consequent enforcement of
international law against foreign sovereigns—would contradict deepseated concepts of territorial sovereignty and interfere with the
President’s conduct of foreign relations:
Such decisions would, if the acts involved were declared invalid,
often be likely to give offense to the expropriating country;
since the concept of territorial sovereignty is so deep seated, any
state may resent the refusal of the courts of another sovereign to
accord validity to acts within its territorial borders. Piecemeal
dispositions of this sort involving the probability of affront to
another state could seriously interfere with negotiations being
carried on by the Executive Branch and might prevent or
render less favorable the terms of an agreement that could otherwise be reached. Relations with third countries which have
engaged in similar expropriations would not be immune from
effect.466
In other words, the Court understood the Constitution’s allocation
of powers over foreign affairs to preclude both federal and state courts
from second guessing the acts of a recognized foreign state taken within
460.
461.
issue.”).
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.

See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 429 (citing authorities).
See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 3, at 1559–61 (“Sabbatino . . . effectively resolved the
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421.
Id.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 406–07, 428–30.
Id. at 431–32.
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its own territory even if necessary to enforce a new and emerging norm of
customary international law designed to restrict territorial sovereignty.
On this view, the Constitution requires courts to leave efforts to enforce
such norms—in traditional terms, to interfere with the perfect rights of
foreign sovereigns—to the political branches. This is the necessary import of the Court’s adherence to the act of state doctrine “in its traditional formulation.”467 That formulation preserves the political
branches’ authority to accept or reject Cuba’s territorial sovereignty by
“preclud[ing] the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of
the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its
own territory.”468
The Sabbatino opinion states these conclusions in various ways. It observes that the “text of the Constitution does not require the act of state
doctrine” in the sense of “irrevocably remov[ing] from the judiciary the
capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of state.”469 Congress could,
in other words, decide to abrogate the doctrine and direct courts to scrutinize disfavored acts of state.470 The Court went on to explain, however,
that “[t]he act of state doctrine does . . . have ‘constitutional’ underpinnings”471 rooted in the allocation of foreign relations powers to the political branches. The doctrine “arises out of the basic relationships between
branches of government in a system of separation of powers,”472 and “its
continuing vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political branches of the
Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.”473 The act of state
doctrine reflects the judiciary’s sense “that its engagement in the task of
passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than
further this country’s pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole.”474 In other words, it reflects “a basic choice
regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National
Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community.”475 Because the act of state doctrine reflects the
467. Id. at 401.
468. Id. (emphasis added).
469. Id. at 423.
470. Congress took just this course following Sabbatino. In 1964, Congress enacted
the second Hickenlooper Amendment, which limited the act of state doctrine in cases like
Sabbatino. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 (Hickenlooper Amendment), Pub. L. No. 88633, §§ 301(d)(4), 620(e)(2), 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e)(2) (2000)). In fact, in Sabbatino itself on remand, the judiciary applied the
statute retroactively to defeat Cuba’s claim to the proceeds from expropriated sugar.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 178 (2d Cir. 1967).
471. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
472. Id. at 423.
473. Id. at 427–28.
474. Id. at 423.
475. Id. at 425. For wrongs created by foreign acts of state, the Court suggested that
the remedy lies not with the judiciary, but “‘along the channels of diplomacy’” conducted
by the executive. Id. at 418 (quoting Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468, 471 (1937)).
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Constitution’s allocation of certain exclusive powers to the political
branches, the Constitution does not require courts to follow the doctrine
regardless of the wishes of the political branches. When the political
branches choose to abrogate the doctrine, the Constitution permits—indeed, requires—courts to reject its application. In the absence of such
abrogation, however, “the act of state doctrine is a principle of decision
binding on federal and state courts alike,”476 and is best understood as “a
consequence of domestic separation of powers.”477
The Supreme Court’s decision to embrace a traditional rule rooted
in perfect territorial rights and reject a modern rule curtailing such rights
follows the pattern found in key decisions from the early republic, such as
United States v. Peters 478 and The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.479 In
these cases, as in Sabbatino, the Court upheld perfect rights (or close analogues) to shield the conduct of a recognized foreign sovereign from judicial scrutiny, even though the claimant in each case argued that the
challenged conduct violated distinct rights under the law of nations.480
Although The Schooner Exchange tied its holding to the separation of powers, the Sabbatino Court offered a more comprehensive constitutional rationale tied to both separation of powers and federalism.
Sabbatino also highlights an important point about the interaction of
perfect rights and the Constitution over time. The Court has been willing
to add to, but not subtract from, the list of sovereignty-respecting default
rules that courts are required to apply in order to uphold the
Constitution’s allocation of powers. In The Schooner Exchange and The
Paquette Habana, the Court augmented the traditional list of perfect rights
with later-emerging customs favoring foreign sovereigns—namely, the immunity of foreign warships and fishing boats. Judicial adherence to these
customs upheld the Constitution’s allocation of powers in much the same
476. Id. at 427.
477. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990). This
understanding of the act of state doctrine has potential implications for the so-called
Bernstein exception, under which courts sometimes relax the act of state doctrine at the
request of the State Department. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche
Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375, 375–76 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam) (amending
previous ruling in same case, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), after State Department expressly
endorsed American courts passing judgment on acts of former Nazi regime). When
Congress and the President abrogate the doctrine by statute, courts do not hesitate to
follow their directions. See supra note 470 and accompanying text (explaining that
Congress can adopt exceptions to act of state doctrine). When the executive branch
unilaterally attempts to abrogate the doctrine, however, courts may conclude that such
action encroaches on the powers reserved by the Constitution jointly to the political
branches. Thus, although a plurality of the Supreme Court endorsed the Bernstein
exception in First National City Bank of New York v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S.
759, 767–70 (1972) (plurality opinion), a majority of the Justices rejected it, id. at 773
(Douglas, J., concurring); id. (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 776–77 (Brennan, J., joined by
Stewart, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
478. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795).
479. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
480. See supra notes 319–325, 356–373 and accompanying text.
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way as judicial adherence to the original perfect rights of sovereigns. In
both cases, the rule in question avoided judicial initiation or escalation of
hostilities, and thus preserved political branch control over war and
peace. In Sabbatino, however, the Court refused to depart from a traditional rule of territorial sovereignty (historically regarded as a perfect
right), even though the Court acknowledged that the community of nations no longer recognized absolute territorial sovereignty. The Court
based this refusal on the Constitution’s allocation of powers as well. In
effect, the Court held that any decision to abandon the traditional perfect rights of recognized foreign sovereigns would foster resentment and
thus should be made by the political branches rather than the courts or
the states.481
Sabbatino’s method of constitutional interpretation harkens back to
the Marshall Court’s respect for perfect rights as a means of preserving
the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches. This approach
relies on history and structure. As discussed, the Constitution assigns the
power to send and receive ambassadors to the President and the Senate.
This power cannot be understood without reference to what it meant to
recognize another nation at the founding. Recognition implied that the
United States would respect the rights of the state in question under the
law of nations. The political branches might decide to contradict those
rights in the exercise of their foreign affairs powers, but the decision to
do so was theirs alone under the Constitution. Judicial respect for perfect
rights also kept the courts from triggering a war. Violation of a foreign
nation’s perfect rights gave it just cause for war. Because the Constitution
vests control over war and peace in the political branches, courts and
states must respect perfect rights in order to avoid usurping political
branch authority.
This understanding of the Constitution relies on “the method of inference from the structures and relationships created by the constitution.”482 Although subject to abuse if taken too far,483 this method of
constitutional interpretation has deep roots in our constitutional tradition going back at least to the Marshall Court. In this case, there is a tight
fit between the constitutional text allocating foreign relations and war
powers to Congress and the President, the structural inference that these
powers are exclusive, and the requirement that courts and states adhere
481. The Court also seemed to tie the constitutional incorporation of international
law to the importance of the issue to foreign relations. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428 (“It is
also evident that some aspects of international law touch much more sharply on national
nerves than do others; the less important the implications of an issue are for our foreign
relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political branches.”).
482. Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law 7 (1969).
483. See Michael C. Dorf, Interpretive Holism and the Structural Method, or How
Charles Black Might Have Thought About Campaign Finance Reform and Congressional
Timidity, 92 Geo. L.J. 833, 844 (2004) (“[T]he structural method may be dangerously
open-ended . . . .”); Adrian Vermuele & Ernest A. Young, Commentary, Hercules, Herbert,
and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 730, 731–32 (2000).
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to traditional perfect rights or appropriate analogues as a means of upholding these powers. Under these circumstances, there is little risk that
the Court simply engaged in open-ended judicial lawmaking in cases like
The Paquete Habana and Sabbatino.484 Rather, in each case, the Court applied a rule favoring a foreign sovereign in order to respect the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches under the Constitution.
By the end of the twentieth century, the United States had codified
many rules based on perfect rights under the law of nations. Important
examples include the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976485 and
the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978.486 Nonetheless, some rules of this
kind remain uncodified. The most prominent example is head of state
immunity—a traditional perfect right of sovereigns under the law of nations. As long ago as 1812, Chief Justice Marshall observed that “the
whole civilized world” recognizes “the exemption of the person of the
sovereign from arrest or detention within a foreign territory.”487 Then, as
now, recognizing such immunity in U.S. courts is a matter of constitutional importance, at least with respect to foreign states recognized by the
United States. Sabbatino teaches that this immunity should be treated as a
default rule that state and federal courts must follow in order to preserve
the Constitution’s allocation of powers.
D. Implications and Potential Objections
This Article has attempted to situate the status of customary international law in U.S. courts in its proper historical and constitutional context. This context is essential to understanding how and why federal
courts have used international law to decide actual cases over the past two
centuries. This account, however, does not attempt to resolve all questions regarding the status of customary international law in U.S. courts.
For example, we take no position on how courts should treat numerous
modern rules of customary international law unknown to the Founders.
Unlike the traditional law of nations, modern customary international law
increasingly seeks to restrict how nations treat their own citizens in their
own territory. Part of the current debate is whether U.S. courts should
unilaterally incorporate such restrictions into U.S. law or wait for the political branches to do so through constitutional lawmaking procedures.
A narrow view of the historical practice suggests that courts should
wait. The Constitution was drafted at a time when this kind of international law did not exist, and thus there is no clear historical or constitutional basis for requiring courts to apply such law as a means of imple484. See Clark, Role of Structure, supra note 307, at 723–25 (explaining proper use of
structure in constitutional interpretation).
485. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.)
(codifying foreign sovereign immunity).
486. Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 254(a)–(e)
(2000)) (codifying diplomatic immunity).
487. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
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menting the Constitution’s allocation of powers. More specifically, the
political branches’ recognition and war powers are not as directly implicated by the U.S. failure to adhere to modern rules of customary international law restricting how nations treat their citizens as they are by the
failure to follow traditional sovereignty-respecting rules. As the Sabbatino
Court explained, “since the concept of territorial sovereignty is so deep
seated, any state may resent the refusal of the courts of another sovereign
to accord validity to acts within its territorial borders.”488 Although such
resentment may no longer provide just cause for war, it could adversely
affect U.S. foreign relations with the country in question. As Sabbatino
demonstrates, courts might choose to uphold traditional notions of territorial sovereignty—and preempt state interference with such sovereignty—as a means of preserving the foreign relations prerogatives of the
political branches.489
On the other hand, a broad view of the Constitution’s allocation of
foreign affairs powers might lead courts to incorporate elements of modern customary international law on their own. On this view, the judiciary’s failure to adhere to such law could undermine the reputation of the
United States in the international community and interfere with foreign
relations more generally. Thus, courts might seek to preserve amicable
relations by applying customary international law at least until the political branches direct otherwise. This approach shifts the focus from preservation of amicable bilateral relations to preservation of amicable multilateral relations.490 Of course, these simple accounts mask a number of
complex interpretive questions involving changed circumstances, translation, separation of powers, and federalism. Our point here is simply that
the historical and structural paradigms we have identified do not, in and
of themselves, definitively resolve all questions confronting courts today.
Finally, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain 491 neither contradicts our historical account nor definitively resolves the status of customary international law in U.S. courts. In that
488. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432 (1964).
489. In Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), the Supreme Court arguably went
further by invalidating an Oregon statute prohibiting nonresident aliens from inheriting
property from Oregon residents unless the alien could prove, among other things, that his
or her inheritance would not be confiscated, in whole or in part, by a foreign government.
The Court reasoned that the Oregon statute “has a direct impact upon foreign relations
and may well adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with those
problems.” Id. at 441. Although Zschernig is often criticized for permitting dormant
foreign affairs preemption of state law, see, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts,
Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1617, 1631 (1997), the Court’s decision may
be limited to instances in which a state attempts to use its law to interfere with the future
acts of a foreign state taken within its own territory. On this account, the rationale for
constitutional preemption in Zschernig is an extension of the rationale for preemption in
Sabbatino.
490. Preemption of state law on this ground would rely on even broader dormant
foreign affairs preemption than that suggested in Zschernig.
491. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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case, the Court addressed whether the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) authorized a Mexican national to bring a particular cause of action arising
under customary international law in federal court.492 Originally enacted
as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS provides that “[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”493 In Sosa, the Court held that this provision is jurisdictional and would have been understood by the First Congress to provide a
“limited, implicit sanction” to federal courts to entertain common law
claims for a “handful” of international law violations—offenses against
ambassadors, violations of safe conducts, and piracy.494 Today, the Court
explained, “courts should require any claim [under the ATS] based on
the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms” that the Court
identified.495
Although scholars have debated the meaning of this opinion, it does
not call into question the practice we have described. First, the Sosa
Court did not hold that customary international law inherently qualifies
as a form of preemptive, jurisdiction-creating federal law.496 Rather, the
Court concluded that Congress effected a limited statutory incorporation
of the law of nations by enacting the ATS.497 Indeed, it appears implicit
in the Court’s opinion that, absent the ATS, there would be no colorable
basis for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over the claims at issue.498
Had the Court understood customary international law generally to be
federal common law, its careful parsing of the ATS would have been unnecessary in light of the availability of general statutory arising under ju492. Id. at 712.
493. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
494. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712, 720.
495. Id. at 725.
496. See Bradley et al., Sosa, supra note 167, at 889–96 (characterizing Sosa as
concluding that “although the ATS was not intended to create causes of action related to
CIL, it has the effect today of authorizing federal courts to recognize post-Erie federal
common law causes of action for a limited number of CIL violations”); cf. William A.
Fletcher, International Human Rights in American Courts, 93 Va. L. Rev. 653, 672 (2007)
(concluding that “part of the customary international law of human rights became federal
common law in Sosa in 2004”).
497. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
498. In the Court’s view, “the interaction between the ATS at the time of its
enactment and the ambient law of the era,” id. at 714, reveals that the First Congress
“meant to underwrite litigation of a narrow set of common law actions derived from the
law of nations,” id. at 721. By 1875, when Congress enacted general federal question
jurisdiction, the ambient law had changed and there is no indication that Congress meant
to authorize courts to hear any additional claims based on the law of nations. See id. at 731
n.19 (“Our position does not, as Justice Scalia suggests, imply that every grant of
jurisdiction to a federal court carries with it an opportunity to develop common law.”).
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risdiction.499 Second, the Court had no occasion to revisit the idea (implicit in opinions like The Schooner Exchange, The Nereide, and Sabbatino)
that the Constitution requires courts to enforce certain principles derived
from the law of nations to uphold the Constitution’s allocation of powers.
Rather, the Court’s analysis is simply inapposite to this idea, addressing
the distinct question whether the ATS sanctions federal adjudication of a
particular alleged violation of the law of nations.500
CONCLUSION
Commentators fundamentally disagree about the status of customary
international law in American courts. Proponents of the modern position claim that federal courts have power to enforce such law as supreme,
jurisdiction-conferring federal common law regardless of whether the
federal political branches have adopted it through constitutional lawmaking procedures. Proponents of the revisionist position claim that customary international law does not qualify as federal law absent such incorporation by the political branches. Both positions seek to draw support
from historical practice and the structure of the Constitution. But
neither adequately reflects the historical and structural context that has
consistently informed the Supreme Court’s resolution of the nation’s
most significant cases involving the law of nations. This Article recovers
this crucial lost context and, in the process, suggests a third way of understanding how portions of the law of nations interact with the federal system. Simply put, some aspects of the law of nations—the traditional perfect rights of sovereigns and close analogues—have functioned as
preemptive federal law because of the Constitution’s allocation of foreign
relations powers in Articles I and II. Courts have adhered to such rules
out of deference to the federal political branches, which—unlike the
courts—are charged with recognizing foreign states, conducting foreign
relations, and deciding questions of war and peace. As the Court has
recognized, both state and federal courts must adhere to these rules—
absent contrary instructions from the political branches—in order to preserve the exclusive authority of Congress and the President to make important foreign policy decisions on behalf of the nation. The implications of this analysis for the interaction of modern customary
international law and the federal system remain to be examined in detail.
Any such examination, however, must take account of the historical and
structural understandings recovered by this Article.
499. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (conferring jurisdiction upon district courts for “all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”).
500. To the extent that Sosa instructs courts to interpret the ATS in light of its
historical context, it seems likely that the First Congress adopted the ATS to redress
traditional violations of the law of nations such as the guarantee of safe conducts. See
Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 Colum. L. Rev.
830, 882 (2006) (arguing ATS was enacted because of concerns that harm done to British
subjects in violation of international law might disrupt trade and lead to war with Britain).

